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ABSTRACT 
 
In this dissertation the theory of solvency assessment for long-term insurers is reviewed and how 
it evolved.  Key international bodies and standards are identified and selected jurisdictions’ 
solvency frameworks are reviewed.  The South African framework required by legislation 
introduced in 1998 is compared to these standards.  Solvency capital requirements, valuation 
methods and risk management standards are the key areas considered.  The financial results of a 
model office according to the South African requirements are compared to the financial results 
modelled stochastically according to the identified international standards. 
 
It is shown that the South African framework does not meet international standards.  The key 
problem areas are the prescribed nature of the solvency capital requirement, the onerous 
treatment of policy cancellations and the treatment of new business. 
 
The role of actuaries in solvency assessment is also investigated.  South Africa’s statutory-
actuary role is compared with similar international roles.  It is concluded that although similar 
international roles, notably the appointed actuary of the UK, have evolved the role of the 
statutory actuary has remained the same. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In early 2010, the South African regulator of long-term insurance announced 
that the local solvency assessment framework would be replaced with a 
framework similar to the European framework commonly referred to as 
Solvency II.  At the time, Solvency II had not been implemented in Europe.  
The new framework would replace the one required by the Long Term 
Insurance Act, 1998
1
 (LTIA). A project, known as the solvency assessment 
and management (SAM) project, was initiated. The SAM project involved 
representatives from the Financial Services Board (FSB), long-term insurers, 
professional and industry bodies.  Since the early 2000s, other countries such 
as the UK, USA, Switzerland and Australia also have had major changes in 
their approaches to solvency assessment. 
 
1.1  Aim of Research 
 
In this dissertation the theory of solvency assessment of long-term insurers is 
investigated and how it evolved is analysed.  The key international bodies and 
standards are identified and selected jurisdictions’ solvency frameworks are 
reviewed.  The South African framework required by the LTIA is assessed by 
comparing it to these international standards through the comparison of 
solvency capital requirements and risk management standards.  Furthermore, 
the solvency position and profit recognition of a long-term insurer that writes 
only term-assurance policies are modelled according to the LTIA 
requirements.  These results are compared to the results modelled 
stochastically according to the identified international standards. 
 
Over the past decades, actuaries have played a key role in the solvency 
assessment of long-term insurers.  For developed countries most jurisdictions 
have reserved roles for actuaries in the solvency assessment framework.  
South Africa is no exception.  A statutory actuary is required by the LTIA.  
                                                          
1
 Act no. 52 of 1998 as amended, Republic of South Africa 
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The role of the statutory actuary is reviewed and compared to similar 
international roles.  
 
1.2  Outline of Content 
 
The theory of regulation is reviewed in Chapter 2.  The economic theories of 
regulation, regulation for long-term insurers and types of regulation are 
considered.  The chapter ends with the results of empirical studies and the 
effect of the global financial crisis of 2007. 
 
For long-term insurers the determination of solvency is less straight forward 
than for other companies.  This is mainly due to number of assumptions 
involved in the calculation of the value of policyholder liabilities.  In Chapter 
3 the definition of solvency and the meaning of solvency assessment are 
considered.  The development of solvency assessment over the past century in 
Europe is presented and discussed.   
 
The key international bodies that influence regulatory solvency frameworks 
are identified in Chapter 4, followed by a detailed consideration of local and 
other selected international solvency assessment frameworks in Chapters 5–
12.  In this part, the regulatory role of actuaries in solvency assessment is 
considered in Chapter 7.  South Africa’s statutory actuary role is compared 
with selected countries’ roles of actuaries in similar positions 
 
The South African solvency assessment framework is compared with 
international standards in Chapters 13–16. 
 
Conclusions and recommendations are given in Chapter 17.  
 
1.3 Methods 
 
The main content may be grouped into two parts.  The first part, Chapters 2–
12, gives an overview of the theory of regulation, solvency assessment, 
international standards and South Africa’s solvency framework.  This part 
consists of literature reviews.  These reviews include published and 
 14 
unpublished work.  It also includes references to professional guidance, 
standards and legislation. In Chapter 7 the role of the statutory actuary is 
considered and consists of a literature review and the results of a questionnaire 
sent by the South African regulator to selected countries’ insurance 
supervisors. 
 
The second part, Chapters 13–16, compares South Africa’s solvency 
assessment requirements to international requirements.  Two methods are 
used.  The first method introduces a scoring system whereby the South 
African solvency assessment framework is rated by reference to the 
international criteria.  The second method is the comparison of the financial 
results of a new long-term insurer modelled according to the local and 
international requirements.  For the purposes of this dissertation, the financial 
results according to local requirements are modelled with a deterministic 
model, while the financial results according to international requirements are 
modelled stochastically. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
REGULATION 
 
Worldwide, the long-term insurance sector is renowned for its high level of 
regulation.  Regulations exist for market conduct, financial arrangements, 
prices and many other areas.  Falkena et al. (2001) use the term ‘regulation’ in: 
 
“...a generic sense that encompasses regulation (the establishment of 
specific rules of behaviour), supervision (the more general observation 
of the behaviour of financial firms) and enforcement (ensuring the 
rules are obeyed).” 
 
Actuaries must be aware of these regulatory requirements, which are often 
constraints, in almost all disciplines in the long-term insurance industry.  For 
example, pricing actuaries need to be aware of market-conduct regulation, 
price limits and capital requirements.  Valuation actuaries must be cognisant to 
financial and reporting regulations.  Indeed, in South Africa statutory actuaries 
have an obligation to notify the regulator in certain circumstances when 
legislation is breached. 
 
This chapter firstly considers economic theory of regulation. Amongst others, 
reviews are made and conclusions are drawn from Booth (1997) and Klein 
(1995).  Next in this chapter, regulation for long-term insurers is considered.  
Finally, the approach to insurance regulation is discussed with reference to the 
benefits of a particular type of regulation, namely ‘contract regulation’. 
 
2.1 Economic Theory of Regulation 
 
Posner (1974) refers to economic regulation as: 
 
“taxes and subsidies of all sorts as well as to explicit legislative and 
administrative controls over rates, entry and other facets of economic 
activity.” 
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To protect its own benefit, Stigler (1973) argues that regulation is mainly 
sought by an industry.  Two alternative views exist.  The first view is that 
regulation is necessary to protect the public or sub-sections of the public.  The 
second view is that the political process is irrational and fraught with self-
interest of politicians. 
 
In this chapter more recent views are described on the theory of economic 
regulation with specific reference to the long-term insurance industry. 
 
2.1.1 Market socialism 
 
Booth (1997) defines ‘market socialism’ as the situation where the 
government owns productive resources.  Prices are set by government 
according to marginal cost.  In this sense, the government aims to simulate the 
outcome of an efficient market.  Lange (1936) argues that the central planner, 
such as a government, will have the ability to raise or cut prices in response to 
supply and demand.  In theory, the ‘kind central planner’ can therefore clear 
markets. 
 
Shleifer & Vishny (1994) divide the theory into ‘totalitarian socialism’ and 
‘democratic socialism’.  The former refers to the case where an ideal dictator, 
who is free from military and political challenges, is not concerned with 
unemployment, political competition or any other problems.  A strictly 
rational dictator would only be concerned with the maximisation of personal 
wealth, for example building monuments.  Shleifer & Vishny (1992) argued 
that shortages of goods occur because of the self-interested behaviour of the 
“ministry bureaucrats who set the planned prices and output”.  By creating 
shortages the managers or ministries could profit through bribes from rational 
consumers. 
 
In democratic socialism, on the other hand, the government is extremely 
responsive to the will of the people. Shleifer & Vishny (1994) argue that this 
model will not maximise economic efficiency.  Before an election for a new 
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government, the campaigning party will promise to serve the people and is 
likely to focus on popular themes.  As a result, even where a government is 
democratically elected, self-interest will eventually lead to government 
interventions. 
 
2.1.2 Freedom with publicity 
 
Booth (1997) states that in neo-classical economics, consumers react in an 
efficient way to prices and product quality given their budget constraints.  
Product quality for long-term insurance companies would include the ability to 
pay claims.  Under a standard set of assumptions, this model will maximise 
economic welfare. 
 
One of the key standard assumptions is perfect competition.  Where this 
assumption does not hold, this could be corrected by a so-called “freedom 
with publicity” regulatory framework.  This means that government forces 
disclosure of information that in theory will result in consumers’ rational 
behaviour that is consistent with behaviour in a competitive market. 
 
Regulatory disclosure is common in the long-term insurance industry.  In 
South Africa market-conduct and financial regulations that require disclosure 
exist.  The policyholder protection rules
2
 and the statutory actuary’s statement3 
are examples.  
 
Booth (unpublished) mentions that from 1870 to the mid 1990s this type of 
regulation had been closely followed by the United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland (UK) insurers.  The regulations do not necessarily 
prevent company failures because companies will make mistakes.  Insurance 
failure may result in consumers’ reassessing their risk or regulators’ 
reassessing the regulations.  An insurer failure is not necessarily a reason to 
                                                          
2
 Policyholder protection rules under the Long-term Insurance Act, Act no. 52 of 1998 as amended, 
Republic of South Africa 
3
 Companies Act, Act No. 61 of 1973, Republic of South Africa 
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increase regulation.  Over-regulation may stifle innovation and result in a sub-
optimal economy that does not maximise economic wealth. 
 
2.1.3 Public interest 
 
Public-interest theory states that a benevolent government can fix market 
imperfection through regulation.  These imperfections may be wider than for 
freedom with publicity.  According to public-interest theory there are various 
justifiable reasons for government intervention in insurance business.    Klein 
(2001) states that the owners of long-term insurers have a “diminished 
incentive to maintain a high level of safety.”  Booth (2007) asserts that this 
phenomenon is due to time inconsistency: 
 
“An agent (the insurer) makes a promise that it will prefer to break in 
the future.”   
 
Traditional reasons for insurance regulations are twofold.  Firstly, Klein 
(2002) explains that it is costly for consumers to assess the quality and price of 
services associated with the financial strength of the insurer. Secondly, 
insurers may engage in risky strategies that may result in inadequate prices.  
This may result in price competition where the insurance sector takes on risk 
at prices that are too low.  In the past, regulators typically introduced 
minimum price limits for products to prevent this occurrence. 
 
Regulators may introduce maximum price limits.  This may occur if there is 
not a competitive market or if consumer sophistication is insufficient. 
 
2.1.4 Public choice 
 
Public-choice theory explains the behaviour of those in government by 
considering their actions in an economic framework.  Klein (2002) states that 
economic theory suggests that self-interested regulators aim to maximise 
political support rather than maximising economic efficiency.  Regulators are 
government agencies.  They will therefore be influenced by the aims and 
 19 
ambitions of the ruling government.  Booth (1997) explains that in a neo-
classical economic framework a connection exists between success in 
promoting economic welfare and reward.  As explained by Klein (op. cit.), this 
connection does not exist for politicians in the development of regulations.  
One way of obtaining public support is through price regulation.  Numerous 
papers without any empirical evidence had been published to predict the 
possible effect of price regulation for insurance.  Danzon & Harrington 
(2001), however, showed empirically that price controls increase cost for 
worker’s compensation insurance.  They have shown that rate suppression 
increases the cost of claims that will lead to higher premiums contrary to the 
regulator’s initial intent.  These results were both economically and 
statistically significant. 
 
Consumer groups are expected to lobby for more regulations.  Self-interested 
regulators will aim to satisfy these pressures.  Referring to Meier (1988), Klein 
(2002) states that more regulation created this way negatively restricts the 
insurance industry in a way that does not promote industry interests.  An 
example of regulations that have been implemented due to consumer pressure 
is the use of gender as a factor in the calculation of insurance premiums and 
benefits in relation to insurance contracts in Europe from 21 December 2012.
4
 
 
Booth (unpublished) also refers to ‘capture theory’.  In this theory interest 
groups have control over policy makers that are responsible for the regulatory 
process.   Regulations may therefore develop for the perceived benefit of the 
interest groups. 
 
2.1.5 Austrian economics 
 
An overview of ‘Austrian economics’ is given by Booth (1997).  According to 
this theory a market never reaches the stage of an idealised model such as 
perfect competition.  There is a constant process of trial and error in search of 
the most efficient economy.  It is impossible for a regulator to have adequate 
                                                          
4
Press release no 12/11,1 March 2011, Court of Justice of the European Union, Test-Achats case 
 20 
information to improve the workings of the market.  In this environment 
failures will occur but should serve as part of the learning process.  The 
Austrian economists believe that a lightly regulated economy will not 
necessarily fall into a state of disorder. 
 
2.1.6 Market fundamentalism 
 
Soros (2009) refers to the term ‘market fundamentalism’ as the false belief 
that financial markets tend toward equilibrium and that random deviations can 
be attributed to external causes.  To the advantage of the owners and managers 
of financial capital, this theory has been used to justify the existence of 
deregulated markets. 
 
Avgouleas (2009) criticises the ‘fundamental assumption of modern financial 
theory’ that markets only move on the expectation of rational expectations, i.e. 
that asset prices are set by rational investors.  This criticism stems from 
behavioural finance theory which challenges two aspects, namely: 
 
 that certain observations cannot be explained by the assumption of 
rational behaviour; and 
 that the corrective actions of arbitrage trading are limited due to a 
number of restrictions. 
 
Stiglitz (2003) explains that the consequence of market fundamentalism is the 
existence of systemic risks.  These risks are often ignored because “markets 
are intended to solve almost all problems.”  As a result, international crises 
have become regular events.  
 
 
2.2 Regulation for Long-term Insurers 
 
Klein (1995) states that the two primary categories for insurance regulation are 
solvency regulation and market regulation.  The primary categories can be 
seen as protecting policyholders before and after entering into an insurance 
contract.  The objective of solvency regulation is to ensure that long-term 
 21 
insurers meet the regulatory standards and to notify the regulator if 
policyholder benefits may potentially be jeopardised.  Market regulation 
includes a wide range of activities such as premium rates, policy design and 
underwriting practices. 
 
Falkena et al. (2001) refers to two additional objectives of financial regulation, 
namely, securing systemic stability in the economy and ensuring institutional 
safety and soundness. Systemic stability encompasses a system where long-
term insurers can operate competitively and have access to appropriate liquid 
financial instruments to conduct their business.  Institutional safety and 
soundness include solvency and market regulation as described by Klein (op. 
cit.). 
 
2.2.1 Benefit and protection of policyholders 
 
The European Parliament has adopted a directive
5
 that lays down the rules of 
insurance business in the European Community.  Article 27 states that the 
main objective of supervision is the protection of policyholders and 
beneficiaries.  This statement covers many areas, such as general market 
conduct, financial stability, investor confidence and fair treatment in terms of 
company discretion on behalf of its stakeholders.  A critical aim is global 
financial stability. 
 
Short-term insurance products, health-insurance products and group-life 
products are usually transferable from the original insurer to other insurers
6
 
without the reduction of benefits of policyholders with no incurred claims.  
The policyholders at risk and in need of supervisory protection in case of an 
insurer failure are the ones with incurred claims.  Long-term insurance, on the 
other hand, may require the build-up of provisions from early durations of the 
policy to provide for benefits that may be payable at later durations. The build-
up of provisions of a long-term insurance contract depends on the nature of the 
insurance contract including an annuity.  Provisions are required for the 
                                                          
5
 General rules on the taking-up and pursuit of direct insurance and reinsurance, 2009 
6
 International Actuarial Association, A global framework for insurer solvency assessment, 2004, page 
10 
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savings element of endowment policies.  Guarantees such as level future 
premiums, future insurability, surrender values and investment return may also 
require the build-up of provisions from early durations of the policy. 
 
At inception, the full benefit of an insurance contract is payable in the future.  
Contingent benefits, such as a death benefit, may be payable after many years.  
This is unlike most goods and services where the benefit of the good or service 
is immediately available to the consumer, for example a hair-cut or food.  The 
misappropriation of policyholder funds may have serious implications for the 
long-term savings industry such as low levels of savings, loss of policyholder 
benefits in full or in part on failure of a company and loss of confidence by 
investors. 
 
Insurance products are generally more complex than other goods and services.  
There are various reasons for this complexity.  Life cover, for example, is 
often not a tangible commodity that consumers can instantly enjoy, but is 
rather a necessary evil often required by third parties such as banks to protect a 
loan.  However there are values that can be perceived by the consumer, such 
as the protection of dependants in the event of death of a breadwinner.  The 
variety and different features of products may also make it difficult to compare 
value, for example: 
 
 an individual-life cover product sold through an independent financial 
advisor that requires upfront medical evidence of the proposer’s state 
of health;  
 cover offered through a compulsory group scheme by an employer; 
and 
 credit life offered by a bank to cover a loan that requires no 
underwriting. 
  
Invalid comparisons with other financial products may also compromise the 
perceived value proposition of a long-term insurance product.  An example of 
an invalid comparison is the comparison of the surrender value of a whole-life 
policy during the first few years with the accumulated amount of the same 
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premiums in a bank account.  The consumer may inaccurately conclude that a 
bank account offers superior benefits if the cost of risk benefits and sales cost 
are ignored. 
 
Another complication to the consumer is the existence of various long-term 
insurance products where discretion is exercised by the long-term insurer.  
Areas of discretion include the level of surrender penalties charged on 
withdrawal of a contract and bonus allocations to with-profits policies.  
Consumer confidence may easily be damaged without adequate disclosure and 
transparency at different stages throughout the term of a policy.  Initiatives, 
such as the mandatory publication
7
 of a company’s “Principles and Practices 
of Financial Management” have been promoted by the Financial Services 
Board (FSB) to improve transparency.  
 
Uncertain terms of a contract may also be harmful to consumer confidence.  
Deferred underwriting such as the exclusion of pre-existing conditions at 
claim stage is an example.  Uncertainty may arise to the extent that a 
policyholder was aware of a medical condition or not. 
 
These issues can all be addressed through legislation to ensure the protection 
of policyholders and beneficiaries. 
  
2.2.2 Systemic stability 
 
Systemic stability refers to the smooth running of financial markets to the 
extent that there are no shocks due to their own doing.  An example for the 
long-term insurance industry may be adequate provision to pay future 
administration cost and expected benefit payments to policyholders.  Systemic 
stability does not include external shocks to the financial markets such as, for 
example, terrorist attacks or political unrest. 
 
2.2.3 Institutional safety and soundness 
                                                          
7
 FSB, Directive 147.A.i (LT), Governance of discretionary participation business, 2006 
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Institutional safety and soundness refer to a regulatory environment whereby 
long-term insurers can be sufficiently profitable, competitive locally and 
globally and adequately capitalised to cover overall risks faced by the 
industry.  This includes long-term insurers that have sufficient level of 
solvency capital to withstand adverse risk events. 
 
Another function of supervision is to oversee the exit strategy under failure of 
a long-term insurer.  This may include the transfer of obligations to a third 
party, the closure of new business or the assumption of management for a 
recovery period. 
 
2.3 Types of Regulation 
  
Falkena et al. (2001) describes the spectrum of the approaches to financial 
legislation from highly prescriptive and rule-based on the one side to 
principle-based determined by long-term insurers’ own internal assessments 
on the other side.  The latter is termed ‘contract regulation’.  Effectively, the 
long-term insurer agrees principles and objectives with the regulatory agency 
that will be used in the future.  This may be regarded as a ‘contract’ or 
agreement between the long-term insurer and regulatory agency. 
 
The IAIS paper8 (referred to as the ‘IAIS common structure’) described below is 
strongly biased towards contract regulation with emphasis on internal risk 
assessment and management by companies. Solvency II also highlights the 
importance of own risk assessment.  Capital requirements under Solvency II 
are based on principles rather than prescriptive rules.  An important change in 
the United States of America (USA) is the recognition of the benefits of 
contract regulation.  Since 2006, the American Academy of Actuaries has 
presented and continued to interact with the National Association of Insurance 
Commissioners (NAIC) on principle-based reserving. 
 
                                                          
8
 The IAIS common structure for the assessment of insurer solvency, 2007 
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2.4 Advantages of Contract Regulation 
 
Falkena et al. (2001) states the advantages of contract regulation.  Below is 
more detail regarding these advantages under the following headings: 
 
 flexibility to the regulator; 
 cost-effective; 
 wider range; 
 spirit of regulation; 
 benefit to the industry and ability to manage complex definitions; and 
 coping with change. 
 
2.4.1 Flexibility to the regulator 
 
There may be more scope for the regulator to accept or decline actions of 
companies.  The regulator is not prescribing a fixed set of rules that determine 
the regulatory regime.  The individual companies themselves define their 
means of achieving the objectives of the regulator.  These companies’ 
objectives must be accepted by the regulator before implementation.  The 
regulator may reject individual companies proposed methods or require 
adjustments. 
 
On the other hand, the companies may tailor their principles and objectives in 
a way that fits the corporate culture of the long-term insurer.  Collaboration 
rather than prescriptive rules may achieve the objectives of the regulator more 
effectively. 
 
2.4.2  Cost-effective 
    
It is argued by Falkena et al. (2001) that the regulated long-term insurer may 
reduce costs since while the insurer aims to achieve the regulator’s objectives, 
it may do so taking into account its own circumstances. Principle-based 
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regulation may well reduce the number of failures of financial-services 
companies. 
On the other hand, the regulator may need more resources to assess each long-
term insurer’s individual interpretation of its objectives and its means to 
achieve those goals.  Additional rules must also exist for long-term insurers 
that do not successfully negotiate approaches that are acceptable to the 
regulator.  These extra costs will ultimately be borne by the consumer of 
financial services products if the regulator recovers the cost from the long-
term insurers.   
 
2.4.3 Wider range 
 
It may be possible for the regulator to cover a wide range of diverse 
companies without directly providing for each company’s individual 
circumstances.  An overly prescriptive regime may well stifle innovation. 
 
2.4.4 Spirit of regulation 
 
Principle-based regulation favours compliance with the intention of the 
objectives of the regulator.  Rule-based approaches motivate companies to 
interpret the regulations in isolation and without regard to the regulator’s 
objectives. 
 
2.4.5 Benefit to the industry and ability to manage complex definitions 
 
Clear objectives from the regulator may benefit the industry as a whole.  An 
example is the concept of policyholder’s reasonable expectation, which 
evolved to treating customers fairly.  This concept is complex to define by a 
finite set of rules, but the principle is more readily understood. 
 
2.4.6 Coping with change 
 
Contract regulation may be more flexible to change than a rule-based 
environment.  An example is the introduction of new products with new 
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features.  The objectives of the regulator should still be met, but a rule based 
environment may be too rigid to manage such a situation. 
2.5 Empirical Studies 
 
Bennet et al. (1984) produced a comprehensive paper as the result of the work 
by the Faculty of Actuaries European research group.  The study compares the 
regulatory frameworks of Denmark, France, Germany and Netherlands with 
each other and with the UK framework.  The research considers: 
 
 legislation; 
 taxation; 
 the market place; 
 premium bases; 
 assets and liabilities; 
 profits and bonus systems; and 
 the role of the actuary. 
 
At the time of the research there was a common perception that the UK 
enjoyed minimal legislative controls and restrictions.  The conclusion of the 
research was that this was not the case and that in some cases the UK had 
more controls than some of these European countries.  Actuarial management 
was one of the most significant differences between the countries in the study.  
This is effectively additional and independent requirements imposed by the 
UK’s actuarial profession on its members, rather than requirements from the 
legislator.  The research group also concluded that despite the regulatory 
constraints of long-term insurance business in these countries the industry still 
managed to grow faster than inflation.  This growth came from existing 
companies with minimal new entrants.  Despite the limited number of new 
entrants, the research group argued that the flexibility of the UK legislation 
permitted individual companies to change strategies to allow for competitive 
innovation. 
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The Conference of European Insurance Supervisory Services (CEISS) has 
been in existence since 1949
9
.  Members meet at least every two years for a 
day to exchange information regarding supervisory issues.  The London 
Working Party (unpublished) (referred to as the ‘Sharma report’) presented a 
paper that examined the risks of insolvency.  Twenty-one company failures 
were studied.  A comprehensive list of risks and recommendations was put 
forward to the European Commission (EC).  These were to be taken into 
account for the new European solvency framework.  The study concluded that 
the cause of insolvency is not one event, but a chain of causes.  Eventual 
financial distress is caused by a trigger event that is the result of all these 
causes.  Regulations should focus on risk practices, internal processes and 
appropriate solvency capital. 
 
Booth & Morrison (2007) argued for limited regulation.  In the past, new 
regulations were the results of failed companies.  By only focussing on 
failures will be a mistake if the effect on the long-term industry and its 
stakeholders are ignored.    Plantin & Rochet (2007) confirms this view.  
Booth & Morrison (op. cit.) criticizes analysis of market failures by 
highlighting the unrealistic assumptions, in particular: 
 
 perfect markets do not exist; 
 regulators do not have perfect knowledge; and 
 regulators are unlikely to work in the public interest. 
 
The research compares the regulatory practices in the USA and the UK with a 
proposed system of regulatory competition.  Regulatory competition could be 
defined as the ability of a long-term insurer to choose its regulatory 
framework.  For example, a European company may operate from a different 
member country if those regulations are more suitable to its business plans.  
An important point that is highlighted by Booth & Morrison (2007) is that the 
UK had produced a much lower rate of company failure than the USA despite 
a comparatively lighter regulated insurance market.  It is further stated that, 
                                                          
9
 Resolution of the conference of European insurance supervisory services, 1995 
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although the level of insolvencies cannot be considered as an indicator of the 
success of regulation, one can at least say that lighter regulation does not 
necessary mean an inevitable weakening of standards. 
 
 
2.6  The 2007-2008 Global Financial Crisis 
 
Avgouleas (2009) explains the causes of the global financial crisis that erupted 
in 2007.  During the period from 1998 to 2007 the world economy entered a 
stable environment with relative low interest rates.  Favourable macro-
economic conditions, financial innovation and a large number of new market 
participants resulted in unwarranted growth of credit markets.  The relaxation 
of global capital restrictions allowed large hedge funds, which were 
unregulated investment funds, to enter global credit markets.  These hedge 
funds were capitalised through debt and, in turn, invested in a wide range of 
credit derivatives and financial structures.  A common structure was the 
pooling of debt that was securitised by property.  Hedge funds and other 
institutions acquired this debt from banks and mortgage originators.  Credit 
ratings were obtained from well-known credit agencies to give an indication of 
the security of the expected debt repayments. 
 
As a result of the on-selling of loans from the originator to third parties, 
underwriting standards deteriorated and credit was extended to individuals 
who could not afford it.  Property prices increased significantly.  Although the 
original loan extended by the bank was sold to a third party, the bank also lent 
money to them for funding these transactions.  The banking sector had 
therefore not reduced their risk exposure to the original loans.  When the 
defaults started to occur, property prices reduced significantly, creditors could 
not fulfil their obligations and credit extension virtually stopped.  Worldwide, 
governments intervened to prevent a total collapse of the financial sector. 
 
The main reasons for the global financial crisis were: 
 
 unjustifiable underwriting practices; 
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 credit ratings that failed to highlight the risks of the ‘innovative’ 
financial structures; 
 weak risk-management practices in large institutions; and 
 inadequate regulatory policies. 
 
As a result of the global financial crisis, regulatory changes are inevitable for 
the financial industry, including long-term insurers.  New regulations are 
likely to include unregulated entities such as hedge funds.  Avgouleas (2009) 
argues that it is key to regulate systemic risk—both nationally and 
internationally. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
SOLVENCY ASSESSMENT 
 
For solvency assessment the definition of ‘regulation’ by Falkena et al. (2001) 
encompasses all three aspects of regulation, i.e.: 
 
 the establishment of rules of  behaviour; 
 the observation of the behaviour of long-term insurers; and 
 enforcement. 
 
Solvency assessment is, however, not only a regulatory requirement.  Porteous 
& Tapadar (2008) considers asset allocation for financial firms based on an 
economic capital assessment.  Two similar definitions of economic capital are 
given.  One of these definitions states that economic capital is the “excess 
assets” that a firm needs to hold on a “realistic basis” to remain solvent over a 
“specified time horizon” with a “prescribed probability”.  This definition 
could intuitively be used for solvency assessment.   The authors argue that 
four parties are interested in the economic capital of a company for different 
reasons, namely: 
 
 firms, such as long-term insurers, require an economic assessment for 
efficient balance-sheet management to optimise profit; 
 regulators should require that the amount of regulatory capital is at 
least equal to the amount of economic capital; 
 rating agencies are interested how a firm’s actual capital structure 
compares with the economic capital structure; and 
 capital providers are interested in the safety of potential investment and 
are therefore also interested in the comparison between actual and 
economic capital. 
 
In addition to the four parties mentioned by the authors, policyholders are 
interested in secure benefit payments. 
 
This chapter gives an overview of solvency assessment.  
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3.1 The Definition of Solvency 
 
The definition of solvency has evolved since the 1700’s.  Hägg (unpublished) 
describes a particular incident in Sweden.  In 1724 a German merchant from 
Hamburg made a proposal to the Swedish government with the aim of 
establishing an insurance company.  The company was to issue marine 
insurance.  It would be well capitalised with large capital stock and thus be 
‘solvent’.  For political reasons, the German was unsuccessful.  It was only 
years later, in 1903, that the ‘solvency principle’ was set in the Swedish 
regulatory system to “safeguard the performance of all entered insurance 
agreements’’. 
 
Redington (1952) explains that there are three threats to long-term insurers’ 
solvency. An insurer is solvent if assets exceed liabilities.  The threats to 
solvency due to this definition are: 
 
 mismatched liabilities; 
 war risks; and 
 guaranteed option values. 
 
Ferguson (1976) describes the development of long-term insurers’ solvency in 
the UK and the complexities in the determination of insolvency.  The main 
difficulty is to specify the point where a long-term insurer should be wound-
up.  At the he wrote the paper, the UK had experienced a period of over fifty 
years with no long-term insurance company failures.  The actuarial guidance 
at that time considered six factors that may affect the financial position of 
long-term insurers. The six factors are: 
 
(a) premium rates of current and new business; 
(b) the nature of contracts with particular reference to guarantees; 
(c) the investment policy; 
(d) future marketing plans; 
(e) current and expected future level of expenses; and 
(f) the extent of the long-term insurer’s free estate. 
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Ferguson groups the six factors into three headings, namely: 
 
 (a) and (b)  –  unsound premium rates; 
 (d), (e) and (f) – expenses out of control; and 
 (c) and (f) – asset failure. 
 
The author highlights the point that the control of investments and the 
prevention of asset failure are crucial for the solvency assessment of a long-
term insurer. 
 
In October 1980, the Council of the Faculty of Actuaries set up a Working 
Party to investigate the criteria for solvency assessment of long-term insurers.  
Consequently, Hardie et al. (1984) investigated the interests of various parties 
in the solvency position of a long-term insurer.  The parties are the prospective 
and current policyholders, management, shareholders and the supervisory 
authority. 
 
Policyholders are mainly concerned that their claims are paid when they fall 
due.  They would also be concerned that profit distribution is reasonable when 
compared with other companies in the case of discretionary participating 
policies. 
 
Management and shareholders are concerned that claims are paid to 
policyholders when they fall due and that the company would be able to 
continue to operate properly.  To address these concerns the terms of new 
business in the future for policyholders and the expected returns to 
shareholders must be satisfactory. 
 
The supervisory authority is less concerned with the competitiveness of a 
company’s bonus payments.  The company’s ability to pay claims to 
policyholders when they are due and its ability to maintain an effective 
solvency margin are highlighted as critical factors to the supervisory authority. 
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Hardie et al. (1984) makes a critical statement in ¶2.2.7: “The Working Party 
has taken the view that solvency must be a matter of probability.”  This view 
may be partially true, but does not recognise that solvency and risk 
management cannot be separated.  A modernised version of the statement 
might state that solvency must be a matter of conditional probability—that is 
conditional on defined risk-management practices. This is because a 
regulatory framework: 
 
 “…cannot just be about capital requirements; no amount of capital can 
substitute for the capacity to understand, measure and manage risk and 
no formula or model can capture every aspect of the risks an insurer 
faces.” 10 
 
Choksi (2007) defines three types of insolvency, namely: 
 
 balance-sheet insolvency—where liabilities exceed assets; 
 cashflow insolvency—where debt cannot be paid when it is due; and 
 bankruptcy—formally filed for by the distressed corporate through a 
legal process. 
 
Regulators are concerned about balance-sheet and cashflow insolvency.  They 
manage the financial wellbeing of long-term insurers through regular solvency 
assessments and ad-hoc information requests.  
 
3.2  The Meaning of Solvency Assessment 
 
The results of a solvency assessment may be different depending on the 
purpose of the assessment.  The purpose can generally be grouped by the party 
that requires the results.  Two bases are commonly referred to: 
 
 a ‘break-up basis’ is the assessment of in-force business only; and 
 a ‘going-concern basis’ is the assessment of in-force and future new 
business.  
                                                          
10
 Financial Services Authority, Solvency II: a new framework for prudential regulation of insurance in 
the EU, 2006 
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In the case of a wind-up, curators are interested firstly whether a long-term 
insurer is insolvent according to the ‘balance-sheet insolvency’ definition that 
is determined on a break-up basis.  The result of this assessment will 
determine whether to file for bankruptcy or to secure an orderly run-off of the 
insurance portfolio. 
 
Shareholders, rating agencies and management are interested in the financial 
strength of a long-term insurer, its ability to write new business and 
constraints from its capital structure.  The assessment will be performed on a 
going-concern basis, with assets and liabilities valued fairly. 
 
The past and current European development has influenced regulatory 
frameworks globally, including South Africa.  The view of regulators has 
developed over time.  To illustrate this development, the European solvency 
assessment for regulatory purposes is described below. 
   
3.2.1 The 1979 European life insurance directive 
 
Sandström (2006) gives an overview of how the European solvency 
framework developed over the last century.  Building on the work of Professor 
T Pentikäinen in the 1950s, Champagne (unpublished) proposed measures for 
solvency assessment for long-term insurers.  Most of the proposals were 
adopted years later in the first European solvency directive
11
 (referred to as the 
First Life Directive). 
 
According to Sandström (op. cit.), Campagne (unpublished) based his work on 
the principle that a long-term insurer would be solvent if the expected value of 
a loss is smaller than the value of the free assets.  Campagne used data of 
long-term insurers from five European countries.  His recommendation was 
that capital of 4% of the technical provision (policyholder liabilities) should be 
held to act as a ‘buffer’ against adverse experience.  The buffer is termed the 
                                                          
11
 Directive 267 of 1979 on the coordination of laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating 
to the taking up and pursuit of the business of direct life assurance, Official Journal of the European 
Communities, L63/1 
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required solvency margin (RSM).  Actual free assets are termed the solvency 
margin (SM).  Insolvency will not necessarily occur if the SM is less than the 
RSM.  The RSM is rather an early warning indicator for the regulator. 
 
The First Life Directive adopted the recommended buffer of 4% of the 
policyholder liabilities.  In addition, 0.3% of the sum at risk was required, so 
that: 
 
               ; (1)  
 
where: 
                   
                                        
                           
 
The sum at risk can be determined by: 
 
        (2)  
 
where S denotes the sum insured. 
 
Allowance within limits for reinsurance was accepted.  For term assurance a 
reduction of the second term in (1), was allowed. 
 
Negative policyholder liabilities were not allowed.  For net-premium 
valuations a Zillmer adjustment to reduce the value of liabilities was allowed.  
This is achieved by increasing the net premium by the Zillmer adjustment.  
 
The Zillmer constant in this framework is determined by: 
 
      (        )   (3)  
 
where                                       
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For whole-life policies the Zillmer adjustment is then calculated by: 
 
 
  
 
  
   (4)  
 
where: 
Z denotes the Zillmer adjustment that may be added to the net 
premium; and 
   is determined at the valuation interest rate less the assumed bonus 
loading where applicable. 
 
Refer to Carroll (1975) for further detail regarding the net-premium valuation. 
 
Over and above the result of the RSM, the First Life Directive also had 
restrictions on the assets that were allowed in determining the SM.  Insolvency 
would occur if the SM was less than the guaranteed fund (GF).  The GF is 
defined as:  
 
   
 
 ⁄   (5)  
 
There are still countries that use this method or principles from this method, 
for example Kenya
12
, Mozambique
13
 and India
14
.  Until 1998, it was also the 
method used to calculate the regulatory capital requirement in South Africa. 
 
3.2.2 The Müller report 
 
The insurance committee of the EC requested the Conference of the Insurance 
Supervisory Authorities of the European Union Countries (CISA) to have the 
solvency regulations reviewed.  A working group under the chairmanship of 
                                                          
12
 Insurance Act, 1984, Republic of Kenya 
13
 Council of Ministers, Decree 42 of 2003, Regulations of financial guarantees 
14
 Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority of India, circular 65, 2008 
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Dr H Müller produced a report
15
 (referred to as the Müller report) with 
recommendations of changes to the regulations.   
 
The Müller report concluded that solvency framework at that time was 
adequate, but made a few recommendations.  The report stated: 
 
“The working group takes the view that the present solvency margin 
system has in essence proven its worth. However, some changes and 
additions are necessary.” 
 
The recommended changes were not fundamental.  The report mentioned that 
long-term insurance failures would not have been prevented under stricter 
legislation.  The most significant recommendation was to increase the 
minimum guaranteed fund, which is the minimum monetary amount a long-
term insurer should hold.  This increase should take into account inflation 
since the First Life Directive had taken effect 18 years earlier.   
 
Members of the working group did not agree on the treatment of unit-linked 
investment business.  Some of the working group members argued for a 
reduction in RSM from 4% to 0.25%.  The conclusion was, however, that 4% 
was a sufficient but prudent margin. 
 
The report also recommended restrictions to the assets that were allowed in 
demonstrating solvency. 
 
A final recommendation was to clarify when a supervisor may intervene and 
what actions would be available to the supervisor. 
 
3.2.3 The directives of 2002 
 
Following the Müller report and further investigations, two life directives
16
 
were adopted by the European Parliament in 2002.  The solvency requirements 
                                                          
15
 Solvency of insurance undertakings, CISA, 1997 
16
 European Parliament and Council: 
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of the First Life Directive were altered to take account of these findings.  The 
key changes were: 
 
 assets had to be of those specified in the directive; 
 quality and diversification of assets were specified; 
 the minimum GF was increased to  €3 million; 
 the monetary amount of the minimum GF would increase with 
inflation determined with reference to the European index of consumer 
prices, but rounded to the nearest €100 000; 
 a reduction to 1% of the technical liabilities (from 4% previously) for 
unit-linked business with guaranteed charges for more than five years; 
and 
 a solvency margin of 25% of the previous year’s operational expenses 
for unit-linked business with no guarantees.  
 
The regular increase of the minimum GF would be reviewed annually but 
would occur only if the increase was more than 5%. 
 
3.2.4 A new European solvency regime 
 
In 1999, the EC’s insurance committee confirmed17 the implementation plan 
of the directives of 2002 discussed above.  It also expressed the need to review 
the solvency regime after the implementation of these directives.  This was the 
first time the new solvency framework was officially referred to as ‘Solvency 
II’.  
 
KPMG produced a comprehensive review
18
 (referred to as the KPMG report) 
of the financial position of insurance undertakings from a regulatory point of 
view.  The KPMG report was commissioned by the Internal Market 
                                                                                                                                                                      
- Directive 2002/12/EC, Amending Council Directive 79/267/EEC as regards the solvency 
margin requirements for life, 5 March 2002; and 
- Directive 2002/83/EC, Concerning life assurance, 5 November 2002 
17
 European Commission, Internal Market Directorate General, MARKT/2095/1999, The review of the 
overall financial position of an insurance undertaking (Solvency II review), 1999  
18
 KPMG, Study into the methodologies to assess the overall financial position of an insurance 
undertaking from the perspective of prudential supervision, 2002 
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Directorate General of the European Commission.  The study considered a 
wide range of methods and practices.  It also compared the European Union’s 
(EU’s) insurance solvency framework with selected non-EU countries.  The 
report covered the following key items: 
 
 risk and risk models; 
 technical liabilities; 
 asset valuation; 
 reinsurance; 
 alternative risk-transfer arrangements and advance risk-reduction 
techniques; 
 the effect of accounting changes; and 
 the use of alternative supervisory methods. 
   
The KPMG report and the Sharma report (discussed in §2.5) were two key 
contributions to the development of the Solvency II framework.  The Solvency 
II framework is discussed in more detail in chapter 5. 
 
3.2.5 A note on the determination of European policyholder liabilities 
 
The First Life Directive did not specify a method to determine policyholder 
liabilities.  (Policyholder liabilities are referred to as ‘technical liabilities’ or 
‘mathematical provisions’.)  Instead, the method was to be in accordance with 
local requirements of member state supervisors.  Most member states used the 
net-premium valuation method. 
 
In 1992, the EC issued
19
 minimum criteria for the valuation of policyholder 
liabilities.  The criteria addressed the method and assumptions that had to be 
used. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
19
 European Commission, Directive 92/96/EEC, The taking-up of the business of life assurance, 
Directive 92/96/EEC, 1992 
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Method 
 
The determination of the policyholder liabilities must be calculated 
prospectively by prudent actuarial methods.  Retrospective valuations are 
allowed if it can be shown that the result is at least as prudent as a prospective 
valuation.  All contractual benefits must be allowed for.  Expenses, including 
commission payments, must also be included and may be implicit, for 
example by reducing future premiums.  For the determination of the discount 
rate, the method must take the assets held into account, although it is not 
specified how. Valuation methods must be consistent from year to year. 
 
The liabilities must be calculated on a contract basis, i.e. per policy.  Where 
the result of a policy liability is less than the surrender value, the liability must 
be increased to be at least equal to the surrender value.  Approximate methods 
are allowed if it can be shown that the result is more prudent than the result of 
individual policy calculations 
 
For liabilities, Exley, Mehta & Smith (1997) criticised the value obtained by 
the use of discount rates derived from a notional asset portfolio that is not a 
hedge portfolio.  A hedge portfolio is a portfolio where the assets “behave in a 
way which is ‘close’ to a defined set of liabilities.” A basic principle in 
deriving the economic price, or market price, is to ensure that the price of 
liabilities is consistent with that of equivalent traded assets.  This is referred to 
as the ‘law of one price’.  The minimum criteria issued by the EC are 
inconsistent with the law of one price.  One could argue that a regulator is 
interested in a value that is more conservative than the economic price for a 
liability.  However, this may distort the intrinsic solvency position.  Prudence 
should rather be explicitly held in the RSM. 
 
Assumptions 
 
The interest-rate assumption must be chosen prudently.  Each European 
member state must determine a maximum allowed interest-rate assumption for 
liabilities that may arise in that state.  For policies with interest-rate guarantees 
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the assumed interest rate must be limited to 60% of the yield on government 
bonds by the state in whose currency the contract is denominated.  Valuators 
may assume a lower rate than the maximum rate.  The interest rate used in the 
valuation of unit-linked contracts, single premium policies with a term less 
than eight years and with-profits business with no surrender values are not 
subject to the maximum interest rate, but the interest-rate assumption should 
still be prudent. 
 
The ‘statistical elements’, such as mortality rates, must be set prudently.  
 
The use of a constant interest rate to discount cashflows for all durations 
causes liability-price anomalies.  Exley, Mehta and Smith (op. cit.) argues that 
the appropriate forward interest rates should be used instead.  This approach 
has been adopted in Solvency II discussed in chapter 5. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
KEY INTERNATIONAL BODIES 
 
This chapter identifies the main international organisations that influence 
insurance regulatory regimes or solvency standards. 
 
4.1 The International Association of Insurance Supervisors 
 
The key international association of supervisors of insurance business is the 
International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS).  Established in 
1994, the IAIS represents insurance regulators and supervisors of 190 
jurisdictions
20
. 
 
The IAIS has issued numerous principles, standards and guidance papers 
(PSG) around issues concerning regulators and supervisors of the insurance 
industry.  Solvency is no exception.  PSG exists on capital adequacy and risk 
practices. 
 
4.2 The International Actuarial Association 
 
Previously, the International Actuarial Association (IAA) was titled the 
Comité Permanent des Congrès d'Actuaires
21
. This organisation was 
established in 1895 and renamed the ‘International Actuarial Association’ in 
1968.  In 1998 the IAA was constituted and incorporated as an Association in 
accordance with Swiss law
22
.  The seven aims of the IAA are stated in its 
statute and are mainly to promote the actuarial profession and skills globally. 
 
The IAA has published guidance, papers and exposure drafts to assist actuaries 
of various practice areas.  A comprehensive paper
23
 on solvency measurement 
and principles has been published.  This paper has been used extensively by 
various countries and supervisory organisations to assist in setting parts of the 
                                                          
20
 http://www.iaisweb.org/ accessed 2009 
21
 International Actuarial Association, Decennial report, A profession poised for the future, 2008 
22
 Statutes, approved 14 June 2008 
23
 International Actuarial Association, A global framework for insurer solvency assessment, 2004 
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regulatory framework (see Chapter 9).  It has also been used extensively in 
setting the IAIS common structure. 
 
4.3 The International Accounting Standards Board 
 
The International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) assumed the 
responsibility of setting accounting standards on 1 April 2001 from its 
predecessor body, the International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC).  
The standards were published as International Accounting Standards (IAS) by 
the IASC and are published as International Financial Reporting Standards 
(IFRS) by the IASB.  Three of these standards are of specific importance to 
insurance, namely: 
 
 IAS39 Financial instruments: recognition and measurement; 
 IFRS4 Insurance contracts; and 
 IFRS7 Financial instruments: disclosures. 
 
4.4 The European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA) 
 
In accordance with the new European financial supervision framework, 
EIOPA was established in January 2011 to replace the Committee of European 
Insurance and Occupational Pensions Supervisors (CEIOPS).
24
  
 
CEIOPS played a pivotal role in the first stage of developing the Solvency II 
framework. 
 
The EC established CEIOPS in 2003
25
.  In 2009 further provisions to the 
committee’s role were established.  The purpose26 of CEIOPS was to advise 
                                                          
24
 Regulation (EU) no 1094/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 
establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Insurance and Occupational Pensions 
Authority), amending Decision No 716/2009/EC and repealing Commission Decision 2009/79/EC, 
Official Journal of the European Union, L331/48, 2010 
25
 European Commission, 2004/6/EC, Commission decision of 5 November 2003 establishing the 
Committee of European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Supervisors, 2004 
26
 CEIOPS, Charter of the Committee of European insurance and occupational pensions supervisors 
(CEIOPS), 2009 
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the EC on policy issues regarding insurance and occupational pension 
schemes.  In particular, the committee prepared draft measures for the 
implementation of EU directives.  The committee was also tasked to ensure 
consistency in supervision between EU member countries and with other 
sectors such as banking. 
 
CEIOPS consisted of members and observers.  EU member countries were 
entitled to be represented as members and non-member countries as observers.  
Observers were typically countries that are part of the European Economic 
Area (EEA) such as Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein. 
 
The European system of financial supervision is an integrated network of 
national and European supervisory authorities that governs macro and micro 
prudential levels.  This system includes three European supervisory 
authorities, namely one for the banking sector, one for the securities sector and 
one for the insurance and occupational pensions sector (EIOPA).  In addition 
to the three specific areas, systemic risk is overseen by the European systemic 
risk board.  
 
EIOPA is governed by its board of supervisors, which integrates the relevant 
national authorities in the field of insurance and occupational pensions in each 
member state.  This is supported by the EU’s national supervisory authorities, 
which have the expertise and information about insurance and occupational 
pensions matters.  The authority is commissioned to monitor and identify 
trends, potential risks and vulnerabilities stemming from the micro-prudential 
level, across borders and across sectors. 
EIOPA’s objectives are: 
 
 to better protect consumers, rebuilding trust in the financial system; 
 to ensure a high, effective and consistent level of regulation and      
supervision taking account of the varying interests of all member states 
and the different nature of financial institutions; 
 greater harmonisation and coherent application of rules for financial 
institutions and markets across the EU;  
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 to strengthen oversight of cross-border groups; and 
 to promote coordinated European Union supervisory response. 
 
4.5 Comité Européen des Assurances (CEA) 
 
The CEA was established in 1953.  The committee is a federation of national 
insurance associations from EU countries.  Sandström (2006) states that this 
committee played a role in the 1960s to implement the First Life Directive.  
The committee’s membership of over 30 associations has been stable over the 
past decade. 
 
The mission
27
 of the CEA is to: 
 
 draw attention to strategic issues of insurance and reinsurance 
business; 
 raise awareness amongst consumers and policy makers of the role of 
insurers and reinsurers in policy protection and economic growth; and 
 promote a competitive market to the European consumer. 
 
The CEA has expressed concern
28
 about the large expected increase in 
regulatory capital for insurance companies as a result of the proposed 
Solvency II capital requirements. 
 
  
                                                          
27
About the CEA, http://www.cea.eu accessed May 2010 
28
 CEA, Why excessive capital requirements harm consumers, insurers and the economy, 2010 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
SELECTED SUPERVISORY FRAMEWORKS 
 
5.1 Solvency II 
 
The Solvency II framework directive proposal
29
 was adopted by the EC in July 
2007.  Following the publication of this proposal, a work plan has been agreed 
between the EC and CEIOPS, now EIOPA, for development, implementation 
and future work to be done on Solvency II.  This initiative is a huge change to 
the European solvency framework discussed above.  The initial target 
implementation date for EU countries was 31 October 2012
30
, but has since 
been extended to 1 January 2013. 
 
Solvency II is being created in accordance with the Lamfalussy
31
 four-level 
process.  Level one describes the framework principles—this involves the 
development of a European legislative instrument that sets out the necessary 
framework principles, including implementing powers for detailed measures at 
level two.  The second level prescribes the implementing measures—at this 
level more detailed measures are developed to put the framework principles in 
operation.  In the case of Solvency II the measures are prepared by the EC 
following advice from EIOPA.  For level three additional interpretive 
guidance and common standards are developed (issued by EIOPA) with peer 
reviews of the reports issued in terms of the guidance to ensure consistency 
amongst practitioners.  Lastly, in level four, consistent enforcement is ensured 
through more vigorous action by the EC and enhanced cooperation between 
the member states and their regulators. 
 
                                                          
29
 European Commission, Proposal for a directive of the European parliament and of the council on the 
taking-up and pursuit of the business of insurance and reinsurance (Solvency II), 2007 
30
 Article 310 of EU directive “General Rules on the taking-up and pursuit of direct insurance and 
reinsurance”, 22 April 2009 
31
 Final report of the committee of wise-men on the regulation of European securities markets, 15 
February 2001, chaired by Baron Alexandre Lamfalussy 
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The Level 1 Directive
32
 (referred to the Solvency II directive) text was 
adopted by the European Parliament on 22 April 2009 and was endorsed by 
the Council of Ministers on 5 May 2009 concluding the legislative process for 
adoption.  The remainder of the process is being developed with the aim to 
meet the target implementation date. 
 
The Solvency II framework has the following three main components
33
: 
 pillar 1 — quantitative requirements; 
 pillar 2 — qualitative requirements and supervision; and 
 pillar 3 — supervisory reporting and public disclosure. 
 
The three pillars are not mentioned in the Solvency II directive, but are often 
used to explain the framework.  These components are described in sections 
5.1.1–3 below. 
 
5.1.1 Pillar 1: quantitative requirements 
 
Pillar 1 is an assessment that is based on an holistic balance sheet to set the 
solvency capital requirement and test whether the insurer has sufficient capital 
(own funds) to fulfil this requirement. 
 
There are six sections: 
 valuation of assets and liabilities; 
 technical provisions; 
 own funds; 
 solvency capital requirement; 
 minimum capital requirement; and  
 investments. 
 
In the Solvency II framework the valuation methods of assets and liabilities 
are vastly improved from those prescribed in the First Life Directive.  Smith 
                                                          
32
 European Parliament, General rules on the taking-up and pursuit of direct insurance and reinsurance, 
2009 
33
 Commission of the European Committees, Explanatory memorandum, 2007/0143 (COD) 
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(1996) describes various valuation methods from financial economics that 
could be used by actuaries.  Risk neutrality and cost of capital adjustments are 
two of these approaches that are used for the determination of the value of 
liability.  
 
For the risk-neutral approach future cashflows are adjusted for risk by 
introducing probability theory.  These cashflows are then discounted at the 
risk-free rate.  Any profits or losses that arise by means of outperforming the 
government-bond market are purely speculative, since riskier investment 
strategies are utilised.  This method is adopted in Solvency II– although, due 
to the major increase in the liabilities for annuities caused by the use of the 
risk-free rate, the discount rate has not been finalised. 
 
Under the cost-of-capital-adjustment approach (COCAA) future cashflows are 
discounted at an expected earned rate.  Capital is then allocated to absorb 
possible deviations from this expected earned rate.  Before the future 
cashflows are discounted the cost of financing this supplementary capital is 
added to them.  Smith (1996) argues that the supplementary capital should not 
be the regulatory solvency capital, which at the time did not take into account 
the nature of risk for a specific portfolio. 
 
In the Solvency II framework some of the COCAA principles were 
introduced.  For the determination of the value of liabilities the discount rate is 
not the expected earned rate, but rather the risk-free rate. Thus the cost of 
additional capital to absorb possible deviations from best-estimate cashflows 
is included as the risk margin component of the technical provisions.  
 
There are, however, still inconsistencies with the law of one price.  For 
example, the adjustment for risk under the risk-neutral approach does not take 
into account the creditworthiness of the insurer.  This could easily be included 
by reducing the policyholder liabilities coupled with increased solvency 
capital requirements. 
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Valuation of assets and liabilities 
 
The Solvency II directive has adopted the definition of fair value from 
international accounting standards.  Article 74 states that: 
 
“assets shall be valued at the amount for which they could be 
exchanged between knowledgeable willing parties in an arm's length 
transaction; and liabilities shall be valued at the amount for which they 
could be transferred, or settled, between knowledgeable willing parties 
in an arm's length transaction.” 
 
It is not allowed to adjust the value of liabilities for an insurer’s own credit 
risk.  The definition includes the value of policyholder liabilities and other 
provisions.  The requirement to report the value of assets and liabilities at fair-
value is a significant change from the previous legislative framework.  Assets 
were allowed to be valued at book value and occasionally revalued.  In 
isolation, the value of assets and the value of liabilities will be more volatile 
under the new solvency framework.  However, for a matched portfolio of 
assets and liabilities the profit that results from this volatility will be 
negligible.  
 
Technical provisions 
 
Technical provisions are the policyholder liabilities including any provisions 
for reinsurance.  The method must be consistent with the fair-value definition 
of Article 74 of the Solvency II directive.  Liabilities must be determined gross 
of reinsurance before the explicit expected value of reinsurance is taken into 
account.  For the determination of the technical provisions the insurance 
portfolio must be grouped in homogeneous risk pools.  In addition, the 
calculation of the technical provisions must: 
 
 be the best-estimate value plus a risk margin; 
 be based on applicable and relevant actuarial and statistical techniques; 
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 be a cashflow projection that takes into account the time value of 
money; 
 make use of up-to-date market information; 
 take into account all expected contractual future cashflows under the 
insurance contracts and the associated cost of administering the 
contracts; and 
 take into account all financial guarantees and contractual options 
included in the insurance and reinsurance policies. 
 
The Solvency II directive
34
 defines the best estimate as follows: 
 
“The best estimate shall correspond to the probability-weighted 
average of future cash-flows, taking account of the time value of 
money (expected present value of future cash-flows), using the 
relevant risk-free interest rate term structure.” 
 
The Solvency II directive
35
 further defines the risk margin as follows: 
 
“The risk margin shall be such as to ensure that the value of the 
technical provisions is equivalent to the amount insurance and 
reinsurance undertakings would be expected to require in order to take 
over and meet the insurance and reinsurance obligations.” 
 
Guidance will only be published during level 3 of the Lamfalussy process.  
The IAA (unpublished b) gives four possible methods of calculating the risk 
margin, namely: 
 
 quantile methods; 
 cost-of-capital methods; 
 discount-related methods; and 
 explicit assumptions. 
 
                                                          
34
 Article 76(2), Calculation of technical provisions 
35
 Article 76(3), Calculation of technical provisions 
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The Solvency II directive prescribes
36
 a cost-of-capital approach.  This 
approach sets the risk margin equal to the opportunity cost of holding 
regulatory solvency capital that is necessary to support the technical 
provisions over the full term of the policies.  .  In the Swiss solvency 
framework (see below) the opportunity cost is prescribed as 6% per annum. 
For Solvency II, this opportunity cost has been adopted in the industry impact 
studies. 
 
Own funds 
 
In demonstrating solvency, an insurer must show that it has adequate funds of 
appropriate quality to cover solvency capital.  To show that an insurer has 
appropriate quality of funds the European Parliament has adopted a tiered 
approached for the categorisation of available capital. 
 
‘Basic own funds’ are defined as the value of assets less liabilities plus 
subordinated liabilities.  Creditors of subordinated liabilities rank below 
policyholders in the case of insolvency.  Assets covering these liabilities will 
therefore be available for payment to policyholders first in the event of a 
wind-up. 
 
‘Ancillary own funds’ are funds that may become available and that are not 
shown on the balance sheet, such as: 
 
 unpaid share capital; 
 letters of credit and guarantees; and 
 legally binding commitments to the long-term insurer. 
 
Supervisory approval is required for these items to qualify for ancillary own 
funds. 
 
‘Own funds’ are the total value of the basic own funds and the ancillary own 
funds.  
                                                          
36
 Article 76(5), Calculation of technical provisions 
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The capital is categorised into high-, medium- and low–quality.  The criteria 
used to categorise the capital are: 
 
 permanence; 
 subordination; 
 loss-absorbency; 
 perpetuality; and 
 absence of servicing costs. 
 
For basic own funds tier 1 corresponds to high quality, tier 2 to medium 
quality and tier 3 to low quality. On the other hand, high quality ancillary own 
funds qualify for tier 2 capital and medium quality for tier 3. 
 
Tier-2 and tier-3 items do not provide for full absorption of losses in all 
circumstances.  It is not clear whether policyholders would rank before the 
providers of this capital in the event of a wind-up.  For supervisory purposes 
this capital is limited in demonstrating solvency. 
 
Solvency capital requirement 
 
In demonstrating regulatory solvency, a long-term insurer has to cover the 
solvency capital requirement (SCR) at least with eligible own funds.   Eligible 
own funds are determined by: 
 
 
   ∑  
 
   
 
 
(6)  
where                                                         
 
For this purpose, the following conditions must hold: 
 
      
   ⁄      
 
(7)  
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  (8)  
 
In addition to these two conditions, 80% of the MCR must be covered by      
If these conditions are not met the value of the capital is limited for 
demonstrating solvency. 
 
In determining the SCR the following principles must be followed: 
 
 the long-term insurer must assume that it will continue as a going-
concern; 
 all in-force business must be included; 
 the effect of new business over a twelve month period from the 
valuation date must be allowed for; 
 all quantifiable risks must be taken into account; 
 the result of the SCR must correspond to a “...value-at-risk of the basic 
own funds of an insurer subject to a confidence level of 99.5% over a 
one-year period”37; and 
 risk-mitigating techniques may be allowed for. 
 
The SCR for a long-term insurer is calculated by: 
 
              (9)  
 
where: 
 
                         (    )   
                                             
                  -                                                                   
 
The BSCR is determined by the formula: 
 
                                                          
37
 Article 101(3), Calculation of solvency capital requirement 
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   √∑∑         
 
   
 
   
 (10)  
 
where: 
                                                       
                                         
                                 
                                            
 
The values of the correlation coefficient are prescribed as: 
 
                       
 
(11)  
             . (12)  
 
The life underwriting result is calculated by: 
 
 
   √∑∑     
   
   
 
 
   
 
   
  (13)  
 
where                                               
 
       
 
  and from the 
Solvency II directive: 
 
  
 
 denotes “the risk of loss, or of adverse change in the value of 
insurance liabilities, resulting from changes in the level, trend, or 
volatility of mortality rates, where an increase in the mortality rate 
leads to an increase in the value of insurance liabilities (mortality 
risk)”;  
 
  
 
  denotes “the risk of loss, or of adverse change in the value of 
insurance liabilities, resulting from changes in the level, trend, or 
volatility of mortality rates, where a decrease in the mortality rate leads 
to an increase in the value of insurance liabilities (longevity risk)”;  
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 denotes “the risk of loss, or of adverse change in the value of 
insurance liabilities, resulting from changes in the level, trend or 
volatility of disability, sickness and morbidity rates (disability–
morbidity risk)”;  
 
  
 
 denotes “the risk of loss, or of adverse change in the value of 
insurance liabilities, resulting from changes in the level, trend, or 
volatility of the expenses incurred in servicing insurance or reinsurance 
contracts (life expense risk)”;  
 
  
 
 denotes “the risk of loss, or of adverse change in the value of 
insurance liabilities resulting from fluctuations in the level, trend, or 
volatility of the revision rates applied to annuities, due to changes in 
the legal environment or in the state of health of the person insured 
(revision risk)”;  
 
  
 
 denotes “the risk of loss, or of adverse change in the value of 
insurance liabilities, resulting from changes in the level or volatility of 
the rates of policy lapses, terminations, renewals and surrenders (lapse 
risk)”; and 
 
  
 
  denotes “the risk of loss, or of adverse change in the value of 
insurance liabilities, resulting from the significant uncertainty of 
pricing and provisioning assumptions related to extreme or irregular 
events (life catastrophe risk).” 
 
The market risk result is calculated by: 
 
 
   √∑∑     
   
   
 
 
   
 
   
 (14)  
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where: 
 
                                              
 
       
 
   and 
 
from the Solvency II directive: 
 
  
  denotes “the sensitivity of the values of assets, liabilities and 
financial instruments to changes in the term structure of interest rates, 
or in the volatility of interest rates (interest rate risk)”; 
  
  
  denotes “the sensitivity of the values of assets, liabilities and 
financial instruments to changes in the level or in the volatility of 
market prices of equities (equity risk)”; 
  
  
  denotes “the sensitivity of the values of assets, liabilities and 
financial instruments to changes in the level or in the volatility of 
market prices of real estate (property risk)”; 
  
  
  denotes “the sensitivity of the values of assets, liabilities and 
financial instruments to changes in the level or in the volatility of 
credit spreads over the risk-free interest rate term structure (spread 
risk)”;  
 
  
  denotes “the sensitivity of the values of assets, liabilities and 
financial instruments to changes in the level or in the volatility of 
currency exchange rates (currency risk)”; and 
 
  
  denotes “additional risks to an insurance or reinsurance 
undertaking stemming, either from lack of diversification in the asset 
portfolio, or from large exposure to default risk by a single issuer of 
securities or a group of related issuers (market risk concentrations).” 
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The correlation coefficients for underwriting risk and market risk are not 
prescribed in the Solvency II directive, but will be prescribed in 
supplementary legislation for long-term insurers that do not use an internal 
model. 
 
The counterparty default-risk result,  , must reflect the expected loss from 
exposure to third parties over the twelve-month period from the valuation date.  
The long-term insurer is allowed to take account of collateral or other 
securities held that will lower the loss in the event of a default. 
 
Operational risk must be taken into account to the extent that it is not reflected 
in the BSCR.  For unit-linked policies the operational risk must be a function 
of the annual expenses.  The operational risk result is limited so that: 
 
       ⁄ . (15)  
 
 
To be consistent with the result of the BSCR any deferred tax that will not be 
payable should the losses occur may be used to reduce the value of the SCR.  
Also, discretionary benefits that are allowed for in the technical provisions 
may not be payable.  These amounts may also be used to reduce the SCR, but 
are limited to their expected loss-absorbing capacity. 
 
Subject to approval, a long-term insurer is allowed to use an internal model for 
the whole SCR assessment or parts of the assessment.  
 
Minimum capital requirement 
 
The minimum capital requirement (MCR) is the absolute minimum capital 
required before authorisation to operate as a long-term insurer is withdrawn.  
The result must be submitted quarterly to the national supervisor of the 
member states.  There are three parts to the calculation: 
 
(a) a linear function; 
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(b) monetary limits; and 
(c) relative limits. 
 
a) Linear function 
The first part is determined as a linear function of the technical provisions, 
premiums, capital-at-risk, deferred tax and administration expenses.  The 
calculation of the linear function must correspond to a value-at-risk of the 
eligible basic own funds subject to a confidence level of 85%.  There is not a 
prescribed formula in the Solvency II Directive.  Initially, a formula will be 
prescribed by the supervisory authorities.  To assess the effect of 
implementing Solvency II, the following formula was used to determine the 
result of the linear function: 
 
       (∑         
 
   )  ∑     
 
      . (16)  
 
where:                               
                                      
                                                             
                                 
                              
 
The business types, i, are: 
 
1 – with-profits business with guaranteed benefits; 
2 – with-profits business with future discretionary benefits; 
3 – unit-linked business without guarantees; 
4 – unit-linked business with guarantees; and 
5 – other business. 
 
b) Monetary limits 
For long-term insurers and reinsurers a minimum amount of €3 200 000. A 
captive reinsurer has a minimum of €1 000 000. 
 
c) Relative limits 
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As a minimum, the result of the linear function is adjusted to be at least 25% 
of the SCR.  As a maximum, the result is limited to 40% of the SCR.   
 
The MCR is then set as the maximum of (a) and (b), subject to the relative 
limits.   
 
Investments 
 
Long-term insurers are required to invest prudently in the best interest of their 
policyholders.  Assets that cover the technical provisions must be consistent 
with the nature and term of liabilities.  Further, the Solvency II directive 
requires that the assets covering the SCR and MCR must be of appropriate 
security, quality, liquidity and profitability. 
 
5.1.2 Pillar 2: qualitative requirements and supervision   
 
Insurers have to show that adequate governance structures and processes are in 
place to manage risk that may face the entity.  For internal models, the long-
term insurer must demonstrate that the model is embedded in the decision-
making process.
38
  The supervisory review process is the overall process 
conducted by the supervisory authority in reviewing the insurance and 
reinsurance undertakings.  The supervisory authority may prescribe additional 
capital (‘capital add-ons’) if an undertaking’s risk profile is riskier in their 
opinion than the solvency capital requirement of Pillar 1 suggests. 
  
5.1.3 Pillar 3: supervisory reporting and public disclosure 
 
Pillar 3 specifies the requirements of regular reporting to the supervisory 
authority and the nature and content of disclosure of the undertaking to the 
public. 
 
 
 
                                                          
38
 Article 120, Use test 
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5.2 Swiss Solvency Test 
 
The Federal Office of Private Insurance (FOPI) is tasked with protecting 
policyholders in Switzerland
39
. Mr H Lüthy, director of FOPI in 2002, 
investigated the Swiss supervisory regime with the support of a task force.  
The result of this work was the Insurance Supervisory Act, 2004
40
 (ISA).  
 
For all insurers operating from Switzerland, insurance statutory solvency has 
to be assessed by means of the Swiss Solvency Test (SST).  This assessment is 
mandatory since 1 January 2006 and must be performed in accordance with 
the ISA and the Insurance Supervision Ordinance
41
.  The SST has 
incorporated some of the features published by the IAA
42
, such as: 
 
 the expected shortfall as risk measurement; 
 a ‘total balance sheet’ approach; 
 a one-year time horizon; and 
 explicit risk margins. 
 
These are also consistent with the IAIS’s common structure for the assessment 
of insurer solvency discussed below.  An additional aim of the SST is to be 
coherent with Solvency II, although Solvency II was not yet finalised at the 
time. 
 
Two capital assessments are required, namely a ‘statutory assessment’ for 
minimum solvency capital and a ‘target–capital’ assessment calculated by 
means of the SST.  The assessment of minimum capital is simple and gives the 
minimum threshold that an insurer needs to hold.  The target capital is a risk-
based market-consistent assessment based on a hybrid of company-specific 
experience and regulatory prescription of parameters.  The target capital 
serves as an early-warning measure to the supervisor. 
 
                                                          
39
 White Paper of the Swiss Solvency Test, 2004 
40
 Swiss Federal Act of 17 December 2004 on the supervision of insurance companies 
41
 Swiss Federal Ordinance of 9 November 2005 on the supervision of private insurance companies 
42
 A global framework for insurance solvency assessment, 2004 
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The aim of the SST is to calculate the net asset value market-consistently and 
to determine whether this value is sufficient to allow the insurer to continue as 
a going concern.  This requires a projection of assets and liabilities up to a 
one-year time horizon.  The net asset value in the SST assessment is termed
43
 
‘risk-bearing capital’ (RC) and the minimum economic capital is termed 
‘target capital’ (TC).  Consistent with the aim, the RC is determined market 
consistently.  This market-consistent valuation method must be in accordance: 
 
“... with and not at variance with information that can be gleaned from 
trade in liquid financial markets.” 44 
 
Where a market value exists for an instrument, this must be used as the basis 
of valuation and is referred to as the ‘marking-to-market’ method.  Otherwise 
the market-consistent value is to be determined by applying a suitable market-
consistent model. 
 
Long-term insurance liabilities are often not traded in a liquid market and will 
not satisfy the above definition.  In this case, the value of liabilities is to be 
calculated on a discounted-cashflow method.  For assumptions, best estimates 
must be used.  No margins for prudence are allowed.  
 
The TC consists of two parts.  The first part is based on the results from 
standard models and scenarios prescribed by the regulator.  The required 
capital is determined from the standard models.  The measure to determine the 
required capital is the expected shortfall at a 1% probability level.  This 
measure is used in Chapter 30–see equation (33) for the definition.  The 
models determine the results for market risk, insurance risk and credit risk 
separately.  The result of each model is a probability distribution of the RC in 
one year’s time, with the exception of credit risk.  The expected shortfall of 
each model is aggregated.  It is assumed that each risk is normally distributed 
with prescribed volatilities.  The regulator has prescribed scenarios in addition 
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 Technical document on the Swiss solvency test, 2006, FOPI 
44
 Swiss Solvency Test, Circular 2008/44, Swiss financial market supervisory authority 
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to the standard models to cater for the non-normality of certain risks.  The 
results are added to the total shortfall from the standard models. 
 
The second part of the TC is capital required to cover the market-value margin 
(MVM) in one-year’s time.  The MVM is defined as the cost of capital to 
cover the regulatory capital (first part of TC) over the lifetime of the insurance 
liabilities.  The cost is prescribed as 6% per year of the regulatory capital.   
 
This addition to the TC is calculated as: 
 
 
  
    
   (
  
    
 
  
    
 
  
    
  )   (17)  
 
 
where: 
 M  is the market value margin in one-year’s time; 
 rt  denotes the risk-free return from time zero to time t; 
 i  is the yearly capital cost; and 
 Kt  denotes the regulatory capital at time t. 
 
FOPI encourages insurers to develop internal models to project the RC based 
on the company’s experience.  Internal models are subject to approval.  It is a 
requirement that the insurer is able to show that the bases of the models are 
embedded in the operational framework of the company.  More appropriate 
scenarios may also be used if the company can demonstrate that they are more 
reasonable. 
 
The SST is based on a modular approach whereby the results of each standard 
model and scenario are aggregated into the final result.  This allows an insurer 
to add additional models or scenarios without redeveloping the whole 
framework. 
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Some risks are dealt with through qualitative measures rather than quantitative 
analysis.  Operational risk is one such risk.  FOPI is interested in an active 
approach by insurers in managing and monitoring potential causes of 
operational risk.  FOPI may prescribe additional capital if an insurer is unable 
to satisfy the regulator on their approach to operational risk. 
 
5.3 The UK’s Individual Capital Assessment 
 
Since the introduction of the Financial Services and Markets Act, 2000 
(FSMA), the UK has undergone significant regulatory changes.  The FSMA 
empowers the Financial Services Authority (FSA) to make binding rules and 
issue guidance as the regulator of the financial services industry
45
.     During 
the development process, the FSA has considered international accounting 
standards and other supervisory frameworks such as Solvency II.  Solvency II 
had not been finalised and implementation was expected in 2008 at the time 
the FSA implemented the UK’s solvency capital requirements known as the 
‘realistic-balance-sheet’ approach.  Muir & Waller (unpublished) describes 
this approach as a “realistic market consistent” valuation of assets and 
liabilities.  The expected date of implementing Solvency II has been deferred 
several times and may be deferred again beyond the current implementation 
date of1 January 2013.  Compliance to the Solvency II regime will require 
further changes in the UK. 
 
The UK approach is commonly referred to as the ‘twin peaks’ approach based 
on Basel II’s three-pillar framework.  Pillar one requires certain long-term 
insurers called ‘realistic basis life firms’ to calculate the solvency capital as 
the maximum of the regulatory peak and the realistic peak.  A realistic basis 
firm is defined as a long-term insurer, which has with-profits insurance 
liabilities that are, or have been at some time since 31 December 2004, equal 
to or in excess of £500 million.
46
  The regulatory peak is determined on a 
prescribed statutory basis that includes margins of prudence and allows 
admissible assets only.  Admissible assets are the values that are permitted 
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46
 Financial Services Authority, FSA Handbook 
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according to prescribed rules.  The realistic peak requires a best-estimate 
approach to liabilities and solvency capital with a fair-value approach to all 
assets, including the values of assets that are not permitted under the 
regulatory peak. 
 
Pillar two requires a long-term insurer to carry out its own assessment of the 
amount of capital it should hold.  The assessment must be consistent with the 
risk the long-term insurer is facing and must take into account the controls and 
procedures that are in place to manage those risks.  A wider range of risks are 
considered in this pillar and higher capital requirement is expected than in 
pillar one.  The results of this approach, the individual capital assessment 
(ICA), are not disclosed to the public but only on request to the FSA. 
 
Finally, the FSA will review the ICA periodically.  Following its review the 
FSA may require additional capital which it considers appropriate.  ‘Individual 
capital guidance’ is the FSA’s guidance on what it considers an adequate level 
of capital to be to meet regulatory objectives. 
 
5.4 The Dutch Financial-assessment Framework 
 
The Dutch central bank, De Nederlansche Bank (DNB), and the pension and 
insurance council, Pensioen- & Verzekeringskamer (PVK), merged in October 
2004.  The merged organisation kept the name DNB.  Den Butten 
(unpublished) gives the history of the development to a new regulatory 
framework.  Supervision was divided between the DNB and PVK before the 
merger.  From 1 January 2007, the DNB has set a new solvency framework for 
pension funds and insurance business.  The framework is a risk-based 
determination of the financial position through a solvency assessment 
framework named ‘financieel toetsingskader’ (FTK) which literally means 
‘financial assessment framework’.  The assessment relies on a fair-value 
approach to both assets and liabilities.  Bragt, Steenhouwer & Waalwijk 
(unpublished) demonstrated that the Solvency II solvency requirements may 
be more onerous than the FTK for certain conditions.  The standard solvency 
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test of the FTK determines the amount of capital that is required with a 99.5% 
confidence level and is determined by the formula: 
 
 
 
√  
    
           
    
    
    
 ; (18)  
 
 
where: 
S1 denotes the interest rate risk; 
S2 denotes equity risk; 
S3 denotes currency risk; 
S4 denotes commodity risk; 
S5 denotes credit risk;  
S6 denotes the insurance risk; and 
                                                                             
 
The formula is similar to the capital adequacy requirement (CAR) formula 
used in South Africa (see equation (22) below). 
 
5.5 The USA’s Framework 
 
According to statutory valuation law in the USA policyholder liabilities have 
to be calculated according to the commissioners reserve valuation method 
(CRVM).  This method prescribes assumptions for long-term insurers, in 
particular mortality and interest rates assumptions.   The method has been in 
use for over 150 years and has virtually been unchanged
47
. 
 
Regulatory solvency capital is calculated according to a formula known as the 
risk-based capital (RBC) method.  Let   denotes the RBC result.  The 
equation
48
 is of the form: 
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         √(     )  (     )    
    
    
 ; (19)  
 
where: 
 
   denotes asset risk associated with affiliates; 
   denotes business risk associated with growth of new business; 
   denotes asset default risk including reinsurance exposure; 
   denotes interest-rate risk; 
   denotes credit risk; 
   denotes market risk; 
   denotes insurance risk; 
   denotes health-provider-credit risk; and 
   denotes business risk associated with health expenses. 
 
The values of the risk factors,   , are either directly from the statutory 
accounts or the result of a prescribed calculation. 
 
The result of the RBC is compared with the net asset value after adjustments.  
This is done by dividing the adjusted net asset value (ANAV) by the RBC.  
The regulator has specified options depending on the relative size of the 
ANAV to the RBC.  These options are: 
 
 to take no action if the ANAV is greater than twice the RBC; 
 to require additional reporting from the long-term insurer; 
 to demand an action plan with the additional reporting; and 
 to take management control if the ANAV is less than the RBC. 
 
 
In June 2005 the American Academy of Actuaries (AAA) presented the first 
draft
49
 of a principle-based reserving framework in the USA to the NAIC.  The 
approach has been developed to address the inadequacies of the rule-based 
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 Conceptual framework of a principle-based approach for life insurance products from the American 
Academy of Actuaries’ Universal Life Work Group, June 2005 
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approach that was in place at that time such as the treatment of guarantees for 
investment-type products.   
 
Ten principles were put forward 
 
 all material risks must be provided for in the valuation method—higher 
risks should result in higher reserves; 
 the method will apply to all individual-life products; 
 deterministic modelling may be used in some instances, but stochastic 
modelling will be necessary for products with material ‘tail risk’; 
 assumptions are based on a blend of company experience and 
prescribed rules; 
 parameters of deterministic models are based on best estimates; 
 appropriate governance should be in place, such as peer review, 
together with regulatory review; 
 appropriate controls, limits and caps will be applied to actuarial 
judgement; 
 assumptions will change at each valuation date to reflect the best 
estimates at that time; 
 the statutory reserve should be based on the actual risks a company 
faces—short-comings of models should be acknowledged; and 
 genuine risk-management strategies may be taken into account. 
 
The proposed framework was a major change to the rule-based approach with 
prescribed formulae and assumptions.  One of the major changes is the move 
from assumptions that are fixed over the period of a contract to assumptions 
that are market-related. 
 
Subsequent to the AAA’s draft the NAIC has announced50 the adoption of a 
“Solvency Modernization Initiative” in June 2008.  A work plan was 
announced that included a risk-based approach to the determination of 
solvency capital and reserves.  The recognition of international developments 
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would form part of the initiative with special consideration to the European 
regulatory framework, Solvency II.  Other jurisdictions that were to be studied 
in the development of the USA’s regulatory framework are Canada, Australia 
and Switzerland. 
 
The Life and Health Actuarial Task Force, a committee of the NAIC, has 
released a comprehensive exposure draft
51
, which was adopted in December 
2009.  This valuation manual is made up of numerous independent modules, 
which cover minimum reserves, the requirements for modelling and 
assumptions, reporting, documentation and formats of reporting. 
Implementation of principle-based reserving is planned to start in 2010 with 
implementation in 2012
52
. 
 
5.6 IAA Global Framework 
 
IAA (unpublished) describes the management of risk similar to the control 
cycle used by the Institute of Actuaries of Australia.  A three-pillar approach, 
similar to the Basel II frameworks for banks is used to address risk. As far as 
possible, the IAA’s solvency framework requires the use of a long-term 
insurer’s own data and experience.  This framework was used in the 
development of the SST and Solvency II frameworks. 
 
5.6.1 Pillar 1: Minimum financial requirements 
 
Pillar 1 aims to ensure that appropriate technical provisions (policyholder 
liabilities) are raised with appropriate assets covering liabilities (including 
non-technical provisions).  In addition, a minimum amount of capital is 
required to serve as a buffer to protect solvency. 
 
The IAA recognises five specific types of risk, namely: 
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 underwriting risk; 
 market risk; 
 credit risk; 
 operational risk; and 
 liquidity risk. 
 
A suggested approach calculates the capital requirements for each line of 
business.  The capital requirement is then determined for the company as a 
whole by recognising interdependencies amongst lines of business. 
 
Each line of business, i, will require capital of: 
 
             (20)  
 
where: 
    is the mean loss or best-estimate liability;  
     is the capital requirement; 
   is the standard deviation of the loss outcome; and 
  is a factor reflecting the probability or confidence level. 
 
The company’s solvency capital can then be determined as: 
 
 
  √∑   
 
  ∑            ; (21)  
 
where      is the correlation coefficient between line of business i and j. 
 
The IAA’s proposed formula recognises the interdependence of risk by the 
correlation coefficient,       
 
5.6.2 Pillar 2: Supervisory review process 
 
Pillar 2 is required over and above pillar 1, since all risks cannot be analysed 
quantitatively.  It therefore aims to ensure that insurers have adequate capital 
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resources to support all the risk in their business confirmed through 
independent review by the supervisor or a third party.  The result of the review 
may be supervisory intervention through additional capital requirements or 
managerial intervention.  Pillar 2 also serves to encourage insurers to develop 
better risk-management techniques that are based on their own experience.  
 
5.6.3 Pillar 3: Measurements to foster market discipline 
 
Pillar 3 focuses on market discipline through disclosure, both public and to the 
supervisor only. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
THE SOUTH AFRICAN INSURANCE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 
 
South Africa has an institutional and legal framework for financial 
supervision.  The legislation, which affects the financial services industry 
including the long-term insurance industry, is mainly governed by two state 
departments.  The long-term insurance industry is regulated by various acts 
and regulations.  Nienaber & Reinecke (2009) give a detailed overview of 
legislation for long-term insurance in South Africa. 
 
6.1 The Government Structure for Insurance  
 
In South Africa, there are two ministries that are directly responsible for the 
financial sector, namely the National Treasury, and the Department of Trade 
and Industry. 
 
6.1.1 The National Treasury 
 
The National Treasury is responsible for the management of South Africa’s 
national government finances. The Constitution53 of South Africa mandates 
the National Treasury to promote: 
 
 “transparency”; 
 “accountability”; and 
 “the effective financial management of the economy.” 
 
The Minister of Finance heads the National Treasury.  Various divisions exist 
to carry out the mandate. 
 
The Minister of Finance has appointed the FSB as regulator of financial 
institutions in South Africa, with the exception of banking, which is 
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administered by the Reserve Bank of South Africa.  The functions of the FSB 
stated in the Financial Services Board Act, 1990
54
 are: 
 
 to supervise compliance with laws regulating financial institutions and the 
supply of financial services; 
 to advise the Minister on matters regarding financial institutions and 
services; and 
 to promote education programmes through financial institutions to inform 
and educate users and potential users of financial products and services. 
 
The Policy Board for Financial Services and Regulation is an advisory 
statutory body established in terms of the Policy Board for Financial Services 
and Regulation Act, 1993
55
.  The advisory body has no executive powers—its 
main task is to advise the Minister of Finance on matters about the regulatory 
framework for financial services.  A secondary objective is to ensure 
competitive neutrality in the financial legislation. 
 
Other bodies affecting the long-term insurance industry include the Financial 
Intelligence Centre and Financial Services Advisory Committees. 
 
6.1.2 The Department of Trade and Industry 
 
The Minister of Trade and Industry has appointed the Registrar of Companies 
to be responsible for the administration of the Companies Registration Office 
(CRO).  The CRO administers all companies including long-term insurers. 
 
The National Credit Regulator (NCR) was established by the National Credit 
Act, 2005
56
 (NCA).  For long-term insurance business issued as protection for 
credit agreements, the NCR requires long-term insurers to complete returns.  
The NCA has prescribed some limitations on credit-life business such as 
prohibiting single-premium credit-life policies. 
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6.2 Long-term Insurance Legislation 
 
Key to the prudential regulation of long-term insurers is the LTIA.  The LTIA 
is described in sections 6.2–6.3.  Various other acts are applicable to the 
management of long-term insurers.  A list of acts directly affecting the 
solvency of long-term insurers is shown in Appendix B for completeness.  
 
6.2.1  The Long-term insurance act 
 
 The LTIA consists of nine parts, additional schedules and regulations that 
govern the long-term insurance industry. 
 
The nine parts are described below in sections 6.2.2–6.2.10.  The schedules 
and regulations are discussed in section 6.3. 
 
6.2.2 Administration of the Act 
 
The first part of the LTIA establishes a Registrar and sets out its duties and 
powers.  It also states arrangements on fees payable to the Registrar and 
reporting requirements to the Minister. 
 
An advisory committee is also established under this section with the 
obligation to investigate any matter concerning the long-term insurance 
industry on its own initiative or on request of the Minister or Registrar. 
 
6.2.3 Registration of long-term insurers 
 
Long-term insurance business may only be conducted by entities registered.  
The Registrar may limit the type of business a long-term insurer may enter 
into, for example limiting the amounts for sums assured and premiums or the 
type of benefits that may be underwritten.  Certain words are reserved and 
may not be used in the name of a business unless the business is registered as a 
long-term insurer or the Registrar has approved the name. 
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6.2.4 Business and administration of long-term insurers 
 
Part three of the LTIA describes the general administration of a long-term 
insurer and limitations with regard to its capital structure. 
 
The registrar must be notified of appointments and resignations of directors. 
 
A long-term insurer is compelled to have an actuary in service at all times.  A 
statutory actuary is also required, who may be the same person as the actuary, 
fulfilling certain duties such as certifying the financial soundness of the long-
term insurer and providing the Registrar with information.  The statutory 
actuary must be a Fellow of the Actuarial Society of South Africa and must be 
approved by the Registrar.  The role of the statutory actuary is further 
discussed in Chapter 7. 
 
An internal audit committee of at least three persons is required.  This 
committee reports to the Board of Directors on internal systems and controls 
and financial reporting.  It is also responsible for the promotion of 
communication to other staff members.  The majority of the members of the 
committee must not be employed by the long-term insurer. 
 
Long-term insurers are not allowed to raise debt capital without approval of 
the Registrar.  Any controlling stake in a long-term insurer’s equity shares 
must be approved by the Registrar. 
 
6.2.5 Financial arrangements 
 
A long-term insurer must be financially sound at all times by having 
appropriate assets backing the policyholder liabilities and having sufficient 
capital to fulfil its capital adequacy requirements.  In addition, a long-term 
insurer must have enough capital to generally conduct its business. 
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Dividends are payable only when the statutory actuary has certified that the 
long-term insurer has sufficient assets to maintain a financially sound 
condition. 
 
6.2.6 Compromise, arrangement, amalgamation, demutualisation and 
transfer 
 
Policyholder liabilities may be transferred only to another long-term insurer 
after approval of the High Court of South Africa or if the Registrar is satisfied 
that policyholders have been notified of the transfer and accepted the transfer 
in writing. 
 
6.2.7 Judicial management and winding-up of long-term insurers 
 
There are conditions on which the Registrar may act to protect the 
policyholders.  These conditions include material misrepresentation to 
members of the public and failure to comply with provisions within the LTIA.  
Actions that may be taken by the Registrar include notification to the long-
term insurer, to which the long-term insurer must reply within 30 days, and 
placement of a long-term insurer under judicial management. 
    
6.2.8 Business practice, policies and policyholder protection 
 
Part seven stipulates the general conduct required when selling a policy. 
 
The statutory actuary must be satisfied that policies sold are actuarially sound.  
This includes being satisfied with the premium, benefits and other values such 
as expenses and any bonus declarations to benefits.  Any comparisons between 
different policies must be actuarially justified to the satisfaction of the 
statutory actuary. 
 
Consumers must have a choice when a policy is required as part of a loan 
agreement or any other agreement that may require security.  No valuable 
consideration may be offered as an inducement to a potential consumer to 
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enter into a long-term insurance contract.  A summary of the policy must be 
furnished to the policyholder illustrating expected benefit payments, premiums 
payable and general terms of the policy. 
 
Remuneration to intermediaries is limited, generally by type of product. 
 
Rules are stipulated on how to enter into a valid long-term insurance contract.  
The first premium must be paid, or an arrangement to pay the first premium 
must be made, before a policy is valid.  The policyholder must be notified if a 
premium was not paid.  Limited time is available to the policyholder to rectify 
the situation. 
 
Misrepresentation or failure to disclose information may not necessarily result 
in an invalid policy, unless the nature of the information has a material effect 
on the assessment of the relevant risk for such a policy. 
 
Benefits to minors are limited. For members of the defence force policy 
benefits may also be limited. 
 
Policyholders are generally protected against unfair terms. 
 
6.2.9 Offences and penalties 
 
Part eight deals with persons who do not comply with the LTIA and stipulates 
maximum penalties payable. 
 
6.2.10 Transitional and general provisions 
 
The transitional provisions were mainly intended for the efficient changeover 
from the previous to the current Act. 
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6.3 Schedules and Regulations 
 
The schedules are mainly concerned with the determination of asset and 
liability values.  The Insurance Amendment Act, 2003
57
 introduced capital 
adequacy requirements in addition to liabilities of a long-term insurer when it 
demonstrates that it is financially sound. 
 
The calculation method is not specified in the Act, but the Insurance 
Amendment Act, 2003 states that: 
 
“The values of assets, liabilities and the capital adequacy requirement 
shall be deemed to have been calculated in terms of this Schedule if the 
requirements set out in this Schedule and the requirements prescribed 
by the Registrar, after consulting the Actuarial Society of South Africa, 
have been complied with in making the calculations.” 
 
In November 2004, the FSB clarified the requirements of the Act by issuing 
Directive 140.A.ii (LT)
58
.  The calculations of policyholder liabilities should 
be based on the statutory valuation method supplemented by professional 
guidance notes (PGNs) issued by the Actuarial Society of South Africa, 
specifically PGN 104
59
.  Asset and liability values, other than those for 
policyholder liabilities, should be calculated in accordance with the “South 
African Statements of Generally Accepted Accounting Practice”.  These 
requirements were officially prescribed by the Registrar by issuing Board 
Notice 72
60
 (referred to BN 72). 
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6.3.1 Determination of policyholder liabilities 
 
The requirements for policyholder liabilities and solvency are stated in the 
LTIA and BN 72 and PGNs issued by the Actuarial Society of South Africa.  
The value of policyholder liabilities may be determined prospectively or 
retrospectively.  Assumptions must be set on a best-estimate basis that takes 
into account recent experience. These assumptions should be modified for 
expected future changes.  Compulsory margins are added to the best-estimate 
assumptions to introduce a minimum level of prudence.  Compulsory margins 
on the main assumptions are shown in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Compulsory margins 
Assumption Margin 
Mortality 7.5% of mortality rate 
Morbidity 10% of morbidity rate 
Medical 15% of incident rate 
Lapse 25% of probability of lapse 
Terminations 10% of termination rate 
Surrenders 10% of probability of surrender 
Expenses 10% of renewal expense amount 
Expense inflation 10% of inflation rate 
Investment return charge 25 basis points 
 
The compulsory margins must be applied so that the policyholder liabilities 
increase.  Typically, annuity business would require a reduction of the 
mortality rate as opposed to assurance business, which would require an 
increase of the mortality rate. 
 
A long-term insurer is not allowed to include future voluntary premium 
increases in the policyholder liability calculations if these reduce the 
liabilities.  Future voluntary premium increases and the resulting benefit 
increases are commonly specified at sales stage to policyholders.  These 
increases are agreed upfront and occur automatically, unless the policyholder 
cancels the increase.  This omission may be viewed as a further compulsory 
margin that introduces more prudence. 
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Discretionary margins are allowed.  These may be included if the statutory 
actuary believes that: 
 
 the compulsory margins are insufficient for prudent reserving; or 
 to release profits consistently with policy design or company practice. 
 
These two conditions give the statutory actuary ample freedom to add 
discretionary margins.  However, an implicit restriction exists through BN 72 
that requires the insurer to “define”, “quantify” and “give reasons why” 
discretionary margins have been added.  Practically, this requirement is 
enforced in the FSB’s annual return for long-term insurers where all 
discretionary margins must be defined, quantified and motivated. 
 
Negative liabilities may arise at early durations of risk policies, priced to make 
a profit, if initial expenses are high compared with the size of the recurring 
premium.  For with-profit business, a negative bonus stabilisation reserve may 
be held against liabilities in times of depressed asset value. 
 
PGN 110 sets guidance how the provision for embedded derivatives such as 
policy guarantees should be determined.  Stress-testing of economic scenarios 
is also required in the determination of CAR.  This guidance is classified as 
‘best practice’ and is not mandatory for statutory actuaries. 
 
In conclusion, the determination of policyholder liabilities is based on long-
term insurers’ own experience and may be adjusted upwards for company 
practice or where the statutory actuary believes that compulsory margins are 
not sufficient 
 
6.3.2 Determination of solvency capital 
 
Solvency capital must be determined by the provisions set in the LTIA, by the 
requirements in BN 72 and by the guidance in PGN 104.  The prescribed 
calculations include the option of an internal model approved by the FSB 
instead of the prescribed CAR calculation. 
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CAR before adjustments is the maximum of three components: 
 minimum CAR (MCAR); 
 termination CAR (TCAR); and 
 ordinary CAR (OCAR). 
 
MCAR is specified in BN 72.  This value is the minimum capital that must be 
held by all long-term insures irrespective of the result of an internal model or 
the result of TCAR and OCAR.  This minimum is set to be the maximum of 
R10 million or 13 weeks operational expenses. 
 
The IAIS Solvency & Actuarial Issues Subcommittee has issued principles
61
 
of capital adequacy and solvency.  Principle 8 requires regulators to set out a 
minimum threshold of solvency capital “to provide a minimum assurance of 
the financial capacity and soundness of the insurer.”   
 
This minimum should take into account the intended risk of the business and 
should not be available to fund set-up costs. The MCAR does not explicitly 
take into account the intended risk to be covered and therefore does not 
entirely fulfil the requirements of the IAIS’s published principles.  The LTIA62 
does, however, give the FSB the right to prescribe a different method if the 
result of the CAR calculation is not satisfactory to the registrar.  In addition, 
BN 72 states that the statutory actuary must increase the level of CAR where 
he or she perceives the prescribed minimum value to be inadequate.  There is 
no guidance for the statutory actuary to follow when he or she assesses 
whether the prescribed minimum values are adequate. 
 
The remainder of the CAR calculation is specified in PGN 104.  TCAR equals 
the sum of lapse CAR and surrender CAR, where: 
 
 lapse CAR is the amount required to ensure that no policy liability is 
negative; and 
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 surrender CAR is the amount required to ensure that no policy liability 
is less than its surrender value. 
 
The intermediate ordinary capital adequacy requirement (IOCAR) is 
calculated as: 
 
    √                              (      )        
    
(22)  
 
where 
a denotes the lapse risk component; 
  denotes the surrender risk component; 
   denotes the mortality risk component; 
    denotes the morbidity risk component; 
     denotes the medical risk component; 
  denotes annuitant fluctuation mortality risk component; 
  denotes mortality, morbidity and medical assumption risk 
component; 
  denotes the expense risk component; 
  denotes the investment risk component; 
  denotes the credit risk component; and 
  denotes other risk component. 
 
In the IOCAR calculation each individual risk component is assumed to be 
independent with the exception of   and  .  PGN 104 has a prescribed formula 
to set the minimum value for each risk component except for  .    is set by the 
statutory actuary if he or she has identified other material risks that are not 
provided for by the standard risk components.    
 
OCAR is determined by: 
 
  
 
   
  (23)  
 
where: 
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  √(      )          (24)  
 
Management actions may be taken into account to reduce the result of the 
CAR formulae.  Management actions are mitigating actions that will reduce 
the loss in case of an adverse event.  The management actions may be applied 
to either the TCAR or any component of the IOCAR.  These actions are 
allowed only if: 
 
 the board of directors have approved them; 
 the action plans are realistic;  
 policyholder guarantees are expected to be honoured; and 
 they are not contrary to policyholders’ reasonable benefit expectations. 
 
The statutory actuary must increase the capital where it is perceived to be 
inadequate using the minimum requirements described above.  Future new 
business is not included in the prescribed CAR calculation, but forms part of 
the statutory actuary’s obligation to consider the future financial position of 
the long-term insurer. 
 
In summary, long-term insurers have the right to: 
 
 determine solvency capital using an internal model approved by the 
FSB; 
 use the prescribed CAR formulae to determine regulatory solvency 
capital; 
 use management actions to reduce the result of the standard formulae; 
 increase the CAR where the statutory actuary perceives the CAR to be 
inadequate using the standard prescribed approach; and 
 apply for dispensation from the FSB to hold a lower amount of capital. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
THE ROLE OF THE STATUTORY ACTUARY 
 
In South Africa, long-term insurers are required to have at all times an actuary 
that is referred to as the ‘statutory actuary’63.  Although the LTIA specifies the 
legal requirements of this role, the Actuarial Society of South Africa stipulates 
additional responsibilities.  In this chapter the appointment, the role and a 
comparison of the statutory actuary with similar appointments in other 
international constituencies are discussed. 
 
7.1 The Appointment of the Statutory Actuary 
 
For each long-term insurer the LTIA
64
 requires the statutory actuary to be an 
individual.  Firms, such as consulting and audit firms, may be contracted by 
long-term insurers, but the appointment must be a named individual.     
  
7.1.1 Application and termination 
 
All appointments have to be approved by the registrar.  The Actuarial Society 
of South Africa requires statutory actuaries to have valid practice certificates.  
Practically, an applicant applies for a practice certificate before the application 
to the registrar. 
 
Once an actuary has been appointed for a statutory role, there are no further 
requirements by the registrar, although, in the case that a statutory actuary is 
not concerned fit and proper to fulfil his or her duties, the registrar may 
terminate this position.  The Actuarial Society of South Africa laid down two 
additional obligations.  The first is to comply with its continuous professional 
development (CPD) scheme.   For statutory actuaries the CPD scheme has 
more onerous requirements than for other actuary members.  The second 
obligation is the renewal of the practice certificate.  Practice certificates are 
valid for only three years. 
                                                          
63
 Long Term Insurance Act, Act no 52 of 1998, Republic of South Africa, Section 20(1) 
64
 Section 20(3) 
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A statement of reasons has to be submitted to the registrar on the termination 
of the appointment of a statutory actuary.  If the departing statutory actuary 
believes that the particular long-term insurer is not, or may not be, financially 
sound, an additional statement must be submitted to the registrar that states his 
or her concerns.   
 
7.1.2 Minimum requirements 
 
The minimum requirements to be appointed as a statutory actuary are 
stipulated in the LTIA.  Supplementary to these requirements the registrar has 
additional conditions. These conditions include the minimum professional 
standards laid down by the Actuarial Society of South Africa. 
 
The LTIA
65
 requires a statutory actuary to: 
 
 be a natural person; 
 be a permanent resident of South Africa; 
 be a fellow of the Actuarial Society of South Africa; 
 have adequate practical experience after qualification as an actuary; 
and 
 be approved by the registrar. 
 
The FSB’s application form66 lists additional requirements.  The statutory 
actuary must have a valid practice certificate issued by the Actuarial Society 
of South Africa.  Actuaries that have been found guilty of professional 
misconduct or criminal offences are not eligible to be statutory actuaries. 
 
For the application of practice certificates the Actuarial Society of South 
Africa has additional requirements.  First-time applicants have to have at least 
five years’ relevant work experience, of which three years have to be after 
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 Section 20(3&4) 
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 FSB, Application by a long-term insurer for approval of the appointment of a statutory actuary in 
terms of section 20(4) of the Long-term Insurance Act, August 2007 
 86 
qualification as a fellow actuary.  At least one year of the last three years of 
relevant work experience must be in South Africa.  For existing long-term 
insurers the departing statutory actuary must confirm in writing that in his or 
her opinion the applicant has the necessary knowledge, skills and experience.  
As mentioned in section 7.1.1 the applicant must also comply with the 
Actuarial Society of South Africa’s CPD scheme.  If the applicant does not 
meet all the requirements, the Actuarial Society of South Africa may issue a 
qualified certificate.  A qualified certificate will specify the conditions on 
which an applicant may practise as a statutory actuary.  An example of such a 
condition is a peer review by an independent actuary. 
 
An additional requirement is applicable for subsequent renewal of a practice 
certificate.  This is an experience requirement.  The statutory actuary must 
have signed off the FSB’s statutory returns for at least two years. 
 
7.2 The Role of the Statutory Actuary 
 
The duties of the statutory actuary are mainly prescribed in legislation and 
professional guidance from the Actuarial Society of South Africa.  These 
duties are related to aspects that may affect the financial soundness of a long-
term insurer.  The main aspects are: 
 
 valuation methods of assets and liabilities; 
 choice of assets; 
 pricing and policy design; 
 bonus allocations for with-profits policies; 
 policy alteration rules; and 
 dividend declaration. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 87 
7.2.1 Duties specified in the LTIA 
 
The LTIA
67
 requires that a long-term insurer’s statutory actuary notifies the 
board of directors as soon as he or she becomes aware that the long-term 
insurer is not financially sound.  To be financially sound a long-term insurer 
must have enough assets to cover its liabilities and CAR.  Assets must also be 
appropriately diversified and be of the types specified in the Act
68
.  The 
statutory actuary must be satisfied that the assets are: 
 
“...proper and suitable having regard to the nature of its various 
liabilities and the time when, the place where, and the manner in 
which, it is required, or expects to be required, to meet those 
liabilities...” 
 
If the statutory actuary believes that a long-term insurer is breaching or is 
likely to breach the condition to be financially sound, he or she must notify the 
board of directors.  A report must be submitted with the notification that 
details the factors that cause concern.  The statutory actuary must also notify 
the registrar if the financial soundness of the long-term insurer is materially 
prejudiced.  After 30 days, the statutory actuary must be satisfied that the 
board of directors have taken reasonable steps to rectify the financial 
soundness of the long-term insurer.  If the statutory actuary is not satisfied the 
registrar must be notified immediately. 
 
Before a dividend is declared, the LTIA
69
 requires the statutory actuary to 
certify that the proposed dividend will not cause the long-term insurer to 
become financially unsound. 
 
Another duty of a statutory actuary is to make sure that the returns and reports 
to the FSB are properly drawn up and comply with the requirements of the 
LTIA. 
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Apart from the duties that are directly applicable to the valuation of assets, 
liabilities and solvency capital, the statutory actuary has also duties to support 
sound business practice.  The first of these duties is to ensure that policies are 
actuarially sound.  Although the term ‘actuarially sound’ is not defined, the 
LTIA
70
 refers to three specific aspects that the statutory actuary must be 
satisfied with.  These aspects are: 
 
 the relationship between premiums, benefits and other values; 
 the distinction between premiums, benefits and other values; and 
 bonus allocations. 
 
Bonus allocations have to be in accordance with a long-term insurer’s 
principles and practices of financial management (PPFM).  The PPFM are 
required to be approved by the board and available on a long-term insurer’s 
website. 
 
The statutory actuary must also be satisfied that there are adequately 
documented rules for the failure of premium payments.  These rules must 
include the conditions when a policy will be cancelled or will be made paid-
up. 
 
Finally, the rules for the values of all alterations must be to the satisfaction of 
the statutory actuary.  In particular, the surrender bases must be in accordance 
with the regulations
71
, which require a basis that is approved by the statutory 
actuary for the determination of these values. 
  
For the above duties the LTIA
72
 gives the statutory actuary rights to 
information.  The rights include attending and speaking at the long-term 
insurer’s general meetings and board meetings. 
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7.2.2 Duties specified in the Companies Act, 1973 
 
For long-term insurers the Companies Act, 1973
73
 requires the statutory 
actuary to include a report in the annual financial statements “in accordance 
with a guideline issued by the Actuarial Society of South Africa”.  This 
guideline is PGN 103
74
 and is discussed in more detail in the next section. 
 
 
7.2.3 Professional duties 
 
For professional matters, the Actuarial Society of South Africa has issued 
various standards and guidance.  The Actuarial Society’s standards75 refer to 
the repealed UK’s professional conduct standards76 with minor adjustments.  
In the UK, the Institute and Faculty of Actuaries has replaced the professional 
conduct standards with the actuaries code.  The Actuarial Society of South 
Africa has not directly adopted this code. 
 
Guidance is in the form of PGNs and covers the following: 
 
 long-term insurers; 
 retirement funds; 
 health care; 
 short-term insurers; 
 reports on the effect of AIDS; 
 continuous professional development; 
 educational matters; and 
 guidance that is general in nature. 
 
The following PGNs are directly applicable to long-term insurers’ statutory 
actuaries: 
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 Act no. 61 of 1973 as amended, Schedule IV, Part 1.B (14) 
74
 PGN 103 version 4, The report by the statutory actuary in the annual financial statements of long-
term insurers, 2005 
75
 Actuarial Society of South Africa – professional conduct standards, 2004 
76
 The Professional Affairs Board, professional conduct standards, version 2, 2004, UK 
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 PGN 103
77—the report by the statutory actuary; 
 PGN 104
78—the valuation of long-term insurers; 
 PGN 106
79—guidance for statutory actuaries; 
 PGN 109
80—acquisitions; and 
 PGN 110
81—embedded derivatives. 
 
For statutory actuaries compliance with PGN 103 is mandatory.  To comply 
with the requirements specified in the Companies Act, 1973, this PGN states 
the minimum information that must be certified by the statutory actuary in the 
annual financial statements.  The minimum information required is snapshots 
of the balance sheets that comply with accounting standards and with 
regulatory requirements.  Any differences must be reconciled and explained.  
The effect of changes to assumptions and valuation methods must be 
disclosed.  The CAR and CAR cover must be disclosed with a statement 
whether the statutory actuary believes that the long-term insurer is in a 
financially sound position and is expected to remain so for the foreseeable 
future. 
 
PGN 104 is also mandatory for statutory actuaries and gives guidance for the 
valuation of assets, liabilities and CAR.  PGN 110 gives further guidance on 
the valuation method of embedded derivatives.  This guidance note is 
classified as best practice. 
 
To assist with the interpretation of statutory actuaries’ duties specified in the 
LTIA, PGN 106 provides detailed guidance.  This guidance note is classified 
as best practice. 
 
Statutory actuaries that are involved in acquisitions of long-term insurers may 
be faced with conflicts of interest.  On the one hand they have to act in the best 
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 Life insurance company take overs 
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interest of policyholders.  On the other hand they will be providing advice to 
the directors who must act in the best interest of shareholders.  PGN 109 
provides guidance for actuaries that are involved in these types of takeovers. 
 
7.3 The Actuarial Society of South Africa’s Investigation 
 
The Actuarial Society of South Africa’s statutory-actuary task force issued a 
report
82
 after a review of the role of the statutory actuary.  Reasons for the 
review included the changes in the role of the appointed actuary in the UK, the 
onerous burden on an individual acting as statutory actuary and to recommend 
solutions where conflicting interest may arise.  The focus of the review has 
been on the governance process with specific reference to the relationships 
between the board of directors, management and the regulator, the statutory 
actuary’s role in these relationships and potential conflicting interests.  
Recommendations are given for the following categories: 
 
 product design and pricing;  
 distribution and advice;  
 apportionment of surplus;  
 financial reporting;  
 regulatory solvency and capital requirements; and  
 risk management and sustainability. 
 
Although recommendations were given for each category these 
recommendations could be summarised as follows: 
 
 legislation must clarify who is responsible; 
 the board of directors should be responsible for each category except 
for regulatory solvency and capital requirements; and 
 the actuary should play an advisory role in each category, but be 
responsible for regulatory solvency and capital assessment. 
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 Report of the role of the statutory actuary task force, July 2010 
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To deal with conflicting interests the report does not require a split role as in 
the UK.  The report recommends that the statutory actuary should not be 
eligible as a director.  This view is in contrast with the view described by 
Johnston (2006) and the practice in the UK.  It is also stated that, in the short 
term, remuneration should ideally not be linked to the long-term insurer’s 
financial performance, but no recommendation was made in this regard.  
Instead, it was recommended that financial interests of the statutory actuary in 
the long-term insurer should be disclosed yearly to the board of directors and 
to the regulator.  The report acknowledged that there is no individual 
regulatory role in the Solvency II framework, but stated that there are 
advantages to have a statutory actuary and recommended that the FSB’s SAM 
project must consider to include a regulatory role for actuaries. 
 
7.4 Similar International Positions 
 
The statutory actuary may often be faced with conflicting interest.  Distinction 
must be made between two conflicting interests and a conflict between an 
actuary’s duty and an interest.  For the former the actuary has to decide which 
conflict is more in his (or hers) interest and decide accordingly. The problem 
arises when a duty is in conflict with an interest.  Regulators and professions 
are particularly concerned with the latter.  Furthermore, conflict may arise 
between the desires and requirements of shareholders, policyholders and 
employees of the long-term insurer.  Remuneration policies that are linked to 
the financial performance of the long-term insurer may encourage premature 
recognition of profit by reducing the policyholder liabilities.  The statutory 
actuary, who may be a member of senior management, is faced with the 
conflicting task to protect policyholders on the one hand and to maximise 
profits for shareholders on the other hand.  For pricing, the statutory actuary is 
responsible for policies to be actuarially sound.  With no definition in the 
LTIA of ‘actuarially sound’ the question arises whether premium rates that 
may result in super-profits are actuarially sound.  The expected premiums for 
these policies should be more than sufficient to cover benefits and yield good 
returns to shareholders.  Internationally, these potential conflicting interests 
have been differently dealt with in different locales.  This section investigates 
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the approaches implemented by other jurisdictions.  In section 7.4.1 the 
appointed-actuary approach is described.  The responses of other international 
regulators to an FBS questionnaire with additional information from other 
sources are analysed in section 7.4.2. 
 
7.4.1 The appointed actuary 
 
Johnston (1989) states that: 
 
“A paper about the Appointed Actuary is essentially a paper about 
prudential supervision of life insurance companies.” 
 
From 1974 to 2005 all long-term insurers in the UK had to appoint an actuary 
responsible for financial monitoring and the protection of policyholders.  This 
requirement was from the Insurance Companies Act, 1973.  Dayken (1999) 
explains that this Act did not introduce the term ‘appointed actuary’, but that 
the term was generally used for this position.  The appointed actuary had to 
monitor aspects that might have affected the financial position of a long-term 
insurer, for example: 
 
 product design; 
 methods of marketing; 
 volumes of business; 
 premium rates; 
 options and guarantees; 
 surrender values and paid-up values; 
 investments held and changes in investment policy; 
 derivative exposures; 
 current and likely levels of expenses; 
 current and likely future tax bases; 
 reinsurance arrangements; 
 claims handling policy; and 
 any contingent liabilities. 
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Although the Act required UK long-term insurers to appoint an actuary, the 
duties were prescribed mainly in the form of professional guidance. 
 
The position of the statutory actuary in South Africa and that of the appointed 
actuary in the UK are in essence the same.  In 2005, the appointed-actuary 
approach was replaced with a different approach.  Three positions were 
created to deal with the potential conflict of interest namely, the actuarial-
function holder, the with-profits actuary as to the reviewing actuary.  South 
Africa did not follow this change.  The question arises what the role of 
actuaries should be for regulatory solvency purposes. 
 
After the failure of Equitable Life in the UK an inquiry was ordered by the UK 
Government (House of Commons).  The Penrose report
83
 was the result of this 
inquiry.  Issues that were identified by Lord Penrose that concerned the 
actuarial profession included:  
 
 a lack of comprehensive professional standards; 
 an over-reliance on the role of the appointed actuary; 
 a lack of scrutiny, review and independent audit of actuarial 
calculations; 
 ineffective disciplinary procedures; and 
 a reluctance to challenge fellow actuaries. 
 
Following the Penrose report, the UK government requested Sir Derek Morris 
to conduct a wide-ranging independent review of the actuarial profession.  The 
result was a report commonly referred to as ‘the Morris review’. 84 
 
The review identified a number of weaknesses in the framework of self-
regulation by the actuarial profession, including: 
 
 “professional standards that have been weak, ambiguous or too limited 
in range, and perceived as influenced by commercial interests”; 
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 “an absence of pro-active monitoring of members’ compliance with 
professional standards”; and 
 “a profession that has been too introspective, not forward-looking 
enough and slow to modernise.” 
 
The report acknowledged that certain functions are appropriate to be reserved 
through legislation to actuaries, but cautioned that a professional monopoly 
may be created with a tendency to over-rely on advice received.  The review 
supported the introduction of three roles that replaced the appointed-actuary 
approach, but also recommended that the policyholder liabilities are audited as 
part of a long-term insurer’s overall audit.  South Africa did not follow any of 
these changes. 
 
7.4.2 The FSB investigation 
 
The FSB created a task force to review the role of the South African statutory 
actuary.  The task force completed their investigation in 2008.  The results and 
recommendations were not published.  A questionnaire was sent to the 
regulators of six countries, namely: 
 
 Australia; 
 Canada 
 the Netherlands; 
 Singapore; 
 the UK; and 
 the USA. 
 
The questionnaire and the responses were made available to the author.  
Information from the responses was supplemented with information from the 
applicable jurisdiction’s legislation and professional guidance.  See Appendix 
D for the FSB’s questionnaire. Appendix E gives a summary comparison of 
each country’s approach to the regulatory role of the actuary responsible for 
the financial position of a long-term insurer. 
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The aim of the FSB was to establish: 
 
 who is responsible for the financial soundness of a long-term insurer; 
 for the responsible persons, what the responsibilities are; 
 how independence is ensured; and 
 how conflicts are resolved. 
 
The responsibility to ensure that a long-term insurer is financially sound 
differs between the assessed countries’ jurisdictions.  Although the board of 
directors are in all cases responsible for the risk management of the long-term 
insurer, it is only in the USA and the Netherlands where the board of directors 
are responsible for the value of liabilities.  The board of directors are 
accountable to the shareholders of the long-term insurer.  Shareholders are 
generally interested in sustainable profits.  Senior management is usually 
incentivised on the financial performance of the company.  From agency 
theory, the conflicting interests between shareholders and management and the 
related issues that arise are known as the ‘principal-agent problem’.  This 
theory is well documented—see Laffont & Martimort (2002). For determining 
the financial position of a long-term insurer, the question how to secure 
independence is more important than who is responsible. 
 
Internationally, there are three distinct ways that have been adopted to deal 
with independence and the financial position of a long-term insurer.  The 
Netherlands has adopted the certification of the financial position by an 
independent actuary.  This actuary is not allowed to be employed by, own 
shares in or have any financial interest in the long-term insurer that is 
assessed.  It is the responsibility of management to set the valuation 
assumptions and to perform the valuation.  The certifying actuary is 
effectively acting as a specialist auditor. 
 
In the USA the assumptions and methods are prescribed by the regulator.  It is 
the appointed actuary’s role to make sure that these assumptions and methods 
are used.  The actuary may be employed by the long-term insurer.  A peer 
review by independent actuaries is not required, but the results are audited. 
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The third case is where the actuary is responsible for the assumptions and 
valuation result.  This includes where the actuary recommends the basis to the 
board of directors for approval.  The reason why the latter case is included is 
that in all cases the actuary has a whistle-blowing duty if the actuary does not 
agree with the basis.  South Africa’s approach falls in this category. 
 
Johnston (1989) was clear that the appointed actuary’s position should be a 
senior position, even a director, in the organisation.  This view is the opposite 
of the practice in the Netherlands.  In the UK, the actuarial function holder is 
still allowed to be on the board of directors after the change from the 
appointed-actuary approach to the split-role approach.  
 
The Solvency II directive
85
, which was adopted after the FSB investigation, 
requires that all insurers have an actuarial function, with duties to: 
 
 coordinate the calculation of policyholder liabilities; 
 ensure that the methods, models and assumptions are appropriate for 
the policyholder liabilities; 
 assess the quality and reliability of the data used to determine the 
policyholder liabilities; 
 compare actual experience with assumptions; 
 express an opinion on the reliability and adequacy of the policyholder 
liabilities; 
 comment on the overall underwriting policy; 
 comment on the adequacy of reinsurance arrangements; 
 contribute to the effective implementation of the risk-management 
system; and 
 assist with the solvency capital calculations.  
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There is no requirement that the actuarial function is overseen by an actuary or 
one person.  The Solvency II directive
86
 specifies that the persons carrying out 
the functions must: 
 
“...have knowledge of actuarial and financial mathematics, 
commensurate with the nature, scale and complexity of the risks 
inherent in the business of the insurance or reinsurance undertaking, 
and who are able to demonstrate their relevant experience with 
applicable professional and other standards.” 
 
An apparent omission in the list of duties is the responsibility for investments.  
The Solvency II directive requires that investments should be selected on a 
prudent-person principle where assets are chosen to best match liabilities.  
This responsibility does not form part of the actuarial function. 
 
Internationally, the management of conflicting interest is dealt with in 
different ways.  By introducing a statutory position for the responsibility and 
accountability for the valuation of liabilities, solvency capital and the 
underlying assumptions, conflict may arise.  This is because the board of 
directors’ interests are more aligned with shareholders.  A statutory position 
must balance policyholder and shareholder interests.  In addition to the 
statutory position, the UK introduced a with-profits actuary who must ensure 
that with-profits policyholders are treated fairly.  This actuary reviews the 
recommendations of the actuarial function holder to the board of directors.  
The limitation of discretion in the USA has meant that conflicting interest is 
not an issue for the appointed actuary.  Even more so for the Dutch certifying 
actuary who is not employed, incentivised or has any financial interest in the 
long-term insurer’s financial performance. 
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7.5  Conclusion 
 
In South Africa, the role of the statutory actuary is in essence the same as the 
UK’s appointed-actuary role.  This role has an arduous responsibility.  The 
statutory actuary is central to the solvency assessment because the statutory 
actuary reports on and provides assurance to the board of directors and the 
FSB on the financial soundness of a long-term insurer.  The statutory actuary 
has responsibilities in every aspect that may have an effect on the financial 
soundness of a long-term insurer.  In addition to the legislative requirements, 
prescribed by professional guidance, the statutory actuary is expected to assess 
whether regulatory capital requirements are sufficient.  If this responsibility is 
correctly discharged, it may significantly strengthen the solvency assessment 
framework.  Investigations in the UK have criticised this approach and warned 
against a monopoly that reserves roles for actuaries. 
 
Internationally, the approach of actuaries in long-term insurers’ solvency 
assessments has taken different forms.  To deal with some of the issues related 
to the appointed-actuary approach, changes have been implemented in the UK.  
Member states of the EU have also introduced a new approach, where the 
actuarial function does not place the responsibility on one actuary.  Despite 
these developments, the South African approach has not changed. 
 
There are advantages from the statutory-actuary approach.  The responsibility 
for the financial soundness of a long-term insurer is clearly the responsibility 
of one person.  By being involved in every aspect of the cycle of a policy, 
consistency in risk management can be achieved.  These aspects include 
policy design and pricing, policy alteration rules, valuation of liabilities and 
solvency capital, investment policies and dividend declaration.   
 
There are also disadvantages from the South African approach.  For large 
long-term insurers this role may be too onerous for one person, although the 
approach may work well for small and medium undertakings.  Conflicts of 
interests may arise if the statutory actuary’s remuneration is based on the long-
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term insurer’s financial performance.  Conflict may be more complex if the 
statutory actuary is also a member of the board of directors. 
 
More important than the role of the statutory actuary is the approach to 
solvency assessment.  There is more than one approach that may be 
appropriate for the assessment and management of a long-term insurer.  It is 
important that the solvency assessment framework is clearly defined and that 
regulations and guidance exist to clarify the legal requirements and the role of 
professionals in fulfilling their duties. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF INSURANCE SUPERVISORS’ 
COMMON STRUCTURE FOR THE ASSESSMENT OF INSURANCE 
SOLVENCY 
 
The IAIS common structure describes a principle-based approach to solvency 
supervision that sets out the main elements of such a structure and their 
interdependencies.  A framework has been put forward in collaboration with 
the IAA.  The structure has three levels namely:  
 
 preconditions; 
 regulatory requirements; and  
 supervisory assessment and intervention.   
 
The efficiency of the structure of supervision is further dependent on the 
quality and adequacy of institutional reporting to the supervisor as well as 
public disclosure.  A description of the structure is set out in chapters 9–11, 
followed by a critique thereof in chapter 12.  South Africa’s long-term 
insurers’ solvency requirements and approach are compared to the IAIS’s 
standards in chapters 13–16.  Although all three levels are considered, the 
focus is on level 2. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
LEVEL 1: PRECONDITIONS 
 
The first insurance core principle
87
 states three conditions that are required for 
effective insurance supervision, namely: 
 
 a policy, institutional and legal framework for financial-sector 
supervision; 
 a well developed and effective financial-market infrastructure; and 
 efficient financial markets. 
 
The IAIS acknowledges that these elements are not defined or controlled by 
insurance supervisory authorities in most international jurisdictions.  Good 
laws are not enough and support of a legal system that enforces the law is 
required.   
 
9.1 The Essential Criteria 
 
The financial-sector policy framework must be publicly disclosed. This may 
be through policy statements by government.  Statements should include the 
“institutional and legal framework” that exists for financial-sector issues. 
 
For financial market infrastructure there must be “an efficient and fair legal 
and court system” whose decisions are enforceable.  In addition, 
comprehensive and transparent accounting, actuarial and auditing standards 
must exist, that are documented and consistent with international standards.  
Disclosure of these standards must be in such a format that stakeholders can 
make informed decisions based on the disclosures.  Professional standards 
must be available, including fit-and-proper criteria for individuals in key 
positions such as an appointed actuary.  The supervisory authority, insurance 
industry and general public must also have access to basic economic, financial 
and social statistics.   
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Lastly, long-term and short-term investment opportunities must be available to 
ensure an efficient financial market. 
 
9.2 Conditions for Supervisory Authorities 
 
The second tier of conditions pertains to the supervisory authority.  These 
conditions, from the IAIS common structure, require the supervisor to have 
adequate powers to: 
 
 command the assessment and management of  the risks insurers are 
exposed to; 
 protect policyholders by setting regulatory requirements for individual 
insurers; and 
 instruct an insurer to hold more capital to reduce risk if necessary. 
 
The IAIS common structure focuses on risk management and the 
understanding of risk exposure by the insurer.  Management and 
understanding of risk imply a prospective approach with dynamic financial 
analysis over a period in excess of one year. 
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CHAPTER TEN 
LEVEL 2: REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS 
 
The regulatory requirements cover three aspects, namely financial, governance 
and market-conduct requirements.  The IAIS common structure focuses on the 
financial requirements.  Each aspect is described below. 
 
10.1 Financial Requirements 
 
The IAIS common structure requires long-term insurers to determine the value 
of assets and liabilities consistent with a ‘fair-value’ approach.  The approach 
is discussed below under the following headings: 
 
 a robust and risk-sensitive solvency regime; 
 financial requirements appropriate to the type of risk; 
 risk characteristics and components; 
 total balance sheet approach; 
 valuation and market consistency; 
 determination of current estimate; 
 role of technical provisions and capital; 
 underwriting risk in technical provisions and capital; 
 asset–liability mismatch risk in technical provisions and capital; 
 time horizon for calibration of technical provisions and capital; 
 capital requirements and diversification between risk factors; 
 cost-of-capital and percentile approaches for the determination of the 
technical provisions; and 
 use of standardised and more advance approaches, including internal 
models. 
 
10.1.1 A robust and risk-sensitive solvency regime 
 
The aim of a solvency regime should be to ensure that insurers’ obligations are 
met.  Various scenarios should be taken into consideration, including a going-
 105 
concern basis and the effect of different levels of new business, including 
closure of new business. 
 
Key objectives of the IAIS in developing the common structure for the 
assessment of insurer solvency are enhanced transparency, comparability and 
the harmonisation of global insurance solvency assessment.  A risk-based 
solvency regime is a fundamental requirement to fulfil this aim.  To achieve 
this aim, insurers must manage their own risks and show adequate robustness 
in normal and adverse circumstances. 
 
10.1.2 Financial requirements appropriate to the type of risk 
 
The solvency regime must be sensitive to risk.  It must be clear which risks 
lead to financial requirements. The level of prudence must be disclosed in the 
requirements.  Risks should be assessed individually and in addition their 
interdependence should be taken into account.  The methods may be 
quantitative, qualitative or a combination of both. 
 
The IAIS acknowledges that it is not always straightforward to quantify risks 
into a financial requirement, but that development of improved methodologies 
should be encouraged. 
 
10.1.3 Risk characteristics and components 
 
The risks in an insurance portfolio should be categorised according to the 
characteristics of these risks, for example whether a risk may be reduced by 
diversifying the portfolio or through hedging. 
   
10.1.4 Total balance sheet approach 
 
The solvency regime should recognise the interdependence between assets, 
liabilities, capital requirements and capital resources.  Risk assessment should 
therefore be an overall approach recognising the effect of risks on all 
components of the balance sheet. 
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10.1.5 Valuation and market consistency 
 
Valuation of assets, liabilities and risk exposures should be based on 
information that is identifiable and observable in financial markets and 
generally available data on insurance risks, which may include a company’s 
own experience data. 
 
There are various ways to determine the value of insurance obligations.  The 
principle is that the valuation of the obligation should be market-consistent 
and arbitrage-free.  Different techniques for market-consistent valuations exist, 
for example, the observed price if traded in a liquid market. 
 
Often a deep, liquid market for insurance obligations does not exist.  It is 
important that the values of the same liability should have consistent values in 
a solvency regime.  Some components of insurance obligations, such as 
administration expenses, will depend on a company’s own business practice 
and may therefore be different from those of other companies.  Other 
components of policyholder liabilities are independent of the insurer and 
should therefore be equal in value. 
 
Risk margins must be included where the amount and timing of future 
obligations are uncertain.  These margins are defined to be the amount 
necessary in addition to the best estimate so that an insurer would be prepared 
to take on or retain the obligation. 
 
The amount of policyholder liabilities should be calculated prospectively 
taking into account the risk characteristics of the underlying insurance 
portfolio.  The time value of money should be recognised.  Discounting of 
future obligations should be at the risk-free discount rate consistent with the 
timing and cashflow being valued.  The risk-free rates should take into 
account the term structure of interest rates derived from an appropriate zero-
coupon yield curve.   
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10.1.6 Determination of current estimate 
 
The principle is to derive parameters using best estimates at the date of 
valuation that are market-consistent. 
 
10.1.7 Role of technical provisions and capital 
 
Clear definitions of technical provisions and capital are required.  Where 
technical provisions, or insurer obligations, are based on a market-consistent 
valuation that includes risk margins, capital is required for further protection 
in case of adverse experience.  Items such as a provision for mismatching 
should be included as capital and not as technical provisions.   
 
10.1.8 Underwriting risk in technical provisions and capital 
 
The IAIS has adopted a definition of underwriting risk from a report
88
 by the 
IAA.  The definition is: 
 
“Underwriting is the specific insurance risk arising from the 
underwriting of insurance contracts. The risks within the underwriting 
risk category are associated with both the perils covered by the specific 
line of insurance and with the specific processes associated with the 
conduct of the insurance business.” 
 
For the purpose of calculating the value of technical provisions, the risk 
portfolio should be assumed to be fully diversified.  Any additional amounts 
required as a result of an undiversified risk portfolio or voluntary exposure by 
the long-term insurer should be reflected as capital. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
88
 International Actuarial Association, A global framework for insurer solvency assessment, 2004, page 
179 
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10.1.9 Asset–liability mismatch risk in technical provisions and capital 
 
As mentioned in the previous paragraph, a voluntary exposure, for example to 
mismatch assets to liabilities, should be reflected in capital.  However, 
sometimes ready matching is not available, for example at longer durations.  
Such uncertainty should be dealt with by adding a margin to the current 
estimate in determining the technical provisions, rather than increasing the 
solvency capital. 
 
10.1.10 Time horizon for calibration of technical provisions and capital 
 
Technical provisions must be calculated over the full term of exposure to risk 
of the long-term insurer.  The projection for a whole-life policy may therefore 
be for many future years. 
 
Two periods are important for the computation of the capital requirement.  
The first period is the period over which a shock is applied to a risk factor or 
group of risk factors.  The shock period is typically shorter than the term of the 
policies and is often taken as a one-year period.  The second period is the 
period over which the shock has an effect on the insurer.  The length of the 
period depends on the type of shock that is applied; for example a once-off 
shift in mortality will result in the revaluation of the technical reserves over 
the full term of the policies as opposed to a natural disaster, which may have a 
once-off effect. 
 
The technical provisions are calculated at a certain time using information 
available at that time.  This is also applicable to the risk margin included in the 
technical provisions reflecting uncertainty.  In a shock scenario, the change in 
information may have an effect on the size of the risk margins and should be 
reflected in the calculations. 
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10.1.11 Capital requirements and diversification between risk factors 
 
The capital requirement should reflect the risk exposure of a long-term insurer 
to risk.  Diversification between risk factors may be taken into account where 
this can be substantiated with satisfactory rigour. 
 
10.1.12 Cost-of-capital and percentile approach for the determination of 
the technical provisions 
 
The IAIS considered two approaches for the computation of technical 
provisions, namely the ‘cost-of-capital approach’ and the ‘percentile 
approach’. 
 
The cost-of-capital approach considers the risk–return requirements to set the 
risk margin of the technical provisions.  This is done on the basis that 
sufficient capital is required to run off a portfolio of policies.  The cost of the 
risk is measured as the cost of holding the capital to support the portfolio over 
the term of the policies, i.e. the return required by investors in addition to the 
risk-free rate of return.  A pre-condition of this approach is that the capital 
requirement is risk-sensitive. 
 
The percentile approach aims to meet policyholder obligations with a 
predefined level of certainty.  A fixed level of certainty over different classes 
of policies has the advantage of equity between different classes of business in 
the sense that the same level of protection is applied to policyholders.  Assets 
to cover discretionary benefits of with-profit policyholders may be used to 
offset capital requirements if the assets are available to absorb losses in 
adverse scenarios. 
 
The IAIS acknowledges that further investigation is necessary and that other 
methods may be considered.  Subsequently, the IAA has released a 
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comprehensive paper for the determination of technical provisions and risk 
margins
89
. 
 
10.1.13 Use of standardised and more advance approaches, including 
internal models 
 
The IAIS encourages long-term insurers to use internal models with adequate 
reporting and risk-management programmes. 
 
10.2 Governance Requirements 
 
It is of key importance to the IAIS to have sound governance policies to 
supplement the financial requirements discussed above.  Some risks may be 
managed through governance requirements only rather than by setting 
regulatory financial requirements. 
 
Two levels of governance requirements are acknowledged in the IAIS 
common structure.  The first is associated with the board of directors.  The 
members of the board of directors must have the appropriate level of technical 
expertise, experience and reputation.  Risk policies and measures should be 
established and appropriately documented.  Clear and open communication 
concerning honest and lawful behaviour to staff members is essential. 
 
The second is governance for management.  Management is responsible for 
implementation of system and controls and reporting to the board of directors.  
Insurers should make use of properly skilled staff and professionals such as 
actuaries with the suitable skills and experience to manage the risk 
programme. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
89
 International Actuarial Association, Measurement of liabilities for insurance contracts: current 
estimates and risk margins, 2010 
 111 
10.3 Market-conduct Requirements 
 
Some risks may be better addressed through market-conduct requirements 
than through financial requirements.  The aim of market-conduct requirements 
is that customers enter into suitable insurance contracts.  The customer should 
have a clear understanding of the terms of a policy at the point of sale 
including how an insurer will use its discretion. 
 
Rigorous market-conduct policies and procedures are closely linked to the 
solvency position of a long-term insurer.  Policy liabilities may arise through 
miss-selling practices that may have further consequences on other existing 
business as a result of a damaged reputation. 
 
The solvency regime should clearly define how to deal with potential and 
current customers in different circumstances and should allow scenarios that 
may cause the setting of additional solvency capital. 
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CHAPTER ELEVEN 
LEVEL 3: SUPERVISORY ASSESSMENT AND INTERVENTION 
 
The supervisory authority should have a range of measures that trigger 
intervention at different stages.  The measures should take into account the 
overall risk position of the insurer.  Corrective action should be implemented 
by the insurer to restore inadequate risk management. 
 
Additional capital prescribed by the supervisory authority may be imposed if 
the insurer does not meet the quantitative or qualitative regulatory 
requirements, including governance and market-conduct requirements.  
Additional capital should also be considered where supervisory assessment 
shows inadequate capital levels to specific risk exposures by the standard 
regulatory requirement. 
 
11.1 Public Disclosure and Transparency 
 
For supervisory purposes, disclosure and transparency of the above elements 
are essential.  Distinction should be made between public disclosure and 
disclosure to the regulator by long-term insurers. Information that is 
commercially sensitive may require disclosure to the regulator; for example 
information that is associated with innovation. 
 
Disclosure should include measures of financial strength, expected future 
development and material assumptions. The supervisor should take into 
account the disclosure requirements of accounting standards and the way they 
are applied. 
 
Supervisors must ensure that the information is meaningful and presented in a 
user-friendly way. 
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CHAPTER TWELVE 
A CRITIQUE OF THE IAIS COMMON STRUCTURE 
 
The IAIS common structure sets the framework of supervision for insurers 
with principles on various matters.  More guidance and further explanatory 
notes will be necessary to give practical guidelines to supervisors in different 
countries and jurisdictions.  Principles, such as market-consistent valuation of 
assets and liabilities are radical changes to current solvency requirements of 
some countries.  The emphasis on risk management in addition to financial 
requirements is another area of change.  Compared with the IAIS’s common 
structure some jurisdictions or supervisors, like India’s Insurance Regulatory 
and Development Authority (IRDA), have a very prudent rule-based 
approach
90
. Policyholder liabilities are determined prudently and solvency 
capital requirements are calculated with simple formulae.  Supervisors like 
these are likely to take some time before transforming successfully to 
principle-based and risk-based approaches. 
 
A critical aspect of determining the value of liabilities in a prospective 
calculation is the discount rate of future cash flows.  The IAIS common 
structure prescribes the rate to be the risk-free rate of return. To be consistent 
with the law of one price, risk-free rates should only be used if the cashflows 
are risk neutral.  The Association of British Insurers (ABI) has determined that 
the use of risk-free rates as the discount rate would increase liabilities to such 
an extent that more than £57.16 billion additional capital would be required 
for UK insurers.  This is close to the total market capitalisation of the industry 
at the time.
91
  Such costs will destabilise the industry as a whole. 
 
One of the key aspects that the IAIS common structure is not addressing is the 
assessment of group companies.  The solvency assessment on an individual 
basis for companies in a group may restrict the success of this structure if the 
                                                          
90 The Insurance Act no. 4 of 1938, Section 64VA of India & IRDA’s Circular No:065 
 
91
 Letter addressed to the Chancellor Alistair Darling dated 12 August 2009 from Mr S Haddrill, 
director-general of ABI 
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group structure is not acknowledged as a single economic entity.  Risk 
diversification across group companies will not be recognised resulting in the 
inefficient allocation of capital for companies in a group structure.  In 
addition, minimum capital requirements for some entities within the group 
may artificially increase the group’s solvency capital requirement.  The IAIS 
has issued two documents
92
 on group supervision.  These documents lack 
detail for implementation and further work is necessary. 
 
Solvency II is the EU’s project to create a harmonised system of risk-based 
prudential regulation in the European Economic Area.  The European 
Parliament has adopted a directive
93
 that sets the framework for regulation.  
The main aims for the Solvency II project are: 
 
 improved protection of policyholders; 
 increased competitiveness of EU insurers; and 
 improved allocation of capital resources.   
 
These aims are all to be achieved in a proposed risk-based solvency 
environment.  The calculation of the solvency capital requirement is based on 
either a ‘look-through’ or an ‘aggregate-deduction’ basis for group companies 
in the EU as described in the technical specifications.
94
  These terms are now 
referred to as the ‘accounting-consolidation’ and ‘deduction-aggregation’ 
methods.  The deduction-aggregation method calculates the group solvency as 
the difference between the sum of the aggregated free assets in the group and 
the aggregated solvency capital requirements in the group.  The supervisor 
considers the group structure as a single entity on the accounting-consolidation 
method, although each insurance company must cover its own SCR, without 
consideration of possible diversification benefits from other insurers in the 
group.  This means that a group of companies is not allowed to hold the 
                                                          
92
 IAIS, 
- Principles applicable to the supervision of international insurers and insurance groups and 
  their cross-border business operations,1999 
- Principles on group-wide supervision, 2008 
93
  General rules on the taking-up and pursuit of direct insurance and reinsurance, 22 April 2009 
94
 CEIOPS-DOC-23/07, Committee of European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Supervisors 
(CEIOPS), December 2007 
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regulatory capital in a holding company on behalf of its subsidiaries.  Since 
the holding company of an insurance group will also have to meet the group’s 
SCR, it is important how this capital requirement is determined.  For the 
holding company, diversification between subsidiaries is allowed and holding 
company SCR will therefore be lower than the sum of the individual insurers’ 
SCR. The recognition of a group structure is an improvement to the IAIS’s 
common solvency structure. 
 
Another aspect that is not explicitly dealt with by the IAIS’s common 
solvency structure is the potential occurrence of negative policyholder 
liabilities.  Policy design that allows high initial capital outlay that is 
recovered through future premiums may result in negative policyholder 
liabilities after the first premium has been paid.  Market-consistent valuation 
methods may also show these policyholder liabilities as negative during the 
early durations.  Many countries’ regulations do not permit negative 
policyholder liabilities.   Some jurisdictions have a more stringent requirement 
that no expected negative cashflows, after taking into account the release of 
reserve, are allowed in any future year.  This means that since the best 
estimate reserves are negative but set to zero for supervisory purposes, any net 
negative cash flow in this period will require an additional provision resulting 
in a reserve greater than zero. 
 
The main reason why supervisory authorities do not allow negative reserves is 
the uncertainty of the level of lapses or cancellations during the early durations 
of such policies. This disallowance will result in an increase of the total 
remaining policyholder liabilities, which may potentially reduce the financial 
strength of a company.  This may be addressed by setting solvency capital 
requirements to take into account scenarios such as severe withdrawals during 
the early years.  Severe withdrawal scenarios may vary from 100% 
withdrawals of such policies to less stringent scenarios.  In determining the 
solvency capital, the FSB requires long-term insurers to assume that all 
policies with negative liabilities withdraw on the valuation date.
95
  On the 
                                                          
95
 FSB, Board Notice 72 of 2005 & PGN104 Life Offices – Valuation of long-term insurers 
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other hand, for determining solvency capital a severe scenario will be 
inconsistent with the set confidence level. 
 
A related issue is the discretion that the valuator may use in setting 
assumptions, calculating solvency capital and other areas such as zeroising 
negative reserves or using approximate methods for policyholder liabilities.  
The principle that policyholder liabilities must be market-consistent suggests 
that no discretion may be used in calculating the reserves.  This may be 
impractical in some cases, such as for small schemes or where policy data are 
not credible.  There may also be an element of discretion in setting best-
estimate assumptions, for example, the anticipation of how future experience 
may be different to the most recent experience.  More guidance and further 
research on this subject are required by the IAIS.  
 
A potential difficulty is the validation of risk margins when technical 
liabilities are set. The value of most technical liabilities will be known with 
certainty only when being transferred to another party such as an insurer or 
reinsurer. There are, however, no deep liquid markets with publicly available 
prices for all types of technical liabilities.  Transfers to reinsurers may be on 
other bases than the market price for the technical liabilities, for example, a 
proportion of the risk may be ceded to the reinsurer for a proportion of the 
premium charged to the policyholder.  The premium rates to policyholders 
may have been set at a certain time and may not accurately reflect the current 
price of the risk being borne by the insurer. 
 
The calculation of the size of the risk margins by using techniques such as 
stochastic modelling will most likely result in the placement of different 
values on the technical reserves between long-term insurers, unless the 
valuation models and parameter calibration are prescribed.  Different values 
are inconsistent with the principle of a single price for a technical liability 
stated in the IAIS’s common solvency structure.  Prescribed models and 
parameter calibration are against the principle of assessing “own risk”96.  The 
                                                          
96
 The IAIS Common structure for the assessment of insurer solvency 2007, Structure element 3 
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IAIS acknowledges that no market-consistent price readily exists for most 
insurance obligations.  More guidance and further research are required on the 
topic. 
 
The challenges of validating the risk margins and valuation of insurance 
obligations in the absence of readily available market prices are also 
applicable to the valuation of other instruments where no traded market values 
exist, such as unlisted equity and property.  
 
The IAIS briefly discusses the issues associated with governance processes 
and controls such as those relating to the board of directors and to 
management in the structure document.  Further guidance
97
 is provided by the 
IAIS.  The guidance is given on the establishment and on-going operation of 
an insurance company and related undertakings as a single economic entity 
(enterprise) and its importance from a supervisory perspective.  The emphasis 
is on risk- and capital-management policies, practices and structures and the 
implementation thereof within the insurance group.  Eight key features are 
identified with guidance, namely: 
 
 governance and an enterprise-risk-management framework; 
 risk-management policy; 
 risk-tolerance statement; 
 feedback loop; 
 own risk and solvency assessment; 
 economic and regulatory capital; 
 continuity analysis; and 
 the role of supervision. 
 
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has 
over 30 member countries, including the USA and the UK.  Their aim is to 
promote policies to raise the standard of living in member countries, to grow 
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economically and to expand world trade, while maintaining financial 
stability
98
.  
 
The organisation published the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance in 
2004.  These principles are grouped under the following: 
 
 ensuring the basis for an effective corporate governance framework; 
 the rights of shareholders and key ownership functions; 
 the equitable treatment of shareholders; 
 the role of stakeholders; 
 disclosure and transparency; and 
 the responsibilities of the board. 
 
The IAIS’s guidance on enterprise risk management does not disregard the 
OECD’s principles, but rather gives a framework in which the OECD’s 
principles can be met. 
 
Further guidance by the IAIS should be issued to address the following: 
 
 market conduct; 
 transition from other methods to market-consistent methods; 
 dealing with interdependence between assets, liabilities and capital; and 
 dealing with insufficient data, for example, to model operational risk. 
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 The OECD brochure, 2008 
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CHAPTER THIRTEEN 
COMPARISON OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 
WITH THE IAIS COMMON STRUCTURE 
LEVEL 1: PRECONDITIONS 
 
The preconditions required by the IAIS are: 
 
 a well developed and effective financial-market infrastructure; and 
 efficient markets. 
 
These preconditions are discussed in more detail below. 
 
 
13.1 A Well Developed and Effective Financial-market Infrastructure 
 
The IAIS has published
99
 a set of five principles to ensure that supervision is 
effective.  The five principles require supervisory authorities to:  
 
 have “adequate powers, legal protection and financial resources to exercise 
their functions and powers”; 
 be “operationally independent, notably from political authorities and from 
insurers”; 
 be “accountable and transparent in the exercise of its functions and 
powers”; 
 hire, train and maintain “sufficient staff with high professional standards”; 
and 
 treat “confidential information appropriately.” 
 
The FSB complies with these conditions.  It is an independent organisation 
that is empowered by law to regulate all financial services institutions (except 
banks) and to promote consumer confidence.  Operationally, the FSB is 
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independent from the government, although it is accountable to the Minister of 
Finance.  It employs actuaries, accountants and other professionals. 
 
South Africa has a well developed and effective financial-market 
infrastructure.  Information is continuously published by the public and private 
sectors.  The South African Reserve Bank publishes daily information 
regarding money-market, capital-market, and currency and gold prices.  
Equity- market information is published by a news service
100
.  Exchanges exist 
for the trading of equities, fixed-interest instruments and derivatives.   
 
13.2 Efficient Financial Markets 
 
The IAIS does not define the meaning of ‘efficient financial markets’.  For the 
purposes of this dissertation it is assumed that the term is used to refer to 
information-efficiency, rather than allocation-efficiency as defined by Smith 
(1962) or operational efficiency sometimes used by economists (e.g. Dimson 
& Mussavian, 1998). 
 
Fama (1970) defines an efficient market as one in which “trading on available 
information fails to provide abnormal profit.”  Three categories are identified, 
namely the weak, semi-strong and strong forms of efficiency.  Bhana 
(unpublished), Da Silva (unpublished) and Kelly (unpublished) concluded that 
prices of listed equities were slow to react to information and that the market 
was inefficient.  Later studies such as Mabhunu (unpublished) have shown that 
the behaviour of listed equities satisfies the weak form of efficiency after the 
JSE Securities Exchange (JSE) imposed the requirement to release 
announcements via SENS in October 1997. 
 
For the weak form of market efficiency, the preconditions for insurer solvency 
assessment in South Africa as required by the IAIS are therefore satisfied. 
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CHAPTER FOURTEEN 
COMPARISON OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 
WITH THE IAIS COMMON STRUCTURE 
LEVEL 2: REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS 
 
For South African long-term insurers, solvency requirements are stated in the 
LTIA.  The overarching requirement is that a long-term insurer remains 
‘financially sound’ at all times.  An insurer must have assets that are sufficient 
to provide for the liabilities and to generally conduct business. 
  
The LTIA states that the method of calculating values of assets and liabilities 
must be on the financial-soundness method described by the Actuarial Society 
of South Africa’s guidance in concurrence with the FSB.  The order of priority 
is stated in Board Notice (BN) 72 issued by the FSB.  The highest priority is 
given to any requirement stated in the LTIA, followed by requirements stated 
in BN 72 and then by the guidance notes issued by the Actuarial Society.  This 
guidance is mainly set out in PGN 104
101
 and PGN 110
102
. Various board 
notices and directives issued by the FSB exist with additional requirements.  
The key requirements are prescribed in: 
 
 Board Notice 72 of 2005
103
; 
 Directive 139.A.i (LT)
 104
; 
 Directive 140.A.ii (LT)
105
; 
 Directive 140.B.iii (LT)
106
; 
 Directive 141.A.i (LT)
107
; and 
 Directive 145.A.i (LT)
108
. 
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The LTIA allows the FSB to gather information from long-term insurers. This 
information is provided through standard quarterly and annual returns. 
 
The question arises how the above framework of South Africa compares with 
the requirements of the IAIS. 
 
The South African regulatory framework is compared below with the IAIS 
common structure, which is described in Chapters 7–11.  The IAIS common 
structure can be categorized in: 
 
 a robust solvency regime; 
 a risk-based solvency regime; and 
 valuation principles. 
 
In this chapter, this comparison is discussed for these categories. To avoid 
repetition of the same points, each of these categories is divided in sub-
categories that are at a more granular level than discussed in the previous 
chapters.  For example, the requirement of a ‘total-balance-sheet approach’ is 
considered in various sub-categories, namely: 
 
 solvency capital; 
 recognise the interdependence of risk; 
 valuation of assets; and 
 valuation of liabilities. 
 
For this example, points made under the last two sub-categories are also applicable to 
‘valuation and market consistency’. 
 
The FSB is assessed and scored against these requirements.  The scores are 
defined as a number that indicates whether the FSB has met, partially met or 
have not met the requirement: 
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1 - this requirement or feature is not met; 
2 - traces of this requirement or feature may be present, but not necessarily 
robust; and 
3 - the requirement or feature is fully met or present. 
 
14.1 A Robust Solvency Regime  
 
To fulfil the requirements of a robust solvency regime the regulator has to 
consider well defined and disclosed measures of a long-term insurer’s 
financial strength. The regulator must show that there are: 
 
 a high degree of certainty that insurance obligations can be met; 
 a specified probability level of the overall safety required; 
 transparency; 
 comparability of long-term insurers’ short-term solvency positions; and 
 comparability of long-term insurers’ long-term solvency positions.  
 
14.1.1 A high degree of certainty that insurance obligations can be met  
 
The measure ‘a high degree of certainty that insurance obligations can be met’ 
requires the long-term insurer to meet obligations of the existing book of in-
force policies in various scenarios including the potential effect of new 
business. 
 
The statutory valuation method (SVM) described in BN 72 and PGN 104 
requires the insurer to consider existing policies on a going-concern basis 
when calculating policyholder liabilities and capital adequacy requirements.  
Dardis et al. (unpublished) verified that certain of the risk components of the 
capital requirements are prescribed to “provide protection to the 95th 
percentile.”  This level of protection is over the duration of all policies, as 
opposed to a protection at the 99.5% percentile over a one-year period for 
Solvency II–which gives a similar level of protection. For additional 
protection, there are restrictions on the value of assets that are independent of 
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the valuation methods for the values of policyholder liabilities and capital 
requirements.  These restrictions apply to prohibit concentrations of assets by 
type and counter party.  For the lapse and surrender risk components the 
policyholder liabilities and capital must be sufficient to cover a ‘run-on-the-
bank’ scenario.  This requirement is more onerous than the requirements for 
other risk components. 
 
There is no explicit consideration of the potential effect of future new 
business.  The FSB monitors long-term insurers by assessing information from 
the standard quarterly and annual returns.  Statement G5
109
 in the annual 
return requires the statutory actuary or alternate to certify that: 
 
 taking into account new business, the statutory actuary expects the result 
of the SVM to be favourable in one year’s time; 
 new business terms will not endanger the financial soundness of the 
company; and 
 the reserves and capital are adequate given the company’s marketing and 
new- business plans. 
 
In addition to the above requirements, the statutory actuary is required to 
consider the appropriateness of the compulsory margins, discretionary margins 
and CAR requirements (see chapter 8).  If this duty is appropriately 
discharged, it significantly increases the certainty that policyholder liabilities 
will be met. 
 
These methods for calculating the values of policyholder liabilities, solvency 
capital, the restrictions on asset values and the duty of the statutory actuary to 
include additional discretionary margins, give a high degree of certainty that 
insurance obligations can be met.  The duty of the statutory actuary to certify 
the financial-soundness valuation and the frequent submission of information 
to the FSB give additional confidence.  The overall score allocated is therefore 
3. 
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14.1.2 A specified probability level of the overall safety required  
 
PGN 104 states in ¶6.1 that the solvency requirement is set so that the 
minimum assets a long-term insurer is required to hold in excess of its 
liabilities is based on an “approximate [sic] 95% confidence level”.  The PGN 
further states in ¶6.10.3.1 that mortality is based on a 95% confidence level 
over a one-year period.  This contradicts previous paragraphs which indicate 
that the confidence level is over the duration of the insurance portfolio. 
 
There is no explicit confidence level specified to determine the policyholder 
liabilities.  This is partly due to discretion that may be used when calculating 
the policyholder liabilities, for example, the statutory actuary may zeroise 
negative policyholder liabilities.  The solvency capital methodology provides 
for this discretion through different rules.  The statutory actuary is required to 
consider the sufficiency of the components of the solvency capital. If there is 
any evidence that the risk of the underlying portfolio is more than the risk 
assumed in PGN 104, the statutory actuary should consider increasing the 
solvency capital.  BN 72 and PGN 104 specify conditions that may be more 
onerous than an overall targeted level of a 95% confidence interval.  Examples 
are the requirement to hold an absolute minimum of the greater of R10 million 
and 13 weeks’ operational expenses, and the requirement to assume a 100% 
run-on-the-bank scenario if negative liabilities are allowed. This may result in 
a solvency capital level that exceeds the 95% confidence level.   
 
PGN 104 allows management actions to reduce the CAR result.  An example 
is the reduction of future bonuses for with-profit policyholders after a fall in 
asset values.  Management actions and the ability of the statutory actuary to 
add discretionary margins to the policyholder liabilities may have a significant 
effect on the confidence level associated with the solvency assessment. 
  
This requirement may be seen as partly meeting the IAIS’s requirement since 
the minimum level of solvency is defined.  The contradiction in PGN 104 
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regarding the time horizon of the confidence level needs clarification by the 
Actuarial Society of South Africa.  The score allocated is thus 2. 
 
14.1.3 Transparency 
 
Transparency involves enhancing and improving standards in the assessment 
of insurers worldwide. The IAIS common structure states that long-term 
insurers should make information public to: 
 
“enhance market discipline and provide strong incentives for insurers 
to conduct their business in a safe, sound and efficient manner which 
treats policyholders fairly.” 
 
The IAIS also states that: 
 
“Information provided to the supervisor and subject to confidentiality 
supports and fosters openness on commercially sensitive issues 
between the supervisor and the insurer.” 
 
The objective is to establish whether the South African regulatory 
environment encourages transparency of long-term insurance companies’ 
solvency information according to international standards and guidance. 
  
The requirement to be transparent may be met through disclosure of 
information.  The IAIS has published numerous guidance and standards 
regarding disclosure requirements.  Insurance Core Principle 26
110
 states that: 
 
“The supervisory authority requires insurers to disclose relevant 
information on a timely basis in order to give stakeholders a clear view 
of their business activities and financial position and to facilitate the 
understanding of the risks to which they are exposed.” 
 
                                                          
110
 IAIS, Insurance core principles and methodology,  2003 
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Detailed standards and guidance are given in: 
 
 IAIS Standard on disclosure concerning investment risks and 
performance for insurers and reinsurers (October 2005); 
 IAIS Standard on disclosure concerning technical performance and 
risks for non-life insurers and reinsurers (October 2004); 
 IAIS Guidance paper on public disclosure by insurers (January 2002); 
and 
 IAIS Guidance paper on investment risk management (October 2004). 
 
Disclosure may be grouped into two categories, namely ‘public disclosure’ 
and ‘disclosure to the supervisor’. 
 
Public disclosure 
 
The IAIS guidance
111
 states that “risk disclosure is critical to the operation of a 
sound market”.  Disclosure is of interest to policyholders and investors.  
Policyholders are concerned with the long-term insurance company’s ability to 
pay claims as they fall due, whereas investors require at least a fair return on 
their investment. 
 
The guidance by the IAIS addresses the quality of disclosure and what should 
be disclosed.  Supervisors have an important role to encourage insurers to 
disclose adequate and timely information to market participants. 
 
The quality of disclosure is further categorised in:  
 relevance: 
 timeliness; 
 accessibility; 
 comprehensiveness; 
 reliability; 
 comparability; and 
                                                          
111
 IAIS, Guidance paper on public disclosure by insurers, 2002 
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 consistency. 
This is explained further below. 
 
Relevance–information is deemed relevant if it is material in the decision-
making process of an investor or policyholder.  
 
Timelines–it is desirable that information is released in a timely fashion to 
reflect the true picture of the state of affairs, while allowing enough time to be 
at an acceptable level of accuracy. 
 
Accessibility–access to information should be affordable.  Electronic means of 
disclosure such as the internet are strongly encouraged. 
 
Comprehensiveness–disclosure should be broad enough to give informed 
market participants adequate information to understand the inherent risks of 
the long-term insurer’s business in order to make well-versed investment 
decisions.   
 
Reliability–disclosed information should also reflect the true nature of events 
that may be relevant to the stakeholders.  In particular, it should reflect the 
economic substance and legal result of transactions.  Enough details should be 
disclosed to give the full picture of the related event.  Presentations of 
disclosure should take the form of generally accepted national and 
international standards for the ease of comparability among long-term 
insurers.  An example is the IASB’s IFRS 7112.   
 
Comparability–in addition to the quality of disclosure, the content of public 
disclosure must be meaningful to stakeholders.  In order to make valid 
comparisons to other long-term insurers, sufficient detail should be published 
so that the accounting and actuarial policies, methods and underlying 
assumptions are easily understood. 
  
                                                          
112
 IASB, IFRS 7: Financial Instruments: Disclosures 
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Information to explain the appropriateness of assets, liabilities and solvency-
capital values should be shown, including the valuation methods and 
underlying assumptions.  Any material changes in the underlying assumptions 
with the financial effect should be disclosed. 
 
The recent past and expected future performance should be disclosed.  A profit 
and loss account must be included with additional reports to explain: 
 
 the nature and sources of surplus; 
 investment performance; and 
 changes in equity. 
 
Factors that influence the variability of results and the future strategy and 
outlook should be discussed. 
 
Consistency–methods and assumptions used by long-term insurers should be 
consistent between time periods.  Any changes should be disclosed together 
with the financial effect of the change. 
 
Useful disclosures are the strategies for managing risk and the effectiveness of 
those strategies.  The disclosures should enhance stakeholders’ understanding 
of the stability and viability of the long-term insurer.  Sensitivities and stress-
testing results should be disclosed.  The risk areas that should be addressed are 
typically risks relating to the policyholder liabilities, assets and other areas that 
may have a bearing on the long-term insurer’s ability to meet its obligations. 
The presentation of information should be qualitative and, where appropriate, 
quantitative to help market participants understand the nature and potential 
result of the material exposures to risk and how the long-term insurer manages 
these exposures. 
 
Stakeholders should be provided with information about the insurer’s 
business, management and corporate governance.  The information might 
include board structure, the structure of ownership, strategic alliances, the 
regulatory framework etc. 
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Public disclosure in South Africa 
 
The IAIS advocates that a supervisor should encourage public disclosure by 
long-term insurers.  Financial reporting disclosures are mainly under the 
control of the Registrar of Companies in South Africa.  The Registrar of 
Companies together with professional bodies such as the South African 
Institute of Chartered Accountants (SAICA) determines the minimum 
disclosure requirements for companies’ published financial results. 
 
The Accounting Practices Board (APB) was established to issue ‘statements of 
general accepted practices’ (GAAP) and, ‘general recommended accounting 
practices’ (GRAP).   Another function is to make recommendations to the 
government, Independent Regulatory Board for Auditors or to the Standing 
Advisory Committee in terms of the Companies Act 1973
113
.  The APB was 
established by the following bodies: 
 
 the South African Institute of Chartered Accountants; 
 the Independent Regulatory Board for Auditors; 
 the Johannesburg Stock Exchange; 
 the Association of Chambers of Commerce of South Africa; 
 die Afrikaanse Handelsinstituut; 
 the South African Federated Chamber of Industries; 
 the Chamber of Mines of South Africa; and 
 the Steel and Engineering Industries Federation of South Africa. 
 
These bodies all have representation on the APB. 
 
South Africa has been harmonising its statements of GAAP with international 
standards since 1993.  From 1 January 2005, the APB has adopted 
international financial reporting standards without amendments
114
 as local 
GAAP.   The statements include IASs issued by the IASC and IFRSs issued 
by the IASB, the successor of the IASC.  
                                                          
113
 Act No. 61 of 1973, Republic of South Africa 
114
SAICA, Circular 7, 2004 
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The reporting standard for policyholder liabilities is IFRS 4
115
.  The standard 
specifies that all policy contracts need to be specified as either insurance or 
investment contracts.  Insurance contracts are to be valued according to local 
GAAP and investment contracts according to IAS 39
116
. 
 
Insurance contracts are subject to a liability adequacy test in terms of IFRS 4. 
The purpose of the test is to ensure that the liability held is sufficient to meet 
all expected future obligations under the contract, including guarantees and 
options.  Future obligations are estimated using current estimates of future 
cash flows. If the test shows that the liability is inadequate, the entire shortfall 
needs to be recognised as a loss.  The financial soundness valuation (FSV) as 
set out in PGN 104 satisfies this requirement.  It is also the basis for the 
statutory valuation method (SVM) used for the FSB.  Investment contracts, 
however, are subject to valuation as stipulated in IAS 39.  This valuation may 
show very different results to the FSV results. 
 
IFRS requires: 
 
“… disclosure that identifies and explains the amounts in an insurer’s 
financial statements arising from insurance contracts and helps users of 
those financial statements understand the amount, timing and uncertainty 
of future cash flows from insurance contracts.”  
 
In addition to this aim, IAS 1.17(c) requires that a reporting entity shall: 
 
 “… provide additional disclosures when compliance with the specific 
requirements in IFRSs is insufficient to enable users to understand the 
impact of particular transactions, other events and conditions on the 
entity’s financial position and financial performance.” 
 
                                                          
115
 IASB, IFRS 4 – Insurance Contracts, 2005 
116
 IASB, IAS 39 – Financial instruments: recognition and measurement, 2005 
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Another disclosure requirement from the Companies Act, 1973 is a statement 
in the annual financial report by the statutory actuary.  The statutory actuary 
has to certify whether the long-term insurer is financially sound. This 
requirement is stated in the Companies Act, 1973
117
: 
 
“... in the case of a long-term insurer, a report by the Statutory Actuary 
shall be included in the financial statements, in accordance with a 
guideline issued by the Actuarial Society of South Africa.” 
 
Companies listed on the JSE are to abide by the JSE listing requirements. 
These requirements
118
 demand companies to disclose ‘relevant company 
information’.  ‘Relevant company information’ is defined as company 
announcements and price sensitive company releases.  The JSE has 
established an office called the ‘Securities Exchange News Service’. All 
relevant company information received by the office is, after authentication 
and JSE approval, electronically communicated to the subscribers of the 
service. The service facilitates early, equal and wide distribution of 
information, and as mentioned in section 13.2, has improved the market 
efficiency from its previous inefficient form to weakly efficient. 
 
The requirements for policyholder-specific information mainly stems from the 
LTIA.  Comprehensive disclosure is required when concluding a long-term 
insurance contract.  The policyholder protection rules
119
 express these 
requirements in detail.  For policies with benefits that have discretionary 
elements the principles and practices of financial management
120
 must be 
disclosed on the website of the long-term insurer. 
 
The above disclosure requirements satisfy the IAIS’s requirements on the 
content of disclosure.  However, a large part of the accounting standards on 
disclosure is principle-based rather than rule-based.  Various interpretations 
and applications of these principles exist.  
                                                          
117
 Act no. 61 as amended, Republic of South Africa, Schedule 4, ¶14 
118
 JSE listing requirements, 2003, Schedule 19 
119
 Long-term Insurance Act, Policyholder protection rules, 2004 
120
 FSB, Direct 140,A.i, Governance of discretionary participating business, 2006 
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The required level of quality relating to public disclosure is difficult to 
determine, since most of the disclosure requirements prescribed in IFRS 4 are 
principle-based, rather than rule-based.  This has resulted in a large variety of 
practices by individual long-term insurers depending on their size and whether 
they are listed or privately held companies.  Information published through 
SENS is aimed at investors in shares rather than policyholders.  Policyholders 
will benefit from this information once market commentators interpret and 
publish the SENS announcement. 
 
 
In conclusion, public disclosure in South Africa involves requirements by 
more bodies than just the FSB.  These requirements generally follow 
international reporting standards governed by the Registrar of Companies 
through accounting practices and by the JSE listing requirements for listed 
companies.  Disclosures through annual financial reporting are mainly aimed 
at shareholders and analysts, whilst information published through SENS is 
aimed at investors and market commentators.  The FSB has issued limited 
guidance on public disclosure for long-term insurers. 
 
Disclosure to the supervisor 
 
Commercially sensitive information that is relevant for the assessment of 
solvency should only be disclosed to the supervisor. 
 
Disclosure to the FSB 
 
The LTIA gives the FSB the right to request and gather information.  The 
information may be either routine or specific.  Once-off requests may be 
industry- or company- specific.  The information may be about the long-term 
insurer’s shareholders121, relating to its business122, or if solvency minimum 
standards are breached
123
. 
                                                          
121
 Long-term Insurance Act, part 3, section 27 
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The FSB’s practice is to gather information through four summarizing 
quarterly returns and one comprehensive annual return.  The quarterly returns 
contain: 
 
 a revenue account; 
 a financial position statement; 
 movement and cashflow statistics; and 
 an asset admissible statement. 
 
The annual returns have the naming convention of the letters “LT” together 
with the calendar year since 2006, whereas before 2006 the returns were 
known as the LT2000 irrespective of the calendar year. These returns require 
detailed information regarding: 
 
 management information; 
 data; 
 the valuation method; 
 financial statements; 
 assets; 
 futures and options; 
 general reports; and 
 cell captives. 
 
It is a requirement that the long-term insurer’s auditors, directors, public 
officer and statutory actuary sign these statements. 
 
The sections of the return are split between “available to public” and “not 
available to public”.  The question arises whether the FSB is entitled to 
publicise the information.  As mentioned before, the FSB’s functions are 
stipulated in the Financial Service Board Act, 1990
124
 namely: 
                                                                                                                                                                      
122
 Long-term Insurance Act, part 3, section 36 
123
 Long-term Insurance Act, part 3, section 35 
124
 Act no. 97 of 1990 as amended, Republic of South Africa, section 3 
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 to supervise and enforce laws; 
 to advise the Minister of Finance; and 
 to promote programmes and initiatives by financial institutions to 
inform and educate users and potential users of financial products and 
services. 
 
The functions specified do not give the FSB the explicit right to publish 
company-specific information.  The Promotion of Access to Information Act, 
2000
125
 states that one of the objects of this Act is “...to give effect to the 
constitutional right of access to any information held by the State...”  Subject 
to personal confidentiality, the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa
126
  
also states that everyone has access to:  
 
 “any information held by the State; and  
 any information that is held by another person and that is required for 
the exercise or protection of any rights.” 
 
The current practice of the FSB is to make available certain sections of long-
term insurers’ annual returns for a fee on request.  In addition, information 
regarding industry valuation assumptions, assets, solvency capital etc. is 
available from its website.  No information is made available to the public 
from the quarterly submissions. 
 
The FSB requires copies of the annual financial statements with the 
submission of the annual long-term return. 
 
Overall, long-term insurers publish a large quantity of financial information.  
Disclosures are generally regulated by the Registrar of Companies and the 
FSB.  Financial reporting is also subject to professional standards set by 
professional bodies such as the APB and the Actuarial Society of South 
Africa. 
                                                          
125
 Act no. 2 of 2000, Republic of South Africa, part 1 
126
 Act no. 108 of 1996 as amended, Republic of South Africa, section 32 
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The overall score allocated is therefore 3. 
 
14.1.4 Comparability of long-term insurer’s short-term solvency position 
 
The requirement for comparability between local companies may be satisfied 
if consistent methods and the same assumptions are used to determine the 
values of assets, liabilities and solvency capital in such a way that the FSB can 
make valid comparisons between long-term insurers at any time. In addition, 
the solvency progression for similar business should develop consistently over 
time. 
 
The LTIA requires assets to be valued on the method prescribed by the FSB 
after consultation with the Actuarial Society of South Africa.  BN 72 issued by 
the FSB requires assets to be valued in accordance with local GAAP as 
applied in the annual financial statements.  The ASP has adopted international 
standards as local GAAP.  The statutory requirement, which is demanded by 
the FSB, is to value assets at fair value but to make certain adjustments, for 
example to the value of group undertakings.  Group undertakings may be held 
only at the lower of fair value and net asset value for unlisted undertakings.  
Listed group undertakings may be shown as: 
 
          (     )    (     )  (25)  
 
where: 
                                                                  
  is the net asset value of the group undertaking; and 
  is the fair value of the group undertaking. 
 
The net asset value for regulated financial institutions is defined as the value 
of assets less the value of liabilities less the value of capital requirements.  All 
long-term insures have to comply with these practices.  In addition, the LTIA 
has a list of assets to be disregarded: 
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 current assets that remained unpaid for longer than one year; 
 premiums outstanding for longer than 90 days; 
 development costs; 
 goodwill; 
 negative liabilities; 
 prepaid expenses; and 
 reinsurance contracts. 
 
Negative liabilities are allowed to be offset against positive liabilities.  
Similarly, reinsurance contracts will increase or reduce policyholder liabilities, 
rather than be accounted for as assets.  The remainder of the items in the list 
above is to introduce a level of prudence in demonstrating solvency. 
 
Assets used to show solvency in respect of non-linked liabilities have to be 
listed in the LTIA
127
.  Assets that are not on the list, such as art, may not be 
used in statutory reporting.  The main classes of assets, including derivatives, 
are on this list. 
 
In demonstrating solvency, the proportions held in assets classes are limited
128
.  
Long-term insurers are, however, obliged to report on the values before and 
after these limits are applied.  The FSB therefore has a fair picture of the value 
of these assets and is in a position to compare the value of assets of long-term 
insurers on the statutory and accounting bases. 
 
The financial statements and long-term return to the FSB are reviewed by the 
long-term insurer’s auditors.  Asset values, with the exception of group 
undertakings and assets not permitted by the LTIA, may therefore be seen as 
broadly meeting the requirement to be comparable between long-term 
insurers. 
 
                                                          
127
 Long-term Insurance Act, schedule 1(3) 
128
 Regulations to Long-term Insurance Act, part 2, section 9 
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BN 72 requires liabilities to be valued on the SVM.  The method is described 
in PGN 104 and involves calculating the policyholder liabilities on a 
“prudently realistic basis”.  This approach requires assumptions to be 
determined on a best-estimate basis and prescribed compulsory margins to 
introduce a minimum level of prudence. Discretionary margins are allowed if 
the statutory actuary is of the opinion that the compulsory margins are 
insufficient for prudent reserving or to allow profit release consistent with 
product design or company practice.  BN 72 requires all discretionary margins 
to be defined, quantified and explained. 
 
Management actions that are allowed to reduce CAR may also make 
comparisons more difficult.  However, all management actions and their 
financial effects have to be disclosed. 
 
The current method enables the FSB to make comparison between long-term 
insurers valued at the same time.  Adjustments may be necessary to take 
account of discretionary margins.  Long-term insurers with different financial 
year-ends will not be directly comparable.  This is due to the fact that all 
economic assumptions are based on the values derived at the market rates as at 
the valuation date.  Similarly, long-term insurers that have their solvency 
levels calculated on different bases, as a result of their different relative 
exposure to lapse risk versus other risks will be difficult to compare. 
 
Other variables may also be affected if market conditions change drastically 
over a period for companies that have financial year-ends that are different; for 
example, if economic conditions deteriorate drastically policyholders may not 
be able to afford premiums.  Comparison of companies with the same 
financial year-end will however be valid.  The FSB has the right to request 
additional information from long-term insurers with different financial year-
ends.  The score allocated is therefore 3. 
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14.1.5 Comparability of long-term insurer’s long-term solvency position 
 
The results of a 10-year model-office projection are used to consider the 
solvency development over time.  The question to be answered is whether 
solvency is materially different if there is different but appropriate application 
of legislation for the same business. 
 
The deterministic projection is done monthly and is based on a simple scenario 
where a life office only sells 15-year term-assurance policies where initial 
expenses exceed at least three months’ premiums.  No surrender values are 
payable.  The initial sum assured is payable on death and there is no survival 
benefit.  The premiums include a profit loading. 
 
Assets backing the policyholder liabilities are assumed to be 50% in cash and 
50% in equities.  This causes a slight mismatch, but was chosen to produce 
higher capital adequacy requirement (CAR).   Shareholders’ initial assets are 
assumed to be invested in cash (20%), fixed-interest instruments (25%), 
property (25%) and equities (30%). 
 
The valuation model and assumptions are given in Appendix A. 
 
CAR is calculated according to PGN 104 and BN 72 – see below. 
 
Three factors are considered to assess whether different solvency scenarios 
will result from exactly the same business over time. The factors are: 
 
 new business volume; 
 dividend philosophy; and 
 discretion. 
 
Corporate and policyholder tax are ignored. 
 
The following illustrative projections explain the interactions further. 
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A comparison of a growing long-term insurer that allows negative 
liabilities with a long-term insurer that eliminates negative liabilities 
 
The 15-year term with upfront expenses in excess of the initial premium 
generates negative policyholder liabilities in the early duration of a policy.  
This is due to the uneven incidence of expenses.  For a policy, high initial 
expenses are followed by low administration costs while the premium charged 
is level for the duration of the policy.    The high initial costs are recovered 
over the term of the policy.  Since the value of the policyholder liability equals 
the discounted value of outflow less the discounted value of inflow, the 
premium portion to recover the initial cost will cause the policyholder liability 
at early durations to be negative.  The discounted value of the premiums 
therefore exceeds the discounted value of claims and administration expenses 
for the early durations of the policy.  As the cost of claims increases the 
policyholder liability also increases and eventually becomes positive.  As 
mentioned above, negative liabilities are allowed in South Africa, but have 
onerous solvency capital requirements.  The FSB has issued a directive
129
 
clarifying the requirements of the LTIA, which prescribes amounts to be 
disregarded when calculating the value of assets.  Negative policyholder 
liabilities may be used to offset positive policyholder liabilities, outstanding 
claims and other current liabilities.  For illustrative purposes it is assumed that 
the long-term insurer has sufficient current liabilities to allow negative 
policyholder liabilities. 
 
The illustrative projections assume a new long-term insurer with share capital 
of R10 million issues 100 policies in month one and then increases the number 
of new business policies each month. See Appendix A for the new-business-
volume assumptions. 
 
                                                          
129
 FSB, Directive 145.A.i (LT), Disregarding amounts representing negative liabilities in respect of 
long-term policies when calculating the value of assets according to Paragraph 4(iv) of schedule 3 to 
the Long-term Insurance Act, 1998, 2004 
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The statutory actuary has the discretion to eliminate negative policyholder 
liabilities.  The lapse requirement in the CAR is reduced as a result of the 
elimination of negative reserves, but the policyholder liabilities are increased. 
 
The CAR cover is defined as the free assets divided by the CAR, where the 
free assets are equal to the total assets less total liabilities.  Dividends are paid 
so that the CAR cover after a dividend payment is equal to one, but are limited 
so that the free assets do not reduce below the initial capital injected by 
shareholders (in the illustrative projections R10 million).   
 
The LTIA requires CAR cover to be at least one for assets and liabilities 
valued on the SVM.  The projections below assume that it is not necessary to 
disregard any assets and that assets are of the right kind and within the allowed 
limits according to the LTIA. 
 
Tables 1 and 2 below show the results of the model-office projection including 
the progression of CAR cover and value of in-force business over a 10-year 
period.  Table 2 shows the SVM results if negative liabilities are allowed.  
Table 3 shows the results if negative liabilities are set to zero.   
 
The ‘value of in-force’ is the expected future profit discounted at the risk 
discount rate.  The value of the CAR is dependent on the ordinary CAR 
(OCAR), which in turn is dependent on the values of the intermediary 
ordinary CAR (IOCAR) and the ‘gross-up factor’.  The derivation of these 
items is shown in section 6.3.2 and Appendix A. 
 
The ‘CAR cover’ is a measure of financial strength and shows the number of 
times the shareholder assets (free assets) is covering the CAR. 
 
The results of the above two projections and suggested improvements are 
discussed below.  
 
The comparison of the results in Table 2 with those in Table 3 shows that the 
elimination of negative reserves increases policyholder liabilities.  However, 
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the reduction in CAR is less than the value of the negative reserves since the 
lapse item in CAR is not additional to the other CAR items if the prescribed 
formulae are applied.  Table 3 shows that the long-term insurer would not be 
financially sound in years 6, 7 and 8, even though the accumulated dividends 
paid to date were less than that for a long-term insurer that has allowed 
negative policyholder liabilities.  This is not a desirable feature for a 
supervisor, shareholders and policyholders. 
 
The main reason for the different solvency progressions shown in Tables 1 and 
2 is that expected future profits are released earlier in the first projection 
without an equal increase in CAR.  These profits can be paid as dividends.  In 
the second projection, the expected value of future profit is shown as a
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Table 2. A growing life office allowing negative reserves with a CAR cover target of at least 1  
Year 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Income statement 
          
Premium Income 773,180 2,289,274 4,594,950 9,531,408 20,993,567 41,935,172 71,237,765 106,721,574 149,737,056 202,413,492 
Acquisition expenses 532,786 738,598 1,311,667 3,004,208 6,558,337 11,078,977 14,984,604 18,730,755 23,413,443 29,266,804 
Operating expenses 71,379 215,192 438,002 913,567 2,013,783 4,039,956 6,927,214 10,506,107 14,926,559 20,415,865 
Claims 426,710 1,284,547 2,605,319 5,421,205 11,941,069 23,930,801 40,936,593 61,863,444 87,536,165 119,263,449 
Net Cashflow -257,695 50,936 239,960 192,428 480,378 2,885,439 8,389,354 15,621,269 23,860,889 33,467,373 
Increase in reserve -808,201 -856,061 -1,406,935 -3,442,639 -7,482,320 -11,253,812 -12,127,453 -11,458,279 -11,023,163 -10,855,861 
Investment return on reserve -29,049 -91,416 -171,672 -336,693 -735,374 -1,458,557 -2,378,879 -3,288,120 -4,154,111 -4,995,564 
Insurance result 521,457 815,581 1,475,223 3,298,373 7,227,324 12,680,694 18,137,928 23,791,428 30,729,941 39,327,670 
Investment return on free assets 862,437 872,396 892,869 948,734 1,082,774 1,630,472 2,813,681 4,089,196 5,406,202 6,870,068 
Profit before tax 1,383,894 1,687,977 2,368,092 4,247,107 8,310,099 14,311,166 20,951,609 27,880,624 36,136,143 46,197,737 
Dividend paid 1,383,465 1,682,158 2,351,549 4,216,461 4,164,600 2,644,992 7,942,834 14,637,262 21,493,182 26,979,795 
Retained profit 429 5,819 16,543 30,645 4,145,498 11,666,173 13,008,774 13,243,362 14,642,961 19,217,942 
           
Balance Sheet 
          
Total assets 9,191,799 8,335,738 6,928,804 3,486,165 101,142 410,593 1,032,986 2,302,022 5,063,686 12,142,004 
Policyholder liabilities -808,201 -1,664,262 -3,071,196 -6,513,835 -13,996,155 -25,249,967 -37,377,420 -48,835,698 -59,858,861 -70,714,722 
Shareholders account 10,000,000 10,000,000 10,000,000 10,000,000 14,097,297 25,660,560 38,410,406 51,137,721 64,922,548 82,856,726 
Equity 3,156,387 3,216,680 3,295,412 3,606,789 5,689,271 10,184,010 13,336,210 14,560,520 14,613,340 14,390,664 
Property 2,302,106 2,065,675 1,753,075 1,292,613 1,045,968 993,969 863,379 703,626 554,121 438,172 
Fixed interest instruments 2,371,861 2,192,754 1,917,310 1,456,547 1,214,334 1,188,931 1,064,018 893,415 724,903 590,588 
Cash 2,169,645 2,524,890 3,034,204 3,644,051 6,147,724 13,293,651 23,146,800 34,980,160 49,030,184 67,437,301 
           
Value of in-force 385,780 874,352 1,736,590 3,754,158 8,137,741 15,320,129 24,611,523 35,799,132 49,434,733 66,161,910 
           
TCAR 808,201 1,664,262 3,071,196 6,514,170 14,097,297 25,660,560 38,410,406 51,137,721 64,922,548 81,271,117 
IOCAR 754,501 1,578,706 2,632,316 4,891,741 9,878,532 17,977,343 28,084,799 39,742,909 53,632,757 70,589,270 
Gross-up factor 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 
OCAR 885,623 1,853,064 3,089,777 5,741,860 11,595,286 21,101,562 32,965,556 46,649,687 62,953,401 82,856,726 
CAR 885,623 1,853,064 3,089,777 6,514,170 14,097,297 25,660,560 38,410,406 51,137,721 64,922,548 82,856,726 
           
Free assets before dividend 11,383,465 11,682,158 12,351,549 14,216,461 18,261,898 28,305,553 46,353,240 65,774,983 86,415,729 109,836,521 
           
CAR cover before dividend                12.85                    6.30                    4.00                    2.18                    1.30                    1.10                   1.21                    1.29                     1.33                    1.33  
Dividend         1,383,465            1,682,158            2,351,549            4,216,461            4,164,600            2,644,992           7,942,834           14,637,262           21,493,182          26,979,795  
CAR cover after dividend                11.29                    5.40                    3.24                    1.54                    1.00                    1.00                   1.00                    1.00                     1.00                    1.00  
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Table 3. A growing life office eliminating negative reserves with a CAR cover target of at least 1  
Year 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Income statement 
          
Premium Income 773,180 2,289,274 4,594,950 9,531,408 20,993,567 41,935,172 71,237,765 106,721,574 149,737,056 202,413,492 
Acquisition expenses 532,786 738,598 1,311,667 3,004,208 6,558,337 11,078,977 14,984,604 18,730,755 23,413,443 29,266,804 
Operating expenses 71,379 215,192 438,002 913,567 2,013,783 4,039,956 6,927,214 10,506,107 14,926,559 20,415,865 
Claims 426,710 1,284,547 2,605,319 5,421,205 11,941,069 23,930,801 40,936,593 61,863,444 87,536,165 119,263,449 
Net Cashflow -257,695 50,936 239,960 192,428 480,378 2,885,439 8,389,354 15,621,269 23,860,889 33,467,373 
Increase in reserve 0 0 0 335 100,807 309,452 622,393 1,269,036 2,761,664 5,492,709 
Investment return on reserve 0 0 0 0 2,398 17,183 50,963 118,255 261,633 562,922 
Insurance result -257,695 50,936 239,960 192,092 381,969 2,593,170 7,817,925 14,470,488 21,360,858 28,537,587 
Investment return on free assets 831,782 844,127 852,098 852,402 853,306 915,780 1,382,346 2,385,061 4,012,586 5,628,880 
Profit before tax 574,087 895,063 1,092,059 1,044,495 1,235,275 3,508,950 9,200,271 16,855,549 25,373,444 34,166,467 
Dividend paid 575,264 893,763 1,082,599 1,025,378 1,207,273 0 0 0 8,254,002 14,211,756 
Retained profit -1,178 1,301 9,460 19,117 28,002 3,508,950 9,200,271 16,855,549 17,119,442 19,954,711 
           
Balance Sheet 
          
Total assets 10,000,000 10,000,000 10,000,000 10,000,335 10,101,142 13,859,513 23,495,212 41,147,598 60,077,755 84,040,401 
Policyholder liabilities 0 0 0 335 101,142 410,593 1,032,986 2,302,022 5,063,686 10,556,395 
Shareholders account 10,000,000 10,000,000 10,000,000 10,000,000 10,000,000 13,448,919 22,462,225 38,845,576 55,014,069 73,484,006 
Equity 3,015,491 2,942,445 2,822,245 2,720,853 2,535,710 2,543,887 2,405,854 1,955,407 669,754 0 
Property 2,478,041 2,384,462 2,255,322 2,144,248 2,005,556 2,102,299 2,203,709 2,310,011 2,105,538 1,810,713 
Fixed interest instruments 2,553,128 2,531,153 2,466,610 2,416,188 2,328,384 2,514,655 2,715,827 2,933,093 2,754,475 2,440,559 
Cash 1,953,339 2,141,940 2,455,822 2,718,711 3,130,350 6,288,078 15,136,835 31,647,064 49,484,302 69,232,733 
           
Value of in-force 1,130,580 2,417,433 4,590,564 9,797,989 21,212,167 39,160,704 60,386,990 83,513,286 110,050,140 142,047,398 
           
TCAR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
IOCAR 681,486 1,430,775 2,326,261 4,134,772 8,097,155 14,731,552 23,468,149 34,023,053 46,868,892 62,604,239 
Gross-up factor 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 
OCAR 799,919 1,679,425 2,730,534 4,853,339 9,504,331 17,291,696 27,546,595 39,935,798 55,014,069 73,484,006 
CAR 799,919 1,679,425 2,730,534 4,853,339 9,504,331 17,291,696 27,546,595 39,935,798 55,014,069 73,484,006 
           
Free assets before dividend 10,575,264 10,893,763 11,082,599 11,025,378 11,207,273 13,448,919 22,462,225 38,845,576 63,268,071 87,695,762 
           
CAR cover before dividend                13.22                    6.49                    4.06                    2.27                    1.18                    0.78                   0.82                    0.97                     1.15                    1.19  
Dividend            575,264              893,763            1,082,599            1,025,378            1,207,273                      0                        0                          0               8,254,002          14,211,756  
CAR cover after dividend                12.50                    5.95                    3.66                    2.06                    1.05                    0.78                   0.82                    0.97                     1.00                    1.00  
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policyholder liability—the amount that eliminates the negative reserve.  By 
introducing a measure that recognises that this amount is available to cover 
unexpected losses, a more meaningful comparison can be made.  Such a 
measure that may be used to assess the financial strength of a company in 
conjunction with the CAR cover is defined as the embedded-value CAR cover 
(EVCC): 
 
 
   
   
 
   (26)  
 
where: 
 
  denotes the net asset value; 
  denotes the value of in-force business according to PGN130 107; and 
  denotes the CAR according to PGN 104 and BN 72. 
 
V is effectively the discounted value of expected future profit.  The embedded-
value calculation in PGN 107 requires that the cost of capital is used to reduce 
the result. Note that this definition does not reduce      by the cost of 
capital as in PGN 107.  The reason is that the cost of capital is not a cashflow 
that will affect solvency. 
 
Because more capital is available to absorb losses, a higher EVCC value of a 
long-term insurer implies greater financial strength.   
 
For the two projections in Table 2 and 3, the progression of the EVCC 
compared with the progression of the CAR cover is shown in Table 4.  Table 5 
shows the difference in dividend payments.
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 Actuarial Society of South Africa, PGN 107, Embedded value reporting, version 4, 2007 
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Table 5. Comparison of dividend 
 
Year 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Allowing negative reserves 
   
1,383,465  
   
1,682,158  
   
2,351,549  
   
4,216,461  
   
4,164,600  
   
2,644,992  
   
7,942,834  
   
14,637,262  
   
21,493,182  
   
26,979,795  
Eliminating negative 
reserves 
      
575,264  
      
893,763  
   
1,082,599  
   
1,025,378  
   
1,207,273  
                 
0    
                 
0    
                   
0    
     
8,254,002  
   
14,211,756  
Difference 
      
808,201  
      
788,396  
   
1,268,950  
   
3,191,083  
   
2,957,327  
   
2,644,992  
   
7,942,834  
   
14,637,262  
   
13,239,180  
   
12,768,039  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4. CAR cover and EVCC development 
       
            Year 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
           Allowing negative reserves 
          CAR cover 
 
11.29 5.40 3.24 1.54 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
EVCC 
 
11.73 5.87 3.80 2.11 1.58 1.60 1.64 1.70 1.76 1.80 
            Eliminating negative reserves 
          CAR cover 
 
12.50 5.95 3.66 2.06 1.05 0.78 0.82 0.97 1.00 1.00 
EVCC 
 
13.91 7.39 5.34 4.08 3.28 3.04 3.01 3.06 3.00 2.93 
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Table 4 shows that the EVCC is larger for all durations when negative reserves 
are eliminated.  The EVCC development for the different practices in the 
examples above confirms that for the same business, a long-term insurer that 
pays lower dividends will show greater financial strength.   
 
Table 5 shows that the dividend payment is always higher for a long-term 
insurer allowing negative reserves than for a long-term insurer that eliminates 
negative reserves.  
 
As shown in Tables 1 and 2, the solvency progression of similar long-term 
insurers may be different due to the FSB’s adopted measure.  This inconsistency 
may be fixed with relative ease by the introduction of measures such as EVCC. 
Currently, in the long term, the comparability of long-term insurers’ solvency 
position may not be valid.  The overall score allocated to long-term 
comparability is 1. 
 
A summary of the scores with regard to a robust solvency regime is shown in 
Table 6. 
 
Table 6. Scoring the FSB with regard to a robust solvency regime 
 Measure  Score 
A high degree of certainty that insurance obligations can be met 3 
Specified  probability level and explicitly indicating the overall level of safety required 2 
Transparency 3 
Comparability – short term 3 
Comparability – long term 1 
 
 
14.2  Risk-based Solvency Regime   
 
To assess whether the South African framework conforms to the IAIS’s 
requirements for a risk-based solvency regime, the following points are 
considered in detail below: 
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 a framework for the management of a long-term insurer’s own risk; 
 the inclusion of all risks in the solvency assessment; 
 explicit determination and disclosure of prudence; 
 the recognition of interdependence of risk; and 
 qualitative and quantitative aspects of the solvency assessment. 
 
14.2.1 A framework for the management of a long-term insurer’s own risk 
 
The IAIS has argued that the regulatory regime should support the management 
of a long-term insurer’s own risks under normal and adverse circumstances.  
The responsibility for risk management is that of the long-term insurer, while it 
is the supervisor’s role to see that this responsibility is met.  The IAIS 
emphasises that a long-term insurer should demonstrate that the management of 
these risks is implemented for example, when: 
 
 premium rates are set; 
 policyholder liabilities are determined; or  
 economic capital is calculated. 
 
The management of a long-term insurer’s own risk in the South African context 
is considered by investigating two aspects, namely whether the current 
legislation encourages long-term insurers to manage its own risk and whether 
there are any restrictions in doing so. The limitations are considered for the 
following:  
 
 premium rates and underwriting; 
 discretionary benefits and policyholder charges; 
 other policy benefit restrictions; 
 policyholder liabilities and solvency capital; and 
 other sources of capital. 
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Own-risk management 
 
The LTIA does not address risk-management for long-term insurers.  Minimum 
governance structures are prescribed, namely that long-term insures must have: 
 a public officer
131
; 
 an external auditor
132
; 
 a statutory actuary
133
; and  
 an audit committee
134
. 
 
The duty of the public officer is to ensure that the long-term insurer complies 
with the LTIA.  This duty is not described in any detail and may be view as a 
role to ensure compliance, rather than to manage risk. 
 
The external auditor is required to ensure that the statements submitted to the 
regulator are accurate and has no duty regarding risk management. 
 
The role of the statutory actuary is discussed in Chapter 8.  The statutory actuary 
plays a vital role in the solvency assessment and management of a long-term 
insurer.  In terms of risk management, the statutory actuary is responsible for: 
 
 the value of liabilities calculated on best-estimate assumptions; 
 the value of solvency capital, but adjusted if it is judged that the 
prescribed assumptions are inadequate; 
 the adequacy of new business premium rates; 
 recommending bonus declaration for with-profits policies; 
 assessing the effect of dividend declarations; and 
 making sure that policy alteration and premium collection rules are 
actuarially sound. 
 
                                                          
131
 Section 16 
132
 Section 19 
133
 Section 20 
134
 Section 23 
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Although these functions are very important in terms of risk management, the question 
arises whether the duties of the statutory actuary are the only requirements for sound 
risk management.  A shortcoming of the LTIA is that sound risk management is not 
defined.   
 
The audit committee is responsible to assist the board of directors with the evaluation of 
the adequacy and efficiency of the internal systems and controls, accounting practices, 
information systems and auditing and actuarial valuation processes.  It also has the duty 
to facilitate communication between the board of directors, management and the 
statutory actuary.  These functions are also very important in terms of risk management, 
but do not define a risk-management framework. 
 
In conclusion, the LTIA defines roles and duties that are important in the management 
of a long-term insurer’s risk.  The Act, however, does not include a well-defined risk-
management framework.  There is also a lack of definitions, for example ‘adequacy and 
efficiency of the internal systems and controls’ is not defined.  Dependency on the 
statutory actuary as custodian of the financial-soundness of the long-term insurer in 
itself introduces the risk of key person dependency, i.e. the risk that the statutory 
actuary will leave the long-term insurer and not be easily replaceable.  
 
The allocated score is 1. 
 
Premium rates and underwriting  
 
Premium rates and underwriting are generally not limited by the LTIA.  
However, the LTIA
135
 states that when a company registers as a long-term 
insurer, the FSB may limit the amount of premium that a long-term insurer is 
allowed to receive.  This condition does not, however, limit the ability to charge 
appropriate premium rates.  It is rather a condition that the FSB may impose to 
limit new business strain in order to protect the solvency of a newly registered 
company.  The LTIA further requires that the statutory actuary must ensure that 
the premiums charged as well as the distinction between premiums, benefits and 
other values are actuarially sound.  Further to this section, the Actuarial Society 
                                                          
135
 Section 10(a) 
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of South Africa through PGN106
136
 requires that the statutory actuary formally 
sign off all new products confirming that they do not have a materially adverse 
effect on the financial soundness of the long-term insurer.  Premium rates are 
allowed to be written on terms that need support from the free assets only if the 
statutory actuary has informed the board of directors and indicated the limits on 
future volumes that may be prudently accepted. 
 
According to the LTIA
137
, third parties are allowed to determine premiums on 
behalf of a long-term insurer by means of binder agreements, only if the long-
term insurer has a written agreement that states the conditions and basis of 
calculation of the premiums.  
 
From an underwriting point of view the statutory actuary should ensure that the 
requirements of the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair 
Discriminations Act, 2000
138
 are complied with.  This Act does not limit the 
right of the long-term insurer to underwrite or refuse a policy to a person, 
provided it is not unfair and on prohibited grounds.  Prohibited grounds are 
defined in this Act
139
 as: 
 
 race, sex,  pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, 
sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, 
culture, language and birth; and 
 any other ground where discrimination based on that other ground 
causes or perpetuates systemic disadvantage, undermines human 
dignity or adversely affects the equal enjoyment of a person’s rights 
and freedoms in a serious manner that is comparable to 
discrimination on a ground in the point above. 
 
The common differentiation of premium rates by age and gender are not a 
contravention of this act provided that “the discrimination reasonably and 
                                                          
136
 Actuarial Society of South Africa, PGN 106, Actuaries and long-term insurance in South Africa, 
version 3, 2005  
137
 Section 49(a) 
138
 Act no. 4 of 2000 as amended, Republic of South Africa 
139
 Section 1 
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justifiably differentiates between persons according to objectively determinable 
criteria, intrinsic to the activity concerned.”140 
 
The industry body, the Life Offices Association (LOA), now incorporated into 
the Association for Savings and Investment SA (ASISA), announced that from 1 
April 2007, 29 member companies waived their right to repudiate claims caused 
by AIDS-related diseases for life and disability policies
141
.  All member 
companies were requested to waive this condition, effectively limiting their 
underwriting freedom.  Although most companies conformed to the request two 
companies, Clientele Life and Pinnafrica Life, only did so for policies that were 
in-force for five years or longer, demonstrating that companies are still able to 
manage their own affairs.   
 
The legal and professional requirements that the statutory actuary has to ensure 
that premium rates are actuarially sound and the fact that there is almost no 
limitation to charge premiums consistent with the risk taken fulfil the IAIS 
requirement. 
 
Discretionary benefits and policy charges  
 
Discretionary benefits and policy charges are not specifically limited by the 
LTIA, while surrender values are subject to limits specified in regulation 5. 
  
Section 46(1) of the LTIA states: 
 
“A long-term insurer shall not 
 
a)  enter into any particular kind of long-term policy unless the statutory 
actuary is satisfied that the premiums, benefits and other values thereof 
are actuarially sound; 
 
                                                          
140
 Section 14(2c) 
141
 Joint media release of the LOA and AIDS Law Project ALP, 27 March 2007 
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b)  make a distinction between the premiums, benefits or other values of 
different long-term policies unless the statutory actuary is satisfied that 
the distinction is actuarially justified; or 
 
c)  award a bonus or similar benefit to a policyholder unless 
i) it is done in accordance with the principles and practices of 
financial management of the long-term insurer; and 
ii) the statutory actuary is satisfied that it is actuarially sound and 
that a surplus is available for that purpose.” 
 
The responsibility is placed on the statutory actuary to ensure that benefits and 
premiums are actuarially sound and justified.  The term ‘other values’ is vague.  
It is not specified whether these values include only those values disclosed to 
the policyholder or any other values such as those used in pricing.  It is 
reasonable to assume that this term will at least include policy charges, since 
policy charges will have a direct effect on surrender and maturity values.  The 
LTIA has no definitions for the terms ‘actuarially sound’ and ‘actuarially 
justified’.  These terms are not intuitive.  No guidance exists locally from the 
FSB, the Actuarial Society of South Africa or the Accounting Standards Board 
to assist with the interpretation.   
  
Section 46(2) of the LTIA states: 
 
“For the purposes of subsection (1)(c)(i) "principles and practices of 
financial management" means a statement approved by the board of 
directors of the long-term insurer setting out the discretion retained by 
the board of directors and the parameters within which that discretion 
must be exercised in respect of long-term policies where the long-term 
insurer has to exercise its discretion in awarding a bonus or similar 
benefit.” 
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Requirements of the principles and practices of financial management (PPFM) 
are further laid-down in an FSB directive
142
.  Principles are defined as “enduring 
statements of overarching standards” that are not expected to change in the long 
term.  Any change must be communicated to the FSB and to policyholders three 
months in advance. 
 
Practices are defined as the “specific approach” that a long-term insurer applies 
when managing participating policies and must be in enough detail to a 
knowledgeable observer to understand the possible risks associated with such a 
policy.  Notice should be given to policyholders, but this may be done within a 
twelve month period after the change. 
 
The PPFM attempts to define the application of discretion in such a way that 
policyholders’ reasonable benefit expectations are clearly understood, 
specifically for with-profit policies.  This document does not, however, 
guarantee the long-term insurer that unexpected liabilities may not arise due to 
different interpretation of the PPFM.  In addition, it may limit the company to 
apply discretion in extreme situations in order to maintain solvency if the PPFM 
does not adequately describe the actions available to the long-term insurer in 
such conditions.  The limitations introduced by a long-term insurer’s PPFM are 
not a limitation due to legislation, but rather an operational risk. 
  
Surrender benefits of investment-type policies are subject to maximum values 
stipulated in the LTIA, effective from 1 December 2006.  This regulation 
follows after the Statement of Intent (SOI) was signed by the Minister of 
Finance, the LOA and the five largest life offices on 12 December 2005.  This 
regulation and the SOI effectively limit the ability of a long-term insurer to 
charge the policyholder upfront for any initial costs incurred by the company.  
These costs may not be recoverable from other policyholders or other future 
charges and could therefore result in losses to the long-term insurer if policies 
are surrendered at early durations.  Although the SOI and this regulation are 
applicable to all in-force and new business policies the initial charges allowed 
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 FSB, Directive 147.A.i (LT),Governance of discretionary participating policies, 2006 
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were higher until 1 January 2009, after which these maximum charges were 
reduced.  This phased approached gave long-term insurers time to redesign new 
policies while limiting the potential loss on older policies that were surrendered.  
This regulation is therefore not seen as a major limitation to life offices in 
managing their own risks. 
 
There are no other direct limits on charges for long-term insurers.  The main risk 
is how long-term insurers disclose the charges to their policyholders and to what 
extent the disclosure may limit the long-term insurer’s ability to review charges.  
This is particularly important for long-term insurers that sell predominantly 
linked policies.  The policyholder protection rules (PPR) were issued by the 
Minister of Finance under the LTIA and was in force from 1 July 2001.  The 
rules specify that the charges must be disclosed to prospective policyholders at 
proposal or quotation stage.  These include the nature of the charges, e.g. 
whether the charges are reviewable.  This is also applicable to the rules issued 
that are effective from 30 September 2004 for direct marketing and fund 
policies. 
 
One could argue that the required disclosure does limit the long-term insurance 
company to some extent.  This is because other considerations, such as 
competitive pressure may reduce the scope by which a company could mitigate 
risks.  On the other hand, the requirement to have a documented approach, 
which is publicly available, to the financial management when it comes to the 
use of discretion, may promote an acceptable approach to risk management.  
The legal framework does not prevent long-term insurers from managing their 
own risks relating to discretionary benefits and policyholder charges, although 
there were interim limitations with the adoption of minimum surrender values.  
The introduction of interim measures may be seen as partly limiting the long-
term insurer, but overall risk management of discretionary benefits are not 
limited. 
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Other policyholder benefit restrictions  
 
Other policyholder benefit restrictions are not directly regulated and do not 
inhibit the long-term insurer’s ability to manage its own risk.  There are, 
however, other considerations that may be an indirect restriction on long-term 
insurers to compete for business.  One of these indirect restrictions is the CAT 
standards promoting practices of fair charges (C), access (A) to insurance 
products and fair terms (T) that originated from the Financial Sector Charter 
(FSC). 
 
The FSC is a transformation charter in terms of the Broad-based Black 
Economic Empowerment Act, 2003
143
.  The Charter came into effect in January 
2004 as a result of the financial sector summit hosted by the National Economic 
Development and Labour Council (Nedlac).  The FSC was voluntarily 
developed by the financial sector, which includes banks, long-term insurers, 
short-term insurers, reinsurers, managers of formal collective investment 
schemes in securities, retirement funds, etc.  Parties to the negotiations were 
government, business, labour and community constituencies. The FSC was 
signed on 20 August 2002 by 11 representative bodies of the financial industry. 
 
The FSC sets transformation targets over periods of time that will be used to 
score companies on their transfer of black economic empowerment.  Specific 
areas are: 
 
 human resource development; 
 procurement policies; 
 enterprise development; 
 access to financial services; 
 empowerment financing; 
 ownership in the financial sector; 
 control in the financial sector; 
 shareholder activism; and 
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 corporate social investment. 
 
A prescribed scorecard must be completed annually by financial institutions and 
is used by: 
 
 companies to track their own progress; 
 the FSC council to track progress of the industry; 
 government to award contracts to financial institutions; and 
 the private sector to award contracts to financial institutions. 
 
The long-term insurance industry has developed minimum standards for 
products to fulfil the requirements of the FSC.  These products may be marketed 
as ‘Zimele products’ and cover the following: 
 
 member-only funeral insurance; 
 member and family funeral insurance; 
 parent funeral cover; 
 credit life; 
 life cover; and 
 physical impairment cover. 
  
The products include limits on underwriting and premium rates.  Examples of 
underwriting limitations are the waiver of waiting periods in the absence of 
medical underwriting and no HIV/AIDS exclusions
144
.  
 
Long-term insurers may choose not to adopt these standards.  In the long run 
this may limit their ability to write business in certain sections as the score cards 
are being an integral part in the awarding process of both public and private 
sectors.   This may be seen as an indirect limitation in managing a long-term 
insurer’s own risk. 
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Policyholder liabilities and solvency capital 
 
Policyholder liabilities and solvency capital were considered in Chapter six. The 
determination of policyholder liabilities is based on long-term insurers’ own 
experience and may be adjusted upwards for company practice or where the 
statutory actuary believes that compulsory margins are not sufficient.  For the 
determination of solvency capital, a long-term insurer is entitled to manage its 
own risk, and the regulatory requirements are not a limitation.  Management 
actions are allowed to reduce CAR.  The statutory actuary has also the 
obligation to increase CAR if he judges that the standard formula does not 
provide for capital at a 95% confidence level.  Furthermore, the MCAR does not 
necessarily reflect the risk of a long-term insurer, but insurers have the right to 
apply for relaxation of these limits if they are perceived to be unduly onerous. 
 
Other sources of capital 
 
Other sources of capital for long-term insurers are limited.  The LTIA does not 
allow a long-term insurer to borrow without the approval of the FSB and 
complying with conditions that the FSB may specify.  Conflict may arise in case 
of a wind-up between the different providers of capital, namely policyholders, 
shareholders and providers of loan capital.  The FSB has granted permission to 
specific long-term insurers to raise debt on the condition that the issue is 
subordinated to policyholders. 
  
A long-term insurer with rapid new-business growth may require additional 
capital to fund new business while protecting the solvency position.  New 
business will have to be limited if the initial strain threatens solvency. 
 
The limitation of borrowing without the approval of the registrar may be seen as 
limiting the management of a long-term insurer’s own risk.  There are, however, 
other means by which the long-term insurer may mitigate this problem; for 
example the long-term insurer may: 
 
 redesign products to be less capital intensive upfront; 
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 raise more share capital through a rights issue; 
 issue preference shares; 
 enter into a financial reinsurance contract; or 
 raise debt after approval from the FSB. 
 
The limitation of borrowing without approval is therefore not a major limitation, 
but still a limitation.   
 
In conclusion, there is no major limitation of the ability of a long-term insurer in 
South Africa to manage its own risk when determining: 
 
 premium rates and underwriting terms; 
 discretionary benefits and policyholder charges; 
 other policy benefit restrictions; 
 policyholder liabilities and solvency capital; and 
 access to other sources of capital. 
 
This section has considered two aspects, namely whether the South African 
framework support a long-term insurer to manage its own risk and whether there 
are any limitations in managing its risks.  Although, there are no major 
restrictions to manage a long-term insurer’s own risk, the LTIA does not 
promote proactive risk management.  With no definition of risk management, 
one would expect long-term insurers to have inconsistent practices of and 
approaches to risk management.  The allocated score is 1. 
 
14.2.2 Inclusion of all risks in the solvency assessment 
 
The IAIS common structure, element 3 states that: 
 
“A solvency regime should address all relevant potentially material risks, 
including underwriting risk, credit risk, market risk, operational risk and 
liquidity risk. All risks should, as a minimum, be addressed by the 
insurer in its own risk and capital assessment.” 
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To mitigate risks, regulators generally require a long-term insurer to have: 
 
 technical provisions (or policyholder liabilities); 
 capital; and 
 a corporate governance structure. 
 
The IAIS defines technical provisions as the amount required by the long-term 
insurer to fulfil its obligation towards the policyholders and beneficiaries over 
the life-time of a policy.  This obligation includes honouring full benefit 
settlement to policyholders and beneficiaries and the associated cost. 
 
Capital on the other hand serves as a buffer to safeguard the policyholders by 
securing the technical provisions with a higher level of confidence.  The capital 
also differs from the liabilities in that it belongs to the capital providers 
subordinated to the policyholders. 
 
The IAIS further states that the following options are available to a supervisor to 
address risks: 
 
 regulatory financial requirements that range from sophisticated risk-
sensitive requirements to simple ratios or nominal minimum 
requirements; 
 quantitative limits to risk exposures; 
 qualitative requirements; and 
 additional quantitative or qualitative requirements arising from 
supervisory intervention. 
 
Qualitative measurements will be addressed through corporate governance 
requirements. 
 
Ryan et al. (2001) describes a systematic approach to identify risks faced by an 
insurer.  The paper focuses on non-life companies, although the approach is 
equally applicable to long-term insurers.  Traditionally, risks may be classified 
in three main categories, namely: 
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 underwriting risk; 
 asset risk; and 
 other risk. 
 
In turn, each category is further divided into sub-categories. 
 
The KPMG report shows methods to assess the overall financial position of an 
insurance undertaking from the perspective of prudential supervision.  Table 7 
below shows the key risks and financial components as identified in the report.  
If a risk event occurs, it may have a financial consequence.  In Table 7 the 
‘financial component’ is where the risk event will most likely have an effect. 
 
Table 7. Key risks and financial components 
Key Risk Financial component 
Underwriting risk premiums, claims experience, technical provisions, reinsurance 
Credit risk debtors, reinsurance recoveries, investments 
Reinsurance risk claims recoveries, technical provisions 
Matching risk investment return, investments 
Provisioning risk claims experience, technical provisions 
Jurisdictional and legal risk claims, technical provisions 
Interest rate risk investment return, investments, technical provisions 
 
The Sharma report investigated the underlying causes that resulted in insurance 
company failures.   The report was the outcome of The London Working Group 
tasked by the EU Insurance Supervisors Conference.  A comprehensive 
catalogue was put together identifying the main risks. 
 
The types of risks identified by the IAA (unpublished) are: 
 
 underwriting risk; 
 market risk; 
 credit risk; 
 operational risk; and 
 162 
 liquidity risk. 
 
Similarly to the Solvency II framework, the IAA measures the first four risks 
quantitatively, while liquidity risk is dealt with qualitatively.   These risks are 
the same as those promoted by the IAIS and are consistent with the detailed lists 
published by KPMG (2002), the Sharma report and Ryan et al. (2001).  
 
There is not a coherent framework to address risk for long-term insurers in 
South Africa as described by IAA (unpublished).  The main focus of current 
legislation is on matters dealt with in pillar one. 
  
Schedule 3 of the LTIA states: 
 
“The values of assets, liabilities and the capital adequacy requirement 
shall be deemed to have been calculated in terms of this Schedule if the 
requirements set out in this Schedule and the requirements prescribed by 
the Registrar, after consulting the Actuarial Society of South Africa, 
have been complied with in making the calculations.” 
 
These requirements prescribed by the registrar are formalised in BN 72, 
supplemented by more details by the Actuarial Society of South Africa’s PGN 
104.  In determining the liabilities, the risks explicitly considered in PGN 104 
are: 
 
 mortality, including the effect of AIDS; 
 morbidity; 
 medical claims; 
 lapses; 
 surrenders; 
 termination for disability income benefits in payment; 
 expenses; 
 investment return; 
 policyholder behaviour; and 
 tax. 
 163 
 
Each assumption, except for policyholder behaviour and tax, has a prescribed 
compulsory margin.  Best-estimate assumptions of the considerations are 
adjusted for the compulsory margin by adding or subtracting the margin from 
the best-estimate assumption so that the resulting policyholder liability 
increases. 
 
Policyholder behaviour includes the take-up of future options by the 
policyholder and potential liabilities due to policyholders’ reasonable 
expectations. 
 
The following items have to be considered when determining the solvency 
capital, CAR: 
 
 lapses; 
 surrenders; 
 mortality; 
 morbidity; 
 risk associated with medical claims; 
 annuitant mortality fluctuation; 
 assumption risk associated with mortality, morbidity and medical claims; 
 expenses; 
 future expected investment returns; 
 capital value of assets; 
 credit risk; and 
 operational and other risks. 
 
Each item has a prescribed formula except for ‘operational and other risks’.  The 
statutory actuary has to consider the appropriateness of the underlying 
assumptions that resulted in the prescribed formulae.  Additions to each 
individual component must be made where the company’s portfolio is materially 
different.  Responsibility for any other material risk, including operational risk, 
is left to the discretion of the statutory actuary. 
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PGN 104 states that future new business is excluded from CAR, but that it is up 
to the statutory actuary to monitor the potential effect of future new business on 
the free assets. 
 
Most of the risks considered by the IAIS and described by the literature 
mentioned above are captured with PGN 104.  However, apparent omissions are 
liquidity risk and the potential effect of new business.  The guidance note makes 
provision for risks not explicitly mentioned. 
 
IAA (unpublished) states the supplements to capital that will typically be 
assessed under pillars two and three.   
 
The supplements are: 
 
 corporate governance; 
 risk management; 
 investment policy and asset liability matching; 
 stress-testing; 
 risk-sharing and participating business; 
 actuarial peer review; 
 policyholder protection funds; and 
 the supervisory approach. 
 
In the LTIA
145
, provision is made for a part of the supervisory review process 
consistent with pillar two of the IAA: 
 
“…if the Registrar is not satisfied that the value of an asset, a contingent 
liability or the capital adequacy requirement calculated in terms of this 
Schedule reflects a proper value, the Registrar may – 
 
                                                          
145
 Schedule 3(6) 
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a) direct the insurer to appoint another person, at the cost of the insurer, 
to place a proper value on that asset, contingent liability or capital 
adequacy requirement; or 
 
b) direct the long-term insurer to calculate the value in another manner 
which the Registrar determines and which will produce a proper value.” 
 
The FSB requires a risk report from the company’s directors and management 
through the annual long-term returns
146
.  The report is limited to specific 
questions and is not as comprehensive as the framework required by the IAIS 
and the IAA. 
 
Material risks under pillar one are captured within the South African framework.  
However, unlike Solvency II, the SST and IAA guidance, the capital 
requirements associated with new business are not included in the solvency 
capital assessment.  An apparent omission is the consideration of liquidity risk, 
although the statutory actuary is expected to consider all ‘other risks’.  The 
overall score allocated is therefore 2. 
 
Explicit determination and disclosure of prudence 
 
The IAIS common structure requires that: 
 
“... the solvency regime is explicit on how, for each of the risks that 
attract a financial requirement, individually and in combination, 
prudence is reflected in these requirements.” 
 
BN 72 and PGN 104 require that, in the determination of liabilities, compulsory 
prescribed margins must be added to or subtracted from best-estimate 
assumptions so that the policyholder liability increases.  If the statutory actuary 
is of the opinion that the prescribed margins are inadequate, discretionary 
margins must be added. 
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 Long-term Insurance Act, Act no.52 if 1998, Long Term Return, Statement G10 & G11 (2009) 
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BN 72 further states that a long-term insurer must in its annual return to the 
FSB: 
 
 define all explicit and implicit discretionary margins; 
 quantify all explicit margins; and 
 disclose full detail of the reasons why they have been added. 
 
The FSB’s annual long-term return147 requires disclosure of other reserves and 
discretionary margins.  The statutory actuary (or alternate statutory actuary) is 
required to sign the statement, while the long-term insurer’s auditor has to initial 
the statements. 
 
The requirement of explicit determination and disclosure of prudence is 
adequately met and the allocated score for this item is 3. 
 
Recognise the interdependence of risk 
 
Cornerstone 4 of the IAIS common structure states: 
 
“A total balance sheet approach should be used to recognise the 
interdependence between assets, liabilities, capital requirements and 
capital resources and to ensure that risks are fully and appropriately 
recognized.” 
 
This approach is consistent with IAA (unpublished) which states: 
 
“...an insurer’s financial strength for solvency purposes requires 
appraisal of its total balance sheet on an integrated basis under a system 
that depends on realistic values, consistent treatment of assets and 
liabilities and does not create any hidden surplus or deficit.” 
 
                                                          
147
 Statement C4, supported by statement C4.1 of 2009 
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In the South African framework, the interdependence of the risk factors is 
recognised in equation (22).  Further, as part of the interdependence of risks, 
equation (22) does not allow for non-linearity, i.e. the fact that the prescribed 
correlations will not be appropriate in the case of a stress event.  All risks, with 
the exception of credit risk and investment risk, are assumed to be independent.  
The assumption of independence for most risk factors is a simplification that 
could be improved in the standard formula.  Where possible, correlation should 
be calculated using a long-term insurer’s own data and experience.  The score 
allocated is 1. 
 
Qualitative and quantitative aspects 
 
The IAIS specifies that quantifiable risks should be included in technical 
provisions, solvency capital or both.  Qualitative aspects refer to a framework of 
risk management that includes governance. 
 
An FSA discussion paper
148
 states that a regulatory framework: 
 
 “…cannot just be about capital requirements; no amount of capital can 
substitute for the capacity to understand, measure and manage risk and 
no formula or model can capture every aspect of the risks an insurer 
faces.”  
 
 The LTIA have specific requirements regarding corporate governance.  The Act 
requires a long-term insurer to have: 
 
 a public officer; 
 external auditors; 
 a statutory actuary; and 
 an audit committee. 
 
                                                          
148
 Financial Services Authority, Solvency II: a new framework for prudential regulation of insurance in 
the EU, 2006 
 168 
The public officer is responsible for compliance by the long-term insurer with 
the LTIA.  Communications to a long-term insurer from the FSB are generally 
addressed to the public officer.  The transferral of policyholder liabilities 
between long-term insurers requires court approval.  The public officer must 
certify all copies to the court to confirm that they are ‘true and correct’. 
 
A long-term insurer is required to have one or more auditors.  The auditors have 
to fulfil their duty in accordance with the Companies Act, 1973
149
 and the 
Auditing Profession Act, 2005
150
.  An auditor is not required to examine or 
express an opinion about certificates or reports by a statutory actuary. 
 
All long-term insurers are required to have a statutory actuary approved by the 
registrar.  The role of the statutory actuary is considered in detail in Chapter 7. 
 
The audit committee must consist of at least three members, of whom two 
should be independent non-executive directors.  According to the LTIA, the role 
of the committee in terms of a long-term insurer is to 
 
 “assist the board of directors in its evaluation of the adequacy and efficiency of 
the internal control systems, accounting practices, information systems and 
auditing and actuarial valuation processes applied in the day-to-day 
management of its business”; 
 facilitate and promote communication and liaison; 
 “recommend the introduction of measures which the committee believes may 
enhance the credibility and objectivity of financial statements and reports 
concerning the business of the long-term insurer”; and 
 advise on matters referred to the committee by the board of directors. 
 
                                                          
149
 Act no. 61 of 1973 as amended, Republic of South Africa 
150
 Act no. 26 of 2005, Republic of South Africa 
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The IAIS does not give detailed guidance regarding qualitative requirements in 
the IAIS common structure.  Detailed requirements are given in a risk-
management guidance paper
151
.  The risk-management framework must: 
 
 be led by the board of directors and senior management; 
 be appropriate to the nature, complexity and size of the business; 
 be integrated in the operations so that it promotes the desired behaviour; 
 identify and manage relevant and material risks; 
 be appropriately documented; 
 maintain a risk-tolerance statement that sets and defines quantitative and 
qualitative tolerance levels for each relevant and material risk; 
 be flexible so that it is responsive to change; 
 include an ‘own risk and solvency assessment’; 
 include the determination of regulatory and economic capital; and 
 include the assessment of risk over the long term. 
 
These points are more comprehensive than the obligations of the audit committee 
specified in the LTIA.  
 
The qualitative requirements are adequately dealt with in the LTIA.  As mentioned 
in section 14.2.1, a long-term insurer must determine policyholder liabilities and 
CAR.  In addition the LTIA requires a long-term insurer to maintain assets of 
sufficient quantity and quality to be ‘financially sound at all times’. 
 
Although the qualitative requirements are fulfilled, the quantitative requirements are 
less than those stipulated by the IAIS.  The overall score allocated is 2. 
 
Table 8 shows the measures and the scores, rating the FSB, that are relevant to the 
setting of financial requirements considering risk when demonstrating solvency. 
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 IAIS, Guidance paper on enterprise risk management for capital adequacy and solvency 
purposes,2007 
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Table 8. Risk-based solvency regime 
Measure  Score 
Management of long-term insurer’s own risk 1 
Include all risks 2 
Explicit determination and disclosure of prudence 3 
Recognise interdependencies of risk 1 
Qualitative and quantitative aspects 2 
 
 
14.3 Valuation Principles 
 
The valuation principles are assessed by considering the following points: 
 
 the valuation method of assets; 
 the valuation method of liabilities; 
 the time horizon; and 
 the regulatory capital philosophy. 
 
14.3.1 Valuation of assets 
 
For the valuation of assets (and liabilities) the IAIS has adopted the following: 
 
“the solvency regime requires a valuation methodology which makes 
optimal use of and is consistent with information provided by the 
financial markets and generally available data on insurance technical 
risks.” 
 
As mentioned above, the FSB requires local long-term insurers to value assets 
compliant to local GAAP.  SAICA has adopted international accounting 
standards and practices as local GAAP.  For reporting purposes, the valuation 
method of assets is described in IAS 39
152
.   
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 IASB, IAS 39, Financial instruments: measurement and recognition, 2005 
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‘Financial assets’ must be categorised into the following categories: 
 
 assets at fair value; 
 held to maturity;  
 loans and receivables; or 
 available for sale. 
 
A financial asset is defined as: 
 
“An asset that is: 
(a) cash; 
(b) an equity instrument of another entity; 
(c) a contractual right: 
(i) to receive cash or another financial asset from another 
entity; or 
(ii) to exchange financial assets or financial liabilities 
with another entity under conditions that are potentially 
favourable to the entity; or 
 (d) a contract that will or may be settled in the entity’s own 
equity instruments and is: 
(i) a non-derivative for which the entity is or may be 
obliged to receive a variable number of the entity’s own 
equity instruments; or 
(ii) a derivative that will or may be settled other than by 
the exchange of a fixed amount of cash or another 
financial asset for a fixed number of the entity’s own 
equity instruments. For this purpose the entity’s own 
equity instruments do not include instruments that are 
themselves contracts for the future receipt or delivery of 
the reporting entity’s own equity instruments.” 
 
Depending on the category, the value of asset is measured either at ‘amortised 
cost’ or ‘fair value’. 
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Amortised cost is defined as follows: 
 
“The amortised cost of a financial asset or financial liability is the 
amount at which the financial asset or financial liability is measured at 
initial recognition minus principal repayments, plus or minus the 
cumulative amortisation using the effective interest method of any 
difference between that initial amount and the maturity amount, and 
minus any reduction (directly or through the use of an allowance 
account) for impairment or uncollectability” 
 
For a contract with term   valued at time   the definition can be expressed as: 
 
   
     ∑    ∑      
    
     
 
   
                         ; (27)  
 
where: 
                                               
                                               
                                                       ; 
                                                                      ; 
and 
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Initial recognition is generally at fair value.  ‘Fair value’ is defined as: 
 
“The amount for which an asset could be exchanged or a liability settled, 
between knowledgeable, willing parties in an arm’s length transaction.” 
 
The interest rate is determined by solving the equation of value where the initial 
recognition equals the expected discounted value of future cashflows, i.e.: 
 
   
  ∑      
        (28)  
 
where: 
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 Determined in accordance with IAS 36, Impairment of assets, 2006 
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 (29)  
 
and    is the effective yearly interest rate for year t.  
 
Once the interest rate   is determined it stays fixed for subsequent valuations.  In 
the case where more than one interest rate satisfies the equation, the rate that 
reasonable and appropriately reflects the risk should be used.  It may be that the 
estimates of future cashflows change over time.  These changes are allowed in 
determining the value of an asset. 
 
A long-term insurer has discretion when it classifies the assets into one of the 
four categories mentioned above.  For example, a listed government bond may 
be classified as an asset at fair value, held to maturity or available for sale.  
Assets classified as ‘held to maturity’ are valued on the amortised cost method.  
Assets classified as ‘assets at fair value’ or ‘available for sale’ are valued at ‘fair 
value’.  There may be significant differences between the values of the 
amortised-cost method and the fair-value method.  This is because the interest 
rate is constant for the amortised-cost method as oppose to the result of the fair-
value method which is based on information that is observable in the market at 
the time of valuation.  For matching liabilities, a long-term insurer is likely to 
choose a method that will be consistent with the valuation of the liabilities.  For 
shareholder assets long-term insurers may chose methods to reduce volatility, 
which would suggest classifying the bond as a ‘held-to-maturity’ asset. 
 
For assets with embedded derivatives the valuation is split for the ‘host’ contract 
and the embedded derivative.  The host contract is categorised in one of the four 
categories mentioned above, while the embedded derivative is valued at fair 
value.  
 
In addition to the requirements of the accounting standards, the FSB has 
prescribed limitations on the values of group undertakings.  For listed group 
undertakings the long-term insurer may only show a maximum of 20% of the 
fair value.  The value of unlisted group undertakings is limited to the net asset 
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value.  For regulated financial entities the net asset value must be reduced for 
the solvency capital. 
 
The discretion of long-term insurers to choose a method may introduce 
inconsistencies between insurers.  It may also introduce inconsistencies in the 
valuation methods of assets and liabilities.  As mentioned above, the FSB has 
also limited the value of group undertakings.  The IAIS requires “a valuation 
methodology which makes optimal use of and is consistent with information 
provided by the financial markets and generally available data on insurance 
technical risks”.  This requirement is clearly not met. 
 
The overall score is 1. 
 
14.3.2 Valuation of liabilities 
 
The IAIS allows three methods for the calculation of liabilities, namely: 
 
 results from observed market prices; 
 cashflow methods; and 
 replicating portfolios. 
 
Supplementing the market-consistent approach mentioned above, the IAIS has 
adopted the following principle
154
 for policyholder-liability valuations: 
 
“Insurance contracts are written in the expectation that obligations under 
them will be settled with the claimant or beneficiary. The vast majority 
of obligations are discharged by insurers through settlement of insurance 
contracts rather than the transfer of obligations to another insurer.” 
 
“In the absence of deep liquid secondary markets that provide 
sufficiently robust values of insurance obligations, elements of insurance 
obligations should be valued using cash flow models or other methods 
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 IAIS, The IAIS common structure for the assessment of insurer solvency, Structure element 5, 2007 
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that reflect the settlement of the insurance obligations and accord with 
principles, methodologies and parameters that the market would expect 
to be used. Such valuations could be considered to be market consistent". 
 
“Such valuations provide consistency with the other elements of the 
balance sheet for which reliable market values are available and with the 
assessments made by market participants of value and risk.” 
 
Where a deep liquid market exists for trading insurance liabilities, the observed 
prices may be used to determine the value of policyholder liabilities.  Most 
insurance liabilities will, however, not be traded in such conditions.  In these 
cases, policyholder liabilities should be determined as the expected discounted 
value plus a risk margin.  All expected future contractual cashflows are 
projected on a best-estimate basis and then discounted at the risk-free interest 
rate.  When discounting cashflows, the term structure of interest rates should be 
taken into account.  The IAIS requires that the risk margin has to be determined 
by a methodology that is based on “market consistent valuation principles and 
reflects the uncertainty or unavailability of market information.” 
 
No risk margins are required for a liability portfolio where the future cashflows 
can be exactly met in all circumstances by the proceeds from an asset portfolio.  
The liabilities are thus matched by a replicating asset portfolio. 
 
To demonstrate solvency to the registrar, South African long-term insurers have 
to determine their policyholder liabilities in accordance with the SVM.  This 
method requires: 
 
 liabilities to be determined by a prospective method, or retrospective 
calculation if it can be shown that the result is at least equal to the 
prospective result; 
 the use of best-estimate assumptions; 
 the addition of prescribed compulsory margins to the best-estimate 
assumptions; and 
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 that contractual premiums and benefits and any potential payments, 
which may arise due to policyholders’ reasonable expectations, are 
valued; 
 
Compulsory margins have to be added to best-estimate assumptions over the full 
term of the portfolio.  For contracts where rates are reviewable, the compulsory 
margins are required only over the guaranteed period.  In addition to the 
prescribed compulsory margins, discretionary margins are allowed.  These could 
be added if the statutory actuary believes that the compulsory margin is 
insufficient for prudent reserving or to allow profit recognition consistent with 
the product design. 
 
For the interest-rate assumption, PGN 104 requires that the statutory actuary 
must ensure that the return assumptions of all asset classes are mutually 
consistent with each other and consistent with market yields of fixed-interest 
securities.  The interest-rate assumption must reflect the expected returns on a 
portfolio of assets that are appropriate to cover the liabilities by term, nature and 
duration and appropriately allow for tax.  For annuity business, the interest-rate 
assumption must reflect the term structure of interest rates of appropriate assets 
covering the liabilities reduced by an allowance for credit risk. 
 
The SVM may show significantly different results compared with the results 
with a method consistent to the IAIS approach.  The main reasons are that: 
  
 the interest-rate assumption used in the SVM is not necessarily risk-free; 
 the compulsory margins are prescribed and do not reflect the risk of the 
underlying portfolio; 
 discretionary margins may be used to release profit consistent with the 
profit recognition of the product design; and 
 the SVM does not allow for determining the value of liabilities by 
referencing a replicating asset portfolio. 
 
The allocated score is 1. 
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14.3.3 Time horizon 
 
In calculating the liabilities, the IAIS requires the projection period to be long 
enough to cover the policy term.  PGN 104 requires that all contractual expected 
benefits should be valued.  Compulsory margins have to be added to best-
estimate assumptions over the full term of the portfolio.  The allocated score is 
3. 
 
14.3.4 Regulatory capital philosophy 
 
Factors that should be considered when calculating the solvency capital to 
demonstrate solvency to the regulator, such as the inclusion of all risks and risk 
sensitivity, are discussed above.  In addition to those factors, the IAIS has two 
further requirements for the calculation of regulatory capital.  The first 
requirement is that a lack of diversification of the underlying insurance portfolio 
should be reflected in the regulatory capital.  Diversification refers to the 
pooling of risk by insuring sufficient volume for low volatility of cashflows.  
Policyholder liabilities will not be affected by the lack of diversification as 
greater volatility in an insurance portfolio should result in higher regulatory 
capital.  The second requirement is for an insurance portfolio where the 
liabilities are not matched by assets.  Mismatch-risk exposure must be covered 
by the regulatory capital and not by policyholder liabilities. 
 
In South Africa, the risk components of OCAR that are affected by the 
requirement of diversification are: 
 
 lapses; 
 surrenders; 
 mortality; 
 morbidity; 
 health; 
 longevity for annuities; 
 expenses; and  
 credit risk. 
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According to PGN 104, the lapse and surrender components in OCAR assume a 
doubling of cancellations.  Additions have to be considered if: 
 
 the trend of lapses has been worsening over time; 
 the actual experience fluctuates significantly from year to year; or 
 the ‘base level’ is higher than that assumed in PGN 104. 
 
There is no diversification benefit for large portfolios or for portfolios that have 
actual experience lower than the base level. 
 
The prescribed formulae for determining the required capital of mortality, 
morbidity, health and longevity for annuities are functions of the number of 
policies.  These formulae are consistent with the IAIS requirement for 
diversification of risk. 
 
The expense-risk component is equal to 10% of the previous year’s renewal 
expenses.  PGN 104 states that for a mature long-term insurer the expenses may 
fluctuate about 10% from the expenses used in the budget process.  An 
exceptional overrun may be 20%.  Additions must be considered if: 
  
 new business volume has deviated by more than 20% from previous 
budgets; 
 the new business volume is growing materially and expenses are 
unpredictable; or 
  a new type of product has been launched with a different expense 
structure to existing contracts. 
 
The approach in PGN 104 does take into account the nature of uncertainty of the 
expense assumption.  For expenses, pooling of risk to reduce volatility is not 
applicable as for mortality and other similar insurance risks.  The approach to 
expenses is consistent with the intention of the IAIS. 
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For credit risk, factors are applied to the exposure according to a prescribed 
table.  PGN 104 requires that the “actuary should consider the extent to which 
the portfolio is diversified and increase the allowance for credit CAR if 
necessary...” This is in line with the IAIS principle. 
 
Future shortfalls due to the mismatch of liabilities are covered by the 
investment-risk component in OCAR.  Prescribed scenario testing is required to 
show the movements in asset and liability values.  Any shortfall is recorded as a 
component of the investment CAR.  This is consistent with the IAIS’s second 
requirement mentioned above. 
 
The South African framework fulfils the requirements of the IAIS, except for 
lapses and surrenders.  For this exception, the local requirements are more 
onerous than those of the IAIS.  For companies with rapid new business growth 
and high upfront expenses, this may have a significant effect on the overall 
regulatory capital.  The overall score allocated is 2. 
 
The summary of the scores allocated for valuation principles is shown in Table 
9. 
 
Table 9. Valuation principles 
Measure  Score 
Valuation method of assets 1 
Valuation method of liabilities 1 
Time horizon 3 
Regulatory capital philosophy 2 
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14.4 Conclusion 
 
The South African approach to the IAIS Level 2 regulatory requirements has 
areas that comply (a score of 3), areas that need improvement (a score of 2 or 
2.5) and areas that do not comply at all (a score of 1).  Table 10 below shows the 
summary of all the scores allocated in this chapter. 
 
Table 10. Summary of scores 
   Score 
A robust solvency regime   
A high degree of certainty that insurance obligations can be met 3 
A specified  probability level and explicit level of safety 2 
Transparency 3 
Comparability – short term 3 
Comparability – long term 1 
Risk-based solvency regime   
Management of long-term insurer’s own risk 1 
Include all risks 2 
Explicit determination and disclosure of prudence 3 
Recognise interdependencies of risk 1 
Qualitative and quantitative aspects 2 
Valuation principles   
Valuation method of assets 1 
Valuation method of liabilities 1 
Time horizon 3 
Regulatory capital philosophy 2 
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CHAPTER FIFTEEN 
COMPARISON OF THE SOUTH AFRIFCAN REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 
WITH THE IAIS COMMON STRUCTURE 
LEVEL 3: SUPERVISORY ASSESSMENT AND INTERVENTION 
 
In chapter 11 the following criteria were considered for supervisory assessment 
and intervention: 
 
 the availability of a range of measures to assess solvency; 
 the ability of the supervisor to prescribe additional capital; and 
 disclosure. 
 
In this chapter the South African solvency framework is compared with the first 
two criteria.  ‘Disclosure’ was discussed in detail in section 14.1.3 and will not 
be considered again.  
 
15.1 The Availability of a Range of Measures 
 
The IAIS common structure states
155
 that: 
 
“There should be a number of solvency control levels which trigger 
different degrees of intervention by the supervisor in a timely manner. 
The solvency regime should have due regard to the coherence of the 
solvency control levels and any corrective action that may be at the 
disposal of the insurer and of the supervisor, including options to reduce 
the risks being taken by the insurer as well as to raise more capital.” 
 
Subject to the requirements of appropriate assets, the LTIA
156
 only requires a 
long-term insurer to have assets which total value exceeds the aggregate value 
of the liabilities and CAR.  There are no other official measures or guidance to 
indicate when the FSB will get involved in a long-term insurer’s affairs.  This 
involvement may include a request for more information, discussions with 
                                                          
155
Structure element 14 
156
 Section 29, 1–4 
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senior management, an instruction to cease new business and to get directly 
involved with the management for an interim period.   Examples of solvency 
assessment frameworks that clearly define control levels are the SST, the USA’s 
CRVM and Solvency II.  These frameworks are all discussed in chapter 5. 
 
The South African framework does not have a range of measures with 
transparent consequences if thresholds are breached.  The FSB may well have 
internal ‘triggers’ that will result in action.  Since the CAR cover is a common 
industry measure and regularly reported to the FSB, these triggers are likely to 
be dependent on the CAR cover.  It is therefore desirable that these triggers 
should be communicated to the long-term insurance industry.   
 
An example of a more transparent regime is the following actions: 
 
 no action by the FSB if the CAR cover exceeds three; 
 the right to request  more information if the CAR cover is two or more 
but below three; 
 the right to request a corrective plan if the CAR cover is one or more but 
below two; and 
 judicial management if the CAR cover is below one. 
 
The FSB should also investigate the trend of the CAR cover.  Generally, a 
reducing CAR cover is not desirable. 
 
In conclusion, South Africa’s current solvency assessment framework does not 
have the required range of measures for solvency assessment.  It is not clear 
how the FSB will intervene if there is evidence that a long-term insurer’s 
financial strength is deteriorating.  It may be simple to implement measures as a 
function of the existing CAR cover measure. 
 
15.2 The Ability of the Supervisor to Prescribe Additional Capital 
 
The IAIS describes two scenarios that may require a supervisor to instruct a 
long-term insurer to increase its solvency capital requirement.  The first scenario 
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is when a long-term insurer fails to show that it has adequate risk-management 
procedures.  This additional capital requirement should be held until the 
supervisor is satisfied that the risk-management procedures have been 
satisfactorily improved.  Once the supervisor is satisfied that these procedures 
are adequate the additional capital requirement should be withdrawn.  In this 
scenario, long-term insures are incentivised to improve their risk management 
process. 
 
The second scenario is when a supervisor does not believe that the long-term 
insurer’s capital requirement satisfies the specified safety level.  This may 
occur, for example, when a long-term insurer has a different risk profile than 
that assumed in the standard CAR formula. 
 
For the above two scenarios, the South African solvency framework for long-
term insurers does not give the FSB the right to directly increase the CAR.  The 
LTIA
157
 gives the registrar the authority to intervene if the value of the CAR is 
unsatisfactory.  The registrar may instruct a long-term insurer to appoint another 
person for the CAR calculation or prescribe an alternative method.   Since the 
method is not described the registrar may, however, effectively instruct a long-
term insurer to increase the CAR by, for example, an amount or by applying a 
factor.  The major shortcoming of the South African framework for solvency 
assessment is that there is no requirement to have risk-management practices 
embedded in the Act.  There is also no definition for ‘an unsatisfactory value’.  
Practically, it would be difficult for the registrar to prescribe an additional 
capital requirement without a breach of insurance legislation.  Governance 
required by the Companies Act, 1973
158
 and principles, such as those from King 
III
159
, are not under the direct control of the FSB. 
 
  
                                                          
157
 Schedule 3 (6) 
158
 Act No. 61 of 1973, Republic of South Africa 
159
 Institution for directors in Southern Africa, King report for South Africa, 2009 
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CHAPTER SIXTEEN 
AN ILLUSTRATIVE COMPARISON OF SOUTH AFRICA’S CAPITAL 
ADEQUACY REQUIREMENT WITH SOLVENCY CAPITAL DETERMINED 
ACCORDING TO INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS 
 
In this chapter the financial development according to the South African 
regulatory requirements for the simple portfolio described in section 14.1.5 is 
compared with solvency capital requirements derived from principles stated by 
the IAIS and the IAA.  A stochastic model is used for economic and insurance 
risks.  The effect of expected future new business is also included.  For the 
solvency capital requirement derived from these principles the focus is on the 
capital requirement of an efficient long-term insurer and hence no need for the 
supervisor to prescribe additional capital. 
 
Below the following matters are discussed: 
 
 the basic principles of the solvency capital calculation; 
 the description of the model;  
 the results; and 
 conclusions. 
 
16.1 The Basic Principles of the Solvency Capital Calculation 
 
Various international principles and solvency frameworks have been discussed 
in chapters 5 and 9.  In modelling the financial progression according to the IAA 
and IAIS’s principles, the following points are taken into account: 
 
 the liabilities are determined by discounting best-estimate cashflows at 
the risk-free rate; 
 for the liabilities a margin is determined by the cost-of-capital approach; 
 for the solvency requirement the expected surplus is modelled over a 
one-year time horizon; 
 the effect on the expected future surplus of one year’s new business; and 
 the interdependence of risks. 
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16.2 Description of the Model 
 
A model-office projection for the simple portfolio of 15-year term-assurance 
policies described in chapter 15 is performed.  The model in chapter 15 is 
referred to as Model 1.  Model 2 is described in this section.  For these models 
the cashflows are assumed to be identical with the exception of dividend 
payments.  Dividend payments are dependent on the solvency capital 
requirement.  These payments reduce the assets held by the long-term insurer.  
Any difference in dividend payments will therefore also result in differences in 
investment returns. 
 
In Model 2 the policyholder liabilities are determined deterministically.  There 
are no prescribed or compulsory margins as required by the FSB.  Instead, a risk 
margin is added to the best-estimate liability.  The risk margin is determined on 
the cost-of-capital approach—see equation (17) in §5.2. 
 
The Model 2 solvency capital requirement (SCR) is determined stochastically.  
The expected surplus is projected over a one-year time horizon.  To determine 
the SCR, Sandström (2006) describes three risk measures that may be used, 
namely: 
 
 the traditional standard deviation principle; 
 the value-at-risk; and 
 the expected shortfall or conditional tail expectation. 
 
These measures are consistent with the IAA and IAIS’s principles.  For a 
variable, X, the expected shortfall measure is defined as: 
 
  ( )   [ |   ]  (30)  
 
where: 
            (   )      ; and 
     . 
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In Model 2 the SCR is determined as the expected shortfall (ES) with       .   
 
To determine the expected shortfall at the end of each financial reporting year 
the expected surplus is projected for a one-year period from the valuation date.  
This projection is performed by Monte Carlo simulations.  The following items 
are determined stochastically and further discussed below: 
 
 investment returns; 
 inflation; 
 mortality;  
 policyholder behaviour; and 
 new business profit margins. 
 
For investment returns and inflation various models have been proposed.  
Thomson (1996) developed a linear transfer function model for modelling 
inflation with dividend growth as input.  Maitland (2010) criticises this model in 
that the model “suffers from a number of statistical problems and estimation 
errors.”  In particular, mean reversion creates unrealistic risk-adjusted returns 
and gives rise to predictability.  Predictability violates the efficient-market-
hypothesis theory. 
 
Non-linear models such as the regime-switching model of long-term equity 
returns proposed by Hardy (2001) were considered.  Although Hardy’s two-state 
model is a practical model for equity returns, it lacks the consideration of other 
variables such as inflation and interest rates.  For the purposes of the economic 
variables in Model 2, Maitland’s (2010) model is used.  This model projects 
inflation, equity returns, long-term and short-term interest rates.  Each one of 
these four economic variables has two states similar to Hardy’s (2001) regime-
switching model.  For equities a volatile and stable state is modelled.  For the 
other three variables high and low-rate states are used.  The advantage of 
Maitland’s (2010) model is that the correlation between the four economic 
variables and their states are taken into account.  See Appendix C for the 
assumptions. 
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Maitland (2002) showed through principle components analysis that most of the 
variability in yields from the South African yield curve is explained by only two 
factors.  From a statistical point of view, the South African yield curve could be 
reconstructed from the short rate and the long-bond yield.  
 
To determine the discounted value of the liabilities at the end of the one-year-
projection period, a risk-free yield curve is required.  This curve is derived from 
Maitland’s (2010) model output, the zero-year nominal yield and 20-year 
nominal par yield, as input into Cox, Ingersoll & Ross’ (1985) model. 
 
It must be noted that for regulatory purposes there may be other considerations 
than purely academically acceptable models.  The IAA (unpublished) states that: 
 
“To develop standardised approaches for market risks (or other risks for 
that matter) requires judgment and supervisory tradeoffs depending on 
the supervisor’s choice of approximation and its method of application. 
Ideally, the conservatism inherent in a standardised approach should 
incent insurers to use (to the extent they are able) more advanced 
methods in the future.” 
 
For regulatory purposes, there is no uniformly accepted method to model 
policyholder behaviour.  Generally, for the effect of lapses on the SCR a 
prescribed shock is applied.  There is little evidence of what an appropriate 
shock would be for a given confidence level.  South Africa’s PGN 104 suggests 
a reasonable assumption is the doubling of lapses in distressed circumstances, 
but allowance for discretion is made for more onerous scenarios. 
 
To allow for the interaction between the economic environment and policy 
behaviour in Model 2 the level of lapses are set depending on the state of the 
economy.  The state of the economy is defined to be good, neutral or bad and is 
dependent on the four states from Maitland’s (2010) model.  Low inflation and 
low equity volatility are assumed to be positive for policyholders and therefore 
the state of economy is set as ‘good’.  For high inflation and high equity 
volatility the state of the economy is assumed to be ‘bad’.  Other combinations 
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are assumed to be ‘neutral’.  It is assumed that the best-estimate lapse 
experience is expected in the good economic state.  For the bad economic state a 
doubling of lapses are assumed consistent with PGN 104.  A 50% increase in 
lapses is assumed for the neutral economic state. 
 
For a single policy a lapse in a year may be seen as a Bernoulli event.  The 
number of lapses for a portfolio may therefore be modelled with the Binomial 
distribution.  For a large portfolio it may be shown that the number of lapses is 
approximately Normally distributed.  In Model 2 the number of lapses is 
assumed to be Normally distributed with different means and variances for each 
state of the economy. 
 
For modelling mortality, the IAA (unpublished) states that four factors should 
generally be taken into account, namely: 
 
 the level; 
 the trend; 
 the volatility; and 
 extreme events like pandemics. 
 
In Model 2 the level, volatility and pandemics were taken into account.  In 
addition, the effect of selective withdrawals was allowed for by assuming that 
due to a worsening economy additional lapses are exposed to only non-natural 
deaths.  The definition of ‘non-natural deaths’ is taken as the definition used by 
Statistics South Africa’s research on the causes of death160.  In other words, if 
the economy deteriorates only healthy individuals will lapse their life cover if 
they are in financial difficulty.  The remaining portfolio’s mortality will 
therefore deteriorate. 
 
New business is included and it is assumed that the expected and actual volume 
is equal.  For determining the SCR, all policies are assumed to commence half 
way through the time horizon, i.e. in six months’ time after each financial year.  
                                                          
160
 Statistics South Africa, Mortality and causes of death in South Africa,1997–2003: findings from death 
notification, 2005 
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The profit margin in the premium is dependent on the economic conditions at 
the point of sale.  In good economic conditions it was assumed that competition 
would be higher and that premium rates have to be reduced. 
 
In Model 2 the capital requirement for operational risk was set equal to the 
operational risk requirement in Model 1. 
 
A detailed description of the SCR calculation and assumptions are provided in 
Appendix C. 
 
16.3  The Results 
 
The financial progression of Model 2 is significantly different to that of Model 
1.  Overall, dividend payments are lower in Model 2 because of higher solvency 
capital requirements.  A contributing factor is the inclusion of expected new 
business in Model 2.  By excluding new business the SCR and CAR are 
reasonably consistent for the first few years.  The consistent results in the first 
few years are coincidental.  This is because the result of the CAR is determined 
only by the onerous lapse scenario in the TCAR component, while the SCR is 
determined by including all the risk factors.  The CAR is equal to the negative 
liabilities until year 9.  From year 10 onwards the CAR is determined by the 
OCAR as oppose to the TCAR.  Table 11 shows the yearly solvency capital 
requirements for Model 1 & 2 and the SCR excluding the effect of new 
business. 
 
The individual components for the SCR and OCAR are note worthily different.  
Table 12 shows a comparison of these components.  Note that the investment 
component for OCAR has been adjusted for the effect of the asset shock on 
current liabilities.  For the two models the mortality components are similar.  
However, the lapse and investment components differ significantly.  In Model 2 
it is assumed that lapses are independent of the value of the policyholder 
liability.  Offsetting effects are possible for policies with different durations; for 
example, if lapses increase for policies that have been in force for longer 
periods, capital requirements will be reduced because the liabilities are positive.  
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Model 1 does not recognise any favourable effects as a result of deteriorating 
lapse experience. 
 
The investment capital requirements are different for various reasons.  For 
example, the asset shocks prescribed by PGN 104 are less severe than those 
suggested by Maitland’s (2010) model.  PGN 104 prescribes a 30% reduction of 
the value of equities where Maitland’s (2010) model suggests a 57,3% reduction 
for the economy if it is in a good state and a 40,8% reduction if the economy is 
in a bad state.  Another reason is that Model 2 uses a risk-free yield curve which 
is determined stochastically.  From this yield curve the risk-free rates are used to 
determine the policyholder-liability values at the end of the one-year projection 
period. The rates are independent of the assets held.  For Model 1 an asset shock 
is performed at the valuation date; i.e. at the beginning of the one-year 
projection period.  To determine the surplus, policyholder liabilities are 
recalculated on the expected best-estimate assumptions for this adverse scenario.  
The effect on the surplus is particularly dampened because the discount rate is 
determined with reference to expected returns on assets.  For the adverse 
scenario, the value of equities is reduced, but the value of cash remains 
unchanged.  This scenario results in a higher portion of cash and a lower portion 
of equities that cover the liabilities for the sample portfolio.  With cash-interest 
rates lower than expected equity returns the resulting discount rate is also lower.  
For the simple portfolio, a lower discount rate has the result of policyholder 
liabilities that are more negative.  This change in policyholder liabilities has 
therefore an increase effect on the surplus with no capital requirement.  For 
Model 1 the only capital requirement is for the current-liability mismatch. 
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Table 11. Comparison of the CAR with the SCR 
t 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
CAR 885 623 1 853 064 3 089 777 6 514 170 14 097 297 25 660 560 38 410 406 51 137 721 64 922 548 82 856 726 
SCR 3 733 541 4 131 888 6 618 268 11 814 768 21 797 388 36 138 790 57 623 880 86 824 252 123 443 310 169 372 300 
SCR
161
  3 779 214 4 005 362 4 602 291 6 998 167 13 329 167 25 249 764 43 351 066 69 533 770 104 824 384 150 100 578 
 
Table 12. Comparison of Risk Components 
t 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Model 1 
          New business 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Mortality 921 139 1 964 751 3 263 340 5 744 079 10 812 656 18 945 188 29 343 143 41 545 137 56 058 420 73 522 215 
Lapse 323 280 665 705 1 228 479 2 605 668 5 638 919 10 264 224 15 364 162 20 455 088 25 969 019 32 508 447 
Investment
162
 -176 059 -355 547 -647 214 -1 369 845 -2 939 738 -5 255 977 -7 643 239 -9 744 879 -11 598 913 -13 245 953 
Model 2 
          New business -45 673 126 526 2 015 977 4 816 601 8 468 221 10 889 026 14 272 814 17 290 482 18 618 926 19 271 722 
Mortality 229 650 596 336 1 714 699 4 823 583 10 758 001 19 435 298 30 180 466 41 955 049 54 522 984 67 231 534 
Lapse 80 871 135 533 50 572 204 601 956 087 1 219 249 1 186 712 477 271 437 251 -719 857 
Investment    3 468 693     3 273 493     2 837 019       1 969 983       1 615 079       4 595 217     11 983 888     27 101 450       49 864 149       83 588 901  
 
Table 13. Comparison of Liabilities 
t 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Model 1     -808 201  -1 664 262  -3 071 196    -6 513 835  -13 996 155  -25 249 967  -37 377 420  -48 835 698    -59 858 861    -70 714 722 
Model 2     -236 170  -1 591 092  -3 395 423    -8 004 540  -18 385 429  -34 911 299  -52 888 692  -70 407 979    -88 647 089   -108 211 001 
                                                          
161
 SCR excluding new business 
162
 For CAR negatives are eliminated 
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16.4 Conclusion 
 
For the simple portfolio described in section 14.1.5 the solvency capital 
requirements determined by the South African method (CAR) and by the 
international standards method (SCR) are significantly different.  A clear 
difference is the inclusion of new business for the SCR calculation.  If new 
business is excluded, the development of CAR and SCR is similar.  This 
consistency is coincidental if one considers the individual risk factors.   CAR is 
dominated by the onerous capital requirement for lapses.  The SCR recognises 
offsetting effects for lapses.  As a result the lapse requirement was significantly 
lower than that required for CAR.  The investment risk factor also differs 
significantly.  This is because the CAR is determined by prescribed scenarios 
that are less onerous than that suggested by non-linear models such as 
Maitland’s (2010) model.  International standard methods require that the 
liabilities are determined independent of the actual assets held.  For a portfolio 
that is mismatched this may be more onerous when the SCR result if compared 
with the CAR result.  The only risk factor that showed a similar progression was 
the mortality risk factor. 
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CHAPTER SEVENTEEN 
CONCLUSION 
 
In this chapter the conclusions are summarised for the theory of solvency 
assessment, the South African solvency assessment framework and the role of 
the statutory actuary.  
 
17.1 Solvency Assessment 
 
For most developed countries, long-term insurance is highly regulated.  
Although theories such as Austrian economics suggest that no regulation is 
required in the long term, other theories maintain that some form of regulation is 
required to ensure customer protection. Over-regulation may stifle innovation 
and result in a sub-optimal economy that does not maximise economic wealth.  
Regulatory frameworks designed from the freedom-with-publicity theory may 
be more flexible than prescriptive laws.  This form of regulation has proven to 
be successful in the UK.  To ensure sufficient controls in such a framework, 
principle-based regulation may assist regulators.  This form of regulation, also 
referred to as contract regulation, places the obligation on the long-term insurer 
to prove that it is complying with the principles of the law. 
 
For long-term insurers, stakeholders are interested in different forms of solvency 
assessment. Shareholders, rating agencies and management are interested in the 
financial strength of a long-term insurer, its ability to write new business and 
constraints from its capital structure.  The assessment will be performed on a 
going-concern basis, with assets and liabilities valued fairly.  Supervisors may 
be interested in both a break-up basis and a going-concern basis.  The former 
basis is required to ensure that existing policyholders’ benefits are protected 
while the later basis is important to secure systemic stability. 
 
Regulators’ approach to solvency assessment has evolved over the last century.  
In the UK, for example, valuations were performed by formulae in only five-
yearly intervals in the early 1900s.  The aim was to show that a long-term 
insurer had assets that exceeded liabilities.  In the early 1980s the actuarial 
profession stated that solvency assessment must be a matter of probability.  
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Since then, regulators have developed sophisticated frameworks to determine 
whether a long-term insurer may continue as a going concern, should limit or 
cease new business, should transfer their insurance business to a third party or 
be forced to file for bankruptcy.  The emphasis is not only on the strength of a 
long-term insurer’s balance sheet, but also on its risk-management framework. 
 
The determination of solvency capital requirement has also developed from 
simple formulae to more complex risk-based assessments.  The later includes 
the solvency capital requirement that is determined quantitatively and 
qualitatively.  Examples of jurisdictions that require a risk-based assessment are 
those of the Netherlands, Switzerland, UK, and the USA.  The expected 
adoption of Solvency II in 2012 for Europe means that all European long-term 
insurers will be subject to a risk-based solvency assessment. 
 
The two key international bodies that set standards and influence regulatory 
frameworks are the IAIS and the IAA.  The IAIS has issued numerous 
standards, principles and papers for insurer’s solvency assessment.  The IAA 
gave assistance for some of these issues. The FSB is a member of the IAIS.  
Another important role player in the long-term insurance industry is the IASB 
which sets international accounting standards. 
 
17.2 South Africa’s Solvency Assessment Framework 
 
South Africa’s regulatory framework for long-term insurers was assessed 
against the IAIS’ three-level requirements.  Although the focus was on the level 
2 regulatory requirements, all three levels were assessed. 
 
It was shown that South Africa has a well-developed and effective financial-
market infrastructure and that the efficient-market criterion is satisfied. 
 
It was also shown that there are areas in the regulatory regime where the South 
African solvency assessment framework either satisfy, partially satisfy or do not 
satisfy the IAIS’s criteria.  The main areas where improvements are required are 
 195 
the valuation methods of asset and liabilities and the consistent financial 
development of long-term insurers in the long run. 
 
From a supervisory assessment and intervention perspective, South Africa’s 
current solvency assessment framework does not have the required range of 
measures for meaningful solvency assessment.  It is not clear how the FSB will 
intervene if there is evidence that a long-term insurer’s financial strength is 
deteriorating.  Improvement may be as simple as to implement measures based 
on a function of the existing CAR-cover measure. 
 
In Chapter 16 it was shown that for the simple portfolio of term-assurance 
policies, the solvency capital requirements determined by South African 
requirements and that required by international standards are significantly 
different.  A clear difference is the treatment of new business.  Other factors that 
are treated differently are lapse risk and investment risk. The only risk factor 
that showed a similar progression was the mortality risk factor. 
 
17.3 The Role of the Statutory Actuary 
 
In South Africa, the role of the statutory actuary is in essence the same as the 
UK’s former appointed-actuary role.  This role carries an arduous responsibility.  
The statutory actuary has responsibilities in every aspect that may have an effect 
on the financial soundness of a long-term insurer.  Investigations in the UK have 
criticised this approach and warned against a monopoly that reserves roles for 
actuaries.  Notwithstanding these findings the local statutory-actuary approach 
has remained the same. 
 
Internationally, the approach of actuaries in long-term insurers’ solvency 
assessments has taken different forms.  Member states of the EU have 
introduced an approach where the actuarial function does not place the 
responsibility on one actuary.  It is a possibility that these changes may be 
adopted in the SAM project in South Africa.   
 196 
REFERENCES 
 
Avgouleas, E (2009). The global financial crisis, behavioural finance and financial  
regulation: in search of a new orthodoxy. Journal of Corporate Law Studies 
9(1), 23–59 
 
Bennet, IR, Barclay, KJ, Blakeley, AG, Crayton, FA, Darvell, JN, Gilmour, I,  
McGregor RJV & Stenlake RW (1984). Life assurance in four European 
countries. Transactions of the Faculty of Actuaries 39,170–250 
 
Booth, P, (unpublished). Four approaches to the political economy of regulation.  
Actuarial Research Clearing House 1, 453– 468 
 
Booth, P (1997). The political economy of regulation. British Actuarial Journal 3(3),  
675–707 
 
Booth, P & Morrison, AD, (2007). Regulatory competition and life insurance solvency  
regulation in the European Union and United States. North American Actuarial 
Journal 11(4), 23–41 
 
Bhana, N, (unpublished). The share market reaction to earnings announcements: a test  
of the efficiency of the Johannesburg Stock Exchange. Unpublished MComm 
dissertation, University of Durban, Westville, 1994 
 
Bragt, D, Steenhouwer, H & Waalwijk, B (unpublished). Market consistent ALM for  
life insurers – steps toward Solvency II, ORTEC Centre for Financial Research, 
2008 
 
Carroll, PM (1975). The net premium method of valuation. Journal of the Institute of  
Actuaries Students Society 21(2), 121–138 
 
Choski, MA (2007). Sink or Swim? A Case for salvaging deepening insolvency theory.  
Journal of Business and Securities Law 163, 163–212 
 
 197 
Champagne, CA (unpublished). Standard minimum de solvabilité applicable aux  
entreprises d'assurances.  Report to the Organization Eurpeenne de Cooperation 
Economique, 1961. In Sandström (2006) 
 
Cox, J. C., J. E. Ingersoll, and S. A. Ross, 1985, A theory of the term structure of  
interest rates, Econometrica, 53: 385-407. 
 
Danzon, PM & Harrington, SE (2001). Worker’s compensation rate regulation: how  
price controls increase costs. The Journal of Law and Economics 44(1), 1–35 
  
Dardis, A, Booysen, D, Burger, T, De Jager, W, Falconer, C, Franklin, N, Millard, F,  
Nel C, Tripe, P, Van Heerden, H. Capital adequacy for long-term insurers 
revisited. Actuarial Society of South Africa, 2003 
 
Da Silva, G (unpublished). The efficiency of the Johannesburg Stock Exchange: an  
empirical investigation of the United States sanction-oriented draft legislation 
introduction in 1988. Unpublished MComm dissertation. University of 
Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, 1989 
 
Daykin, CD (1999).  The Regulatory Role of the Actuary.  British Actuarial Journal.  
5(3), 529–574 
 
Den Butten, C (unpublished). Het financieel toetsingskader. Unpublished PhD  
dissertation, Mathematics Institute, University of Leiden, The Netherlands, 2007 
 
Dimson, E & Mussavian, M (1998). A brief history of market efficiency. European  
Financial Management 4(1), 91–193 
 
Exley, CJ, Mehta, MA & Smith, AD.  The financial theory of defined benefit pension  
schemes. British Actuarial Journal 3(4), 835–966 
 
Falkena, H, Bamber, R, Lwellyn, D & Store, T (2001). Financial Regulation in South  
Africa, 2nd edition, SA Financial Sector Forum, Rivonia 
 
 
 198 
Fama, EF (1970). Efficient capital markets: a review of theory and empirical work. 
Journal of Finance 25(2), 383–417 
 
Ferguson, DGR (1976). Life office solvency and insolvency. Journal of the Institute of  
Actuaries Students' Society 22, 1–44 
 
Hägg, GPT (unpublished). An institutional analysis of insurance regulation: the case of  
Sweden. Unpublished dissertation, Department of Economics, University of 
Lund, Sweden 1998 
 
Hardie, AC, Limb, A P, Loades, DH, Lumsden, IC, Mason, DC, Pollock, G, Robertson,  
ES, Scott, WF & Wilkie, AD (1984). The Solvency of Life Assurance 
Companies. Transactions of the Faculty of Actuaries 39, 251–340 
 
Hardy, MR (2001). A Regime-Switching Model of Long-term Stock Returns. North  
American Actuarial Journal 5(2), 41–53 
 
IAIS (unpublished). The IAIS common structure for the assessment of insurer solvency.  
International association of insurance supervisors. www.IAIS.org, 2004 
 
Johnston, EA(1989).  The Appointed Actuary. Transactions of the Faculty of Actuaries.   
41, 559–629 
 
Kelly, PJ (unpublished). A test of efficiency on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange.  
Unpublished MComm dissertation. Rhodes University, Grahamstown, 2004 
 
Klein, RW (2001). Insurance regulation in transition. The Journal of Risk and  
Insurance 62(3), 363–404 
 
Laffont, JJ & Martimort, D (2002). The theory of incentives–the principal-agent model.  
1st edition, Princeton University Press  
 
Lange, O (1936). On the Economic Theory of Socialism. Review of Economic Studies  
4(1), 53–71 
 199 
 
Mabhunu, M (unpublished). The Market Efficiency Hypothesis and the Behaviour of  
Stock Returns on the JSE Securities Exchange, Unpublished MComm 
dissertation, Rhodes University, Grahamstown, 1994 
 
 
Maitland, AJ (2002). Interpolating the South African yield curve using principal  
components analysis: a descriptive approach. South African Actuarial Journal 2, 
129–145 
 
Maitland, AJ (2010). A Multiple Markov Switching Model for Actuarial Use in South  
Africa. South African Actuarial Journal 10, 71–108 
 
Muir, M, & Waller, R (unpublished). Twin peaks: the enhanced capital requirement for  
realistic basis life firms. Staple Inn Actuarial Society, 
www.sias.org.uk/data/papers/TwinPeaks/DownloadPDF, 5/11/2003 
 
Nienaber, PM & Reinecke, MFB (2009). Life insurance in South Africa A compendium.  
1st edition, LexisNexis, South Africa 
 
Plantin, G, & Rochet, JC, (2007). When insurers go bust. 1st edition, Princeton  
University Press  
 
Porteous, BT, & Tapadar, P, (2008). The impact of capital structure on economic  
capital and risk adjusted performance. Astin Bulletin 38(1), 341–380 
 
Posner, RA (1974). Theories of economic regulation. The Bell Journal of Economics  
and Management Science 5(2), 335–358 
 
Redington, FM (1952). Review of the principles of life-office valuations. Journal of the  
Institute of Actuaries 78, 286–340 
 
 
 
 200 
Ryan, JP, Archer-Lock, PR, Czernuszewicz, AJ, Gillot, NR, Hinton, PH, Ibson, D,  
Malde, SA, Paul, D & Shah, N (2001), Financial condition assessment. British 
Actuarial Journal 7(4), 519–584 
 
Sandström, A (2006). Solvency: Models, Assessment and Regulation, 1st edition,  
Chapman & Hall, Taylor & Francis Group  
 
Smith, V (1962). An Experimental Study of Competitive Market Behaviour. Journal of  
Political Economy 70, 111–137 
 
Shleifer, A & Vishny RW (1992). Pervasive Shortages under Socialism. Rand Journal  
of Economics  23(2), 237–246 
 
Shleifer, A & Vishny RW (1994). The Politics of Market Socialism. Journal of  
Economic Perspectives 8(2), 165–176 
 
Smith, AD (1996), How actuaries can use financial economics. British Actuarial  
Journal 2(5), 1057–1193 
 
Soros, G (2009). The Crash of 2008 and What It Means: The New Paradigm for  
Financial Markets, 1st edition, PublicAffairs  
 
Stigler, GJ (1973). The theory of economic regulation. The Bell Journal of Economics  
and Management Science 2(1), 3–21  
 
Stiglitz, JE (2003). Dealing with debt: how to reform the global financial system.  
Harvard International Review 25(1), 54–59 
 
The London Working Party (unpublished).  Prudential Supervision of Insurance  
Undertakings. Conference of Insurance Supervisory Services of the Member 
States of the European Union, 2002 
 
Thomson, RJ (1996). Stochastic investment modelling: the case of South Africa. British 
Actuarial Journal 2, 765–802 
 201 
APPENDIX A 
MODEL-OFFICE PROJECTION 
 
A.1  Description of Method 
 
In this appendix, the balance sheet, the income statement, CAR and other 
information are determined by an illustrative model-office projection.  The 
output of the model-office projection for these items is monthly for a ten-year 
period.  The model-office projection is made by projecting a single policy 
deterministically for a new long-term insurer with no other insurance business.  
New business volume is included for each month of the ten-year term.  Each 
new business policy is assumed to have the same expected outcome as the 
projected single policy. 
 
Policyholder liabilities and CAR are set according to the requirements of the 
LTIA, BN 72 and PGN 104.  The model includes the option to set policyholder 
liabilities to zero if they are negative.  For each cohort of policies this is 
achieved by a check at each projection period. 
 
An asset portfolio is specified for the policyholder liabilities and the remainder 
of assets that cover the CAR and shareholder assets. 
 
Although the projection is done monthly, the annual results are presented in the 
main text. 
 
Dividends are paid at the end of each year according to the set dividend policy. 
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A.2  The Policy Projection Model 
 
The policy projection model determines the expected cashflow, investment 
return on the policyholder liabilities and profit per month.  It is assumed that all 
cashflows are incurred at the end of the month.  Let   be the expected profit at 
duration t.  Then: 
 
                      (A1)  
 
where 
    denotes the expected premium at duration t; 
    denotes the expected investment return on assets covering 
policyholder liabilities; 
    denotes the expected expenses at duration t; 
    denotes the expected claims at duration t; and 
     denotes the expected change in policyholder liabilities at 
duration t. 
 
A.2.1 Expected cashflow 
  
The expected cashflow components are determined by: 
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where: 
P   denotes the contractual premium; 
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   denotes the curtate duration in years for duration t; 
         denotes the proportion of survivors aged     at 
duration t; 
    denotes the renewal expense per month at inception; 
 ( )   denotes the monthly renewal-expense inflation rate; 
    denotes the initial expense; 
    denotes the sum assured; 
(  )     
( )
 denotes the dependent monthly mortality rate for a life 
aged     at duration t;  
 ( )   denotes the monthly effective investment return; and 
     denotes the policyholder liabilities at duration t. 
 
A.2.2 Best-estimate survivor probabilities 
  
The survivor probabilities for the expected cashflow are determined by: 
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where: 
      
( )
  denotes the independent monthly mortality rate for a life 
aged     at duration t; 
        denotes the independent annual mortality rate for a life 
aged     at duration t; 
 204 
(  ) 
( )
 denotes the dependent monthly withdrawal rate at 
duration t; and 
  
( )
 denotes the independent monthly withdrawal rate at 
duration t. 
 
A.2.3 Investment return on reserves 
 
The monthly investment return is determined by: 
 
    (   )
 
    ; (A12)  
 
 
where: 
 
   denotes the yearly effective valuation discount rate of interest. 
 
  is determined by the equation 
 
                      ; (A13)  
 
where: 
 
 ∑      ;  (A14)  
 
 
and 
    is the expected yearly effective return of cash; 
   is the expected yearly effective return of gilts; 
   is the expected yearly effective return of equities;  
   is the expected yearly effective return of property; 
 
   is the proportion of policyholder assets invested in cash; 
   is the proportion of policyholder assets invested in gilts; 
   is the proportion of policyholder assets invested in equities; and 
   is the proportion of policyholder assets invested in property. 
 
The expected investment return on reserves is then determined by: 
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            (A15)  
 
 
A.2.4 Expected change in policyholder liabilities 
 
The expected change in reserve (or policyholder liability) is the change in the 
expected regulatory or FSV reserve.  The FSV requires compulsory margins to 
increase the reserve.  These compulsory margins are expected to be realised as 
future profit.  The change in reserve is calculated as follows: 
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where at duration t: 
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   denotes the lapse reserve indicator; 
   
   denotes the FSV lapse reserve; 
   
   denotes the FSV expense reserve; 
   
   denotes the FSV claim reserve; 
   
   denotes the FSV premium reserve; 
    denotes the scaling factor that removes compulsory mortality 
margins; 
    denotes the scaling factor that removes compulsory mortality, 
expense and inflation margins; 
  
   denotes the FSV effective discount rate per month; 
    denotes the compulsory expense margin;  
    denotes the compulsory investment-return margin; and 
    denotes the compulsory inflation margin. 
 
The scaling factors, denoted by    and   , are necessary to remove the 
compulsory margins up to duration t.   is used to allow or eliminate negative 
reserves. 
 
A.2.5 FSV survivor probabilities 
 
The survivor probabilities and investment return for the expected FSV reserve 
are determined by: 
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( )    
( )
(    ); (A31)  
 
 
 
where: 
 
      
  denotes the proportion of FSV survivors for lives aged 
      at duration t; 
(  )     
( )   denotes the monthly FSV dependent mortality rate for a 
life aged     at duration t; 
      
( )   denotes the annual FSV dependent mortality rate for a life 
aged     at duration t; 
(  ) 
( )  denotes the monthly dependent FSV withdrawal rate at 
duration t; 
  
( )  denotes the monthly independent FSV withdrawal rate at 
duration t; 
    denotes the compulsory mortality margin; 
    denotes the compulsory withdrawal margin. 
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A.3  The Policy Projection Assumptions 
 
A.3.1  General assumptions 
 
Negative reserves are allowed by an indicator: 
 
  {
  if negative reserves are eliminated  
  if negative reserves are allowed        
 
 
The model point is based on a life aged   where the assumed age is: 
 
     . 
 
A.3.2  Economic assumptions 
 
The valuation rate of interest is derived from the expected return on the 
underlying policyholder assets.  For fixed interest the rate is always assumed to 
be risk-free. PGN 104 requires the rate on fixed interest to be reduced for credit 
risk.  It is assumed that the liquidity risk premium is zero and that there are no 
other spreads between corporate and government bonds. 
 
The valuation discount rate, i, and the monthly inflation rate,   ( ), are set as: 
 
  = 0,078; and 
 ( ) = 0,004 074.  
 
The yearly inflation rate is assumed to be 0,05 and i is calculated with equation 
(A13). 
 
Let    be the risk-free rate of return per year. The following assumptions are 
used to derive expected returns on asset classes: 
 
        ; 
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           ; 
        
             and 
           . 
 
The risk-discount rate is determined by: 
          . 
 
A.3.3 Cashflow assumptions 
 
The cashflow inputs are: 
 
  = 100 000; 
  = 400; and 
  = 10. 
 
P was determined by formula with the assumptions above and a profit loading 
of 30%.  The result is: 
 
  = 109,80. 
 
A.3.4  Survivorship assumptions 
 
For the mortality assumptions:  
 
 x+s is from the mortality table SA85-95 Assured Lives Ultimate; and 
      . 
 
The withdrawal probabilities per month are: 
 
      ; 
       ; 
       ;  
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{
 
 
               [   ]        
              [    ]        
            [     ]    
            [    )         
 
 
A.3.5 Compulsory margins 
 
The required compulsory margins are: 
 
   = 0,075; 
   = 0,1; 
   = 0,002 5; 
   = 0,1; and 
   = 0,1. 
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A.4  Projection of the Portfolio 
 
A.4.1 The model 
 
The monthly portfolio output, which is based on new business sales per month, 
can be obtained by multiplying the matrix of expected cashflows, reserves and 
profit P5×120 by a matrix representing the volume of new business sales V120×120.   
 
Let   be the new business growth in year s and: 
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The portfolio output per month represented by the matrix A120×120 is then: 
 
A= PV 
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where: 
     ; and (A36)  
 
        (    )
   
        . (A37)  
 
 
The initial cost   and the first month’s renewal expenses   are incurred in the 
same month.     is included in    to simplify the calculation so that: 
 
     (     
( ))           (A38)  
 
 
Alternatively,   could be included as a separate row in the matrix without 
adjusting the formula for   . 
 
For each column j in A an entry denotes the expected income statement item at 
duration j. 
 
The matrix approach could easily be extended to include other entries such as 
the value of in-force by including extra rows in P. 
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A.4.2 New-business volume 
 
New-business volume assumptions are: 
 
     ; 
         
        
      
        
      
      ; and 
             . 
 
A.4.3  Assets 
 
Shareholder assets are augmented each month by the net cashflow from the 
insurance portfolio and investment return.  On the other hand, the shareholder 
assets are reduced by dividend payments and transfers to policyholder reserves.  
Policyholder assets are equal to the policyholder liabilities at all times.  The 
value of assets is equal to the value of shareholder assets and the value of 
policyholder assets. 
 
Shareholder assets are not necessarily invested in the same asset classes as 
policyholder assets.  The shareholder assets are calculated by: 
 
      
      
       
  (A39)  
 
where: 
  
  is the expected value of shareholder assets at t; 
  
  is the expected investment return of shareholder assets from   to 
   ; 
   is the expected profit from policyholders at duration t; and 
   is the expected dividend payment to shareholders at duration t. 
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A.4.4  Asset assumptions 
 
    is the start-up capital and assumed to be 10 000 000.  Income from an asset 
class is assumed to be in cash and capital growth is not realised.  Transfers to 
reserves are in the asset mix that covers the reserves, i.e.   ,   ,    and   .  
Dividend payments to shareholders are assumed to be cash. 
 
The assumptions for the yearly income yields for each asset class are shown in 
Table A.1: 
 
Table A.1. Yearly income yields 
Asset class Yield 
Equity 0.035 
Property  0.04 
Gilts 0.08 
Cash 0.06 
 
Capital growth rates are determined by: 
 
 
   
     
(    )
 (A40)  
 
where: 
   is the yearly expected total return; and 
    denotes the expected income yield. 
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A.5  Capital Adequacy Requirement 
 
A.5.1 Method 
 
The CAR is calculated according to the LTIA, BN 72 and PGN 104.  MCAR is 
excluded to illustrate the development of the CAR cover determined on the 
prescribed risk-based formula.  However, dividend payments are limited so that 
the shareholder assets are at least equal to MCAR.  The CAR is calculated at the 
end of each financial year.  
 
A.5.2 The CAR model 
 
The basic formula 
 
The CAR is calculated by: 
 
        (   
    
 )  (A41)  
 
where: 
  is the projection year; 
  
  denotes the TCAR at the end of projection year r; and 
  
  denotes the OCAR at the end of projection year r. 
Also: 
   
      (    ); and (A42)  
 
 
 
  
  
  
 
    
  (A43)  
 
where:  
  
  denotes the intermediate ordinary capital adequacy requirement 
(IOCAR); and 
   denotes the prescribed gross-up factor for projection year  . 
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        (A44)  
 
where, at the end of projection year r: 
     denotes the lapse-risk component; 
     denotes the mortality-risk component; 
     denotes the mortality-assumption-risk component; 
     denotes the expense-fluctuation-risk component; 
     denotes the investment-risk component; 
     denotes the credit-risk component; and 
     denotes the operational-risk component. 
 
 
The components 
 
The Components of   
  are: 
 
           
 ; (A45)  
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    (A46)  
 
where: 
   is the annual risk premium for projection year r; and 
   is the number of lives during projection year r; 
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           ; and (A48)  
 
to determine     
  let: 
 
      ; (A49)  
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where: 
   is the value of assets at r; and 
   is the value of policyholder liabilities determined according to PGN 
104 at r. 
 
In PGN 104 it is assumed that there are reductions in asset values of: 
 
 30% for equities; 
 15% for property; and 
 0% for cash. 
 
For bonds, it is assumed that there is a 25% reduction in the yield to maturity.  
Determine the values of the assets,   
 , and liabilities,   
 , after the prescribed 
reduction in asset values. 
 
 
 
    
     (  
    
   ) 
 
(A50)  
To determine     
  it is assumed that equation (A49) holds.  Determine the 
values of the assets,   
  , and liabilities,   
  , by reducing the expected future 
income of all asset classed by 15%. 
 
 
 
    
     (  
     
    ) 
 
(A51)  
 
 
To determine    consider the assets which cover the CAR amount.  The same 
reduction factors as for the resilience test are applied to these assets.  The value 
of the debt is reduced by the factors in Table A.2. 
 
Let      denotes the proportionate reduction at the end of projection year r of the 
assets that cover the CAR amount after applying the prescribed factors.  Then: 
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      ∑     
     
 
 ; (A52)  
 
 
where: 
    
  denotes the proportion of asset class i at the end of r that covers 
CAR; and 
    
 denotes the reduction factor at the end of r after the application of 
the resilience-test rules. 
 
Let      denotes the proportionate reduction of the CAR amount at the end of 
projection year r due to the credit risk. Then: 
 
      ∑     
     
 
 ; (A53)  
 
where: 
    
 denotes the reduction factor at the end of r after the application of 
the credit-risk rules. 
 
Note that: 
     
   ; (A54)  
 
for instruments other than debt securities. 
 
 
   √{(      )  
 
 
(      )}
 
 
 
 
(      )
 
 
 
 
 
     is determined by multiplying the appropriate percentages in Table A.2 by 
the values of cash and gilts in each category.  The credit–rating percentages are 
prescribed in PGN 104 and are shown in Table A.2. 
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Table A.2. Credit-rating probabilities 
Credit rating or issuer  
Government 0% 
AAA 1% 
AA 1% 
A 4.1% 
BBB 5% 
BB 13.6% 
B 22.4% 
CCC 44.8% 
 
The probabilities for instruments with outstanding terms less than 12 months are 
reduced by applying the factor of 25%. 
 
Table A.3 shows the assumed percentage holdings in gilts and cash, with the 
short-term reduction factor. 
 
Table A.3. Investment grade mix 
Rating or issuer Gilts Cash 
Government 20% 0% 
AAA 40% 50% 
AA 40% 25% 
A 0% 25% 
BBB 0% 0% 
BB 0% 0% 
B 0% 0% 
CCC 0% 0% 
Total 100% 100% 
Short-term reduction factor 100% 25% 
 
 
Operational risk component is calculated by the formula: 
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                (A55)  
A.6  Dividend Policy 
 
CAR cover is defined as the shareholder assets divided by the CAR.  The 
dividend policy is defined in terms of the CAR cover and initial share capital.  
The dividend payable at the end of each projection year   is set so that the share 
capital after the dividend is paid is not less than the initial capital or below the 
targeted CAR cover.   The LTIA requires a minimum CAR cover of 1, which 
was used as the targeted CAR cover. 
 
To meet the minimum CAR requirement consistent with the minimum monetary 
amount specified in the FSB’s BN 72, initial shareholder capital is set at  
10 000 000. 
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APPENDIX B 
ACTS DIRECTLY AFFECTING LONG-TERM INSURERS 
 
ACT 
 
Companies Act (Act 61 of 1973) 
Financial Services Board Act (Act 97 of 1990) 
Pension Funds Act, 24 (Act 24 of 1956) 
Friendly Societies Act (Act 25 of 1956) 
Financial Intelligence Centre Act (Act no. 38 of 2001) 
Financial Institutions (Protection of Funds) Act (Act 28 of 2001) 
Financial Supervision of the Road Accident Fund Act (Act 8 of 1993) 
Supervision of the Financial Institutions Rationalisation Act (Act 32 of 1996) 
Long-term Insurance Act (Act 52 of 1998) 
Inspection of Financial Institutions Act (Act 80 of 1998) 
Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services Act (Act 37 of 2002)  
Collective Investment Schemes Control Act (Act 45 of 2002)  
The Securities Services Act (Act 36 of 2004)  
Income Tax Act (Act 58 of 1962) 
Value Added Tax (Act 89 of 1991) 
National Credit Act (Act 34 of 2005) 
Tax on Retirement Funds Act (Act 38 of 1996) 
Exchange Control Amnesty and Amendment of Taxation Laws Act( Act 12 of 2003) 
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APPENDIX C 
STOCHASTIC MODEL AND ASSUMPTIONS 
 
To determine the solvency capital required for the term-assurance portfolio, a 
stochastic model was developed.  At the end of each financial year the expected 
surplus is projected for one year on a going concern basis.  For the economic 
variables a multi-state model is used and the term structure of interest rates is 
introduced.  Policyholder behaviour and new business profit margins are 
assumed to be dependent on the state of the economic variables.  For mortality 
the effect of pandemics is introduced.  The base assumptions described earlier 
remain the same. Each of the main items of the model is described below. 
 
C.1 Economic Model and Assumptions 
 
For the economic variables Maitland’s (2010) multiple-Markov-regime-
switching model is used.  Equity returns, long and short-term interest rates and 
inflation are derived from the basic equation: 
 
                  (C1)  
 
where    denotes the state of the economic variable at time t.  The time unit t is 
measured in quarter years and the error term    is normally distributed. 
 
For each economic variable there are two states.  Table C.1 shows the parameter 
values for each of these states and Table C.2 shows the correlation matrix. 
 
Table C.1. Parameters for quarterly rates 
  Inflation 
Short-term interest 
rate Long-term interest rate Equity return 
S 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 
c 0.0299 0.0944 0.0072 0.0234 0.0129 0.0214 -0.0333 0.01404 
 0.2415 0.2415 0.8659 0.8659 0.8523 0.8523 0 0 
 0.032995 0.032995 0.005074 0.015466 0.004082 0.008319 0.62057 0.30581 
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Table C.2. Correlation matrix 
  Inflation 
Short-term 
interest rate 
Long-term 
interest rate Equity return 
Inflation 1 0.147 0.211 0.064 
Short-term interest rate 0.147 1 0.179 -0.157 
Long-term interest rate 0.211 0.179 1 -0.082 
Equity return 0.064 -0.157 -0.082 1 
 
Since there are four economic variables and two states for each state there is a 
total of 16 possible economic states.  The 16 states and the transition 
probabilities from each state to another are shown in Tables C.3 and C.4. 
 
Table C.3. Economic states 
State Inflation 
Short-term 
interest rate 
Long-term 
interest rate 
Equity 
return 
1 1 1 1 1 
2 1 1 1 2 
3 1 1 2 1 
4 1 1 2 2 
5 1 2 1 1 
6 1 2 1 2 
7 1 2 2 1 
8 1 2 2 2 
9 2 1 1 1 
10 2 1 1 2 
11 2 1 2 1 
12 2 1 2 2 
13 2 2 1 1 
14 2 2 1 2 
15 2 2 2 1 
16 2 2 2 2 
 
For the transition probabilities the columns in Table C.4 below show the current 
state of the economic variables and the rows show the next state.  The 
probability in a cell therefore shows the probability of moving from the current 
state (column number) to the next state (row number). 
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Table C.4. Transition probabilities 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
1 0.76  0.07  0.02  0.00  0.26  0.04  0.00  0.00  0.04  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.00  
2 0.21  0.92  0.01  0.03  0.12  0.37  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  
3 0.00  0.00  0.66  0.17  0.00  0.00  0.08  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  
4 0.00  0.00  0.12  0.73  0.00  0.00  0.02  0.05  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  
5 0.01  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.44  0.14  0.03  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.03  0.01  0.00  0.00  
6 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.08  0.36  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.00  
7 0.00  0.00  0.13  0.02  0.04  0.01  0.60  0.12  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.03  0.00  
8 0.00  0.00  0.01  0.03  0.00  0.03  0.10  0.79  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.03  
9 0.01  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.66  0.12  0.00  0.00  0.06  0.02  0.00  0.00  
10 0.01  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.14  0.82  0.00  0.00  0.02  0.17  0.00  0.00  
11 0.00  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.10  0.01  0.57  0.13  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.00  
12 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.12  0.77  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.07  
13 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.05  0.03  0.00  0.00  0.05  0.02  0.00  0.00  0.78  0.33  0.03  0.00  
14 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.02  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.02  0.00  0.00  0.09  0.46  0.00  0.00  
15 0.00  0.00  0.04  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.16  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.26  0.03  0.01  0.00  0.75  0.09  
16 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.02  0.00  0.00  0.04  0.06  0.00  0.00  0.17  0.81  
 
From the end of a financial year, the expected yield curve in one year’s time is 
determined by the Cox-Ingersoll-Ross (CIR) model with input from Maitland’s 
(2010) model.  The CIR models the change in continuous interest rates by: 
 
      (   )   √   √   (C2)  
 
where 
       is the pull-back factor; and 
  is the long-term equilibrium rate from Maitland’s (2010) model. 
 
To determine the yield curve deterministic short-term interest rates are used as 
an approximation by modelling r daily. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
C.2 Mortality 
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The potential effect of pandemics was introduced by a loading to mortality rates 
in the event of a pandemic.  The IAA
163
 used an illustrative probability of 7.8% 
for the probability that one occurs in a year.  This probability and a loading to 
the base mortality rates of 25% in the event of a pandemic are used. 
 
C.3 Policyholder Behaviour 
 
Policyholder behaviour is assumed to be dependent on the state of the economy.  
This behaviour is reflected in the lapse rates. Three economic scenarios are 
assumed for lapses, namely ‘good’, ‘bad’ and ‘extremely bad’ scenarios.  The 
classification of the scenarios and the loadings to the base lapse rates are given 
in Table C.5. 
 
Table C.5. Lapse loadings 
State Classification Loading 
1 Bad 0.5 
2 Good 0 
3 Bad 0.5 
4 Good 0 
5 Bad 0.5 
6 Good 0 
7 Bad 0.5 
8 Good 0 
9 Extremely bad 1 
10 Bad 0.5 
11 Extremely bad 1 
12 Bad 0.5 
13 Extremely bad 1 
14 Bad 0.5 
15 Extremely bad 1 
16 Bad 0.5 
 
 
 
C.4 New-business Margin 
                                                          
163
 International Actuarial Association, Stochastic Modeling: theory and reality from an actuarial 
perspective, 2010 
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The profit margins are assumed to be dependent on two economic scenarios, 
namely ‘good’ and ‘not good’.  For the ‘good’ scenario it is assumed that 
competition through new entrants is fiercer and as a result the profit margin may 
vary uniformly between 20% and 30%.  For the ‘not-good’ scenario margins are 
maintained between 25% and 30%.  
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APPENDIX D 
THE FSB’S QUESTIONNAIRE ON STATUTORY ACTUARIES, 2007 
 
Questionnaire regarding information on Statutory Actuaries 
 
Definition: 
“Statutory Actuary” means an actuary appointed or recognised by the regulator, with 
certain duties as prescribed in the Act and other sub-regulation governing life insurance 
(similar to the previous UK Appointed Actuary). 
 
In the questions below, where we use the term “Statutory Actuary”, please interpret this 
to be the equivalent role(s) as in your jurisdiction. 
 
Questions: 
1. Role of a Statutory Actuary 
1.1 Please provide a brief description of the role of the Statutory Actuary as defined in 
your legislation pertaining to the regulation of life (long-term) insurers in your 
jurisdiction. (If the role is split into more than one role, please provide a brief 
description of each role.) 
1.2 Please list the responsibilities (and scope thereof) of the Statutory Actuary. If the 
role is split into more than one role, please list the responsibilities of each role 
separately. 
1.3 Please provide the name of the body responsible for providing guidance on the 
scope and specifics of the technical work provided by the Statutory Actuary (if different 
to the regulator) and if possible, the guidance/regulations specifying the work to be 
performed, and what powers of oversight this body has over the actuary. 
1.4 If you follow a risk-based regulatory framework, please list the risks you are 
expecting the work of the Statutory Actuary to cover, and briefly which aspect of the 
scope covers these risks: 
- Underwriting risk (including pricing and valuation estimation risk) 
- Market/interest rate risk 
- Credit risk 
 228 
- Operational risk 
- Concentration/group risk 
- Liquidity risk 
- Market conduct risk. 
- Any other risk(s) not stated above 
1.5 Who is responsible for the valuation assumptions used and the accuracy of 
the results of the valuation? 
1.6 Who is responsible for risk management of the insurer? 
 
2. Approval of a Statutory Actuary 
In your jurisdiction: 
2.1 What criteria need to be met for a person to be approved as a Statutory Actuary? 
2.2 What is the process that needs to be followed by a person wanting to be approved as 
a Statutory Actuary? 
2.3 How long does a person maintain his/her status as a Statutory Actuary? 
2.4 Are there any other factors that could lead to a person losing his/her status as a 
Statutory Actuary? 
2.5 What powers do you have to interrogate the work performed by a Statutory Actuary 
or to censure/discipline the Statutory Actuary? 
2.6 What powers do you have and on what grounds will you remove a Statutory 
Actuary? 
 
3. Relationship of the Statutory Actuary with the Insurer 
In your jurisdiction: 
3.1 Is the Statutory Actuary allowed to be an employee of the insurer for whom he/she 
signs off as Statutory Actuary? 
3.1.1 If so, is the Statutory Actuary allowed to hold any shares or share options in either 
the insurer directly or any other related party (e.g. holding company, subsidiary, etc.) 
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3.1.2 If so, when is the size of the shares or share options deemed to be 
material/significant, such as to cause a possible conflict of interest? 
3.2 Is the Statutory Actuary allowed to fulfil another senior role in the insurer, e.g. 
Chief Financial Officer, Chief Executive Officer, etc? 
3.2.1 If yes, are there certain roles that a Statutory Actuary is not allowed to fulfil? 
3.3 Is the Statutory Actuary allowed to be a director of the insurer or any of the related 
parties in the same group? 
3.4 Are there any other limitations regarding the relationship of the Statutory Actuary 
with the insurer? 
 
4. Reporting Structure 
4.1 Who does the Statutory Actuary report to? 
4.2 What is the relationship between the Statutory Actuary and the Board of the 
company for which s/he is doing work? More particularly, is s/he expected to attend 
Board meetings, allowed to attend Board meetings, entitled to see minutes and other 
documents from Board meetings, etc? 
4.3 Is there a difference in treatment between an in-house actuary and a consulting 
actuary in terms of reporting structure? For example, if an external consulting actuary is 
appointed as a Statutory Actuary, to whom would s/he be accountable within the 
insurer? What access would s/he have to the Board, attendance at Board meetings, 
minutes of Board meetings, etc? 
4.4 Are other mandatory governance structures required by law, e.g. an Actuarial Board 
Committee in addition to the Audit Committee? 
 
5. Peer Review 
5.1 Is there any mandatory peer review of the Statutory Actuary’s work? If so, please 
give brief details regarding the requirements of the peer review (e.g. frequency, scope, 
etc.) 
 230 
5.2 Is there any guidance provided around the scope and conduct of voluntary non-
mandatory peer review of the Statutory Actuary’s work? If so, please give brief details 
regarding the requirements of the peer review (e.g. frequency, scope, etc.) 
5.3 What is the scope of the audit requirements in your jurisdiction with respect to the 
actuarial valuation? What is the nature of the sign-off provided by the auditors with 
respect to the actuarial valuation and the results of the valuation? 
 
6. Conflict resolution 
6.1 What process would be recommended to be followed, should the Statutory Actuary 
find him/herself in a conflict (whether s/he is an employee or an independent 
consultant), relating to any of the following (inter alia) : 
6.1.1 Setting actuarial assumptions for a valuation. 
6.1.2 Disagreements with the Board of Directors or Board Actuarial Committee which 
relate to matters under his / her ambit. 
 
7. Other 
7.1 Is there any other information regarding statutory actuaries in your jurisdiction that 
you feel might be of value to us? 
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APPENDIX E 
SUMMARY RESULTS OF APPROACH TO STATUTORY ACTUARIES 
 
Country Australia Canada Netherlands Singapore 
South 
Africa 
UK USA 
  
 
Information from questionnaire or supplementary information 
Supervisory 
authority 
APRA OSFI DNB MAS FSB FSA NAIC 
Legislation Life 
Insurance 
Act, 1995 
Uniform 
Life 
Insurance 
Act, 1925 
Financial 
Supervision 
Act and EU 
Directives 
The 
insurance 
Act, 1966 
LTIA Financial 
Services and 
Markets Act, 
2000 
Federal 
and state 
regulation 
Professional body Institute of 
Actuaries 
Australia 
Canadian 
Institute of 
Actuaries 
Dutch 
Actuarial 
Association 
Singapore 
Actuarial 
Society 
Actuarial 
Society of 
South 
Africa 
Faculty of 
Actuaries 
and Institute 
of Actuaries 
American 
Academy 
of 
Actuaries 
and the 
Society of 
Actuaries 
Is guidance 
provided? 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Term for ‘statutory 
actuary’ 
Appointed 
Actuary 
Appointed 
Actuary 
Certifying 
Actuary 
Appointed 
Actuary 
Statutory 
Actuary 
Actuarial 
Function 
Holder(s) 
Appointed 
Actuary 
Appointed term of 
‘statutory actuary’ 
No specific 
term 
No specific 
term 
No specific 
term 
No specific 
term 
No 
specific 
term 
No specific 
term 
No specific 
term 
          
Item Who is responsible? 
Valuation 
assumptions 
Appointed 
Actuary 
Appointed 
Actuary 
Board of 
Directors 
Appointed 
Actuary 
Statutory 
Actuary 
Board of 
directors 
Based on 
rules set by 
NAIC 
Valuation result of 
liabilities 
Appointed 
Actuary 
Appointed 
Actuary 
Board of 
Directors 
Appointed 
Actuary 
Statutory 
Actuary 
Actuarial 
Function 
Holder(s) 
Board of 
Directors 
Premium adequacy Appointed 
Actuary 
Appointed 
Actuary 
Board of 
Directors 
Appointed 
Actuary 
Statutory 
Actuary 
Board of 
Directors 
Board of 
Directors 
Reinsurance Board of 
Directors 
Appointed 
Actuary 
Board of 
Directors 
Board of 
Directors 
Board of 
Directors 
Board of 
Directors 
Board of 
Directors 
With-profits 
discretion 
Appointed 
Actuary 
Appointed 
Actuary 
Board of 
Directors 
Appointed 
Actuary 
Statutory 
Actuary 
With-profits 
Actuary 
Board of 
Directors 
Risk management Board of 
Directors 
Board of 
Directors 
Board of 
Directors 
Board of 
Directors 
 Board of 
Directors 
Board of 
Directors 
Board of 
Directors 
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Country Australia Canada Netherlands Singapore 
South 
Africa 
UK USA 
 
 
 Information from questionnaire or supplementary information 
Who does the 
responsible actuary 
report to? 
Board of 
Directors 
Board of 
Directors 
Board of 
Directors and 
DNB 
Public 
Officer 
Board of 
Directors 
Board of 
Directors 
Board of 
Directors 
Is a written report of 
the financial 
position required to 
the board of 
directors required? 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Does the responsible 
actuary have a 
‘whistle blowing 
duty’ to the 
regulator? 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
          
Position Is the responsible actuary allowed to be in the position? 
Shareholder Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
CEO No No No No No No Yes 
Director No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Employee Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
          
Review The work of the statutory actuary 
Is peer review a 
requirement? 
No Yes No No No No No 
Does peer review 
guidance exist? 
Yes Yes No No No Yes No 
Is an audit review 
required? 
Yes Yes Yes No  No Yes Yes 
          
Conflict resolution        
What is the 
regulatory required 
action for 
unresolved conflict? 
Notify 
regulator 
Notify 
regulator 
None None Notify 
regulator 
Notify 
regulator 
Notify 
regulator 
Does regulatory or 
professional 
guidance exist? 
Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Acronyms 
APRA   –  Australian Prudential Regulation Authority 
OSFI   –  Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions 
DNB   –  De Nederlandsche Bank 
MAS   –  Monetary Authority of Singapore 
FSB   – Financial Services Board 
FSA   –  Financial Services Authority 
NAIC   –  National Association of Insurance Commissioner 
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SUMMARY OF ACRONYMS 
 
ACRONYM TERM 
AAA American Academy of Actuaries 
ABI Association of British Insurers 
ANAV Adjusted Net Asset Value 
APB Accounting Practices Board 
ASISA Association for Savings and Investment SA 
BN Board Notice 
BSCR Basic Solvency Capital Requirement 
CAR Capital Adequacy Requirement 
CAT Fair Charges, Access and Terms 
CEA Comité Européen des Assurances 
CEIOPS The Committee of European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Supervisors  
CEISS Conference of European Insurance Supervisory Services 
CIR Cox-Ingersoll-Ross 
CISA Conference of the Insurance Supervisory Authorities of the European Union Countries 
COCAA Cost-of-capital-adjustment Approach 
CPD Continuous Professional Development 
CRO Companies Registration Office 
CRVM Commissioners Reserve Valuation Method 
DNB De Nederlansche Bank 
EC European Commission 
EEA European Economic Area 
EIOPA European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority 
ES Expected Shortfall 
EU European Union 
EVCC Embedded-value CAR Cover 
FOPI Federal Office of Private Insurance 
FSA Financial Services Authority 
FSB Financial Services Board 
FSC Financial Sector Charter 
FSMA Financial Services and Markets Act, 2000  
FSV Financial Soundness Valuation 
FTK Financieel Toetsingskader 
GAAP Statements of General Accepted Accounting Practices 
GF Guaranteed Fund 
GRAP General Recommended Accounting Practices 
IAA International Actuarial Association 
IAIS International Association of Insurance Supervisors 
IAS International Accounting Standards 
IASB International Accounting Standards Board 
IASC International Accounting Standards Committee 
ICA Individual Capital Assessment 
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IFRS International Financial Reporting Standards 
IOCAR Intermediate Ordinary Capital Adequacy Requirement 
IRDA Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority 
ISA Insurance Supervisory Act, 2004 
JSE JSE Securities Exchange 
LOA Life Offices Association 
LTIA Long Term Insurance Act, 1998 
MCAR Minimum Capital Adequacy Requirement 
MCR Minimum Capital Requirement 
MVM Market-value Margin 
NAIC National Association of Insurance Commissioners 
NCA National Credit Act, 2005 
NCR National Credit Regulator 
Nedlac National Economic Development and Labour Council 
OCAR Ordinary Capital Adequacy Requirement 
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
PGNs Professional Guidance Notes 
PPFM Principles and Practices of Financial Management 
PPR Policyholder Protection Rules 
PSG IAIS Principles, Standards and Guidance 
PVK Pensioen- & Verzekeringskamer 
RC Risk-bearing Capital 
RBC Risk-based Capital 
RSM Required Solvency Margin 
SAICA South African Institute of Chartered Accountants 
SAM Solvency Assessment and Management 
SCR Solvency Capital Requirement 
SENS Security Exchange News Service 
SM Solvency Margin 
SOI Statement of Intent 
SST Swiss Solvency Test 
SVM Statutory Valuation Method 
TC Target Capital 
TCAR Termination Capital Adequacy Requirement 
UK United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 
USA United States of America 
 
 
